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Abstract. 
This thesis investigates empirically the realist argument that the 
United States arms transfers produced political influence on Saudi 
Arabia's foreign policy behaviour between 1973 and 1983. Within six 
chapters I set out the conditions and interaction of certain 
variables which map the contours implied in my title. 
In my Introduction I set out the aims, purposes and sources of the 
thesis. Against realism as purely a power model, I provide a reading 
of politics adequate to reality entailing flexibility of 
understanding and judgment by decision-makers. 
Chapter One applies the model to foreign-policy analysis. Turning to 
influence, I argue that it is as much a pattern of historical 
relations between states as a pattern of synchronic inter-state 
relations. The arms/influence problem is determined within a 
national-interest centred concept of foreign policy. 
Chapter Two brings us to the main empirical material. Here I examine 
four dimensions of the arms transfer process from the supply side, 
(i) motives, (ii) legal instruments, (iii) the due process involved 
in pre-1973, (iv) the nature of the historical relationship between 
the United States and Saudi Arabia pre-1973. Chapter Three performs 
a similar analysis, but for the post-1973 period. The three arms 
sales are introduced. 
Chapters Two and Three concentrate on the supply side, Chapters Four 
and Five take also into account the demand side. I review the 
historical development of Saudi security policy in terms of internal 
and regional problems. The last section details the military and 
strategical impact of the three major arms deals on Saudi security. 
Chapter Five relates the supply side to the demand side, showing that 
despite the three major arms deals, Saudi Arabia has not co-operated 
automatically with US expectations. This lack of cooperation shows 
the basic incoherence in the US arms policy, especially in the Reagan 
era. This incoherence is not so much between Executive and 
Legislature, as the executive's belief in a direct relation of arms 
to influence, even though there is no adequate correlation. 
The conclusion argues that the 'crude realism' of the US executive -
arms procures influence directly - has to be more flexible in 
US/Saudi Arabian arms relations. The US decision-makers need a 
greater flexibility of approach and understanding, and a more 
sophisticated grasp of the Saudi Arabian/US arms relation. 
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(1) 
INTRODUCTION 
"I hereby find that the defense of Saudi 
Arabia is vital to the defense of the 
United States. II 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
18 February 1943 
liThe sale of AWACs and other air defense 
equipment to Saudi Arabia would make a 
substantial contribution to the national 
security interests of the United States 
in a vital part of the world." 
President Rona~d Reagan 
5 October 1981 
(2) 
This is an empirical thesis. I do not exclude conceptual 
analysis but, for the most part, subordinate it to my explication of 
the Saudi Arabia/United States relationship. The primary focus is the 
relationship of arms and influence between the two countries. 
The connection of arms and influence is a familiar one in 
International Relations literature and indeed is clearly stated in 
the bald title of the book by Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence. 
This too involves extensive historical analysis rather than game 
theory for which he is better known. 
The suggestion of an 'arms/influence' relation implies the 
expectation that one can intuitively grasp the meanings of this 
relation. It ought to seem 'obvious' that a supplier who sells 
something regarded as relatively scarce, yet an important form of 
security such as arms, will produce influence upon a recipient. 
However, one needs more clarification on the arms/influence 
relationship, and the first chapter in particular will attempt to 
pick out some of the analytical features of making an arms transfer 
and the production of certain forms of influence. However, the 
thrust of the thesis will concern itself with illuminating foreign 
relations between the two states; it will not concern itself 
primarily with arguments about the theory of arms/influence. 
Before I consider conceptual preliminaries as a way into the 
main theme of the thesis, I will offer a brief historical note on the 
background to the U.S. arms transfer to Saudi Arabia. 
(3) 
1. United States/Saudi Arabia Arms Transfers Relationship: 
A Brief Background 
Arms transfers has been a controversial issue in many Western 
states. Since World War II there have been various organisations set 
up to oppose it, not least Campaign Against the Arms Trade (CAAT) and 
better known ones such as Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), 
concentrating on nuclear weapons. However, opposition to it has a 
history going back at least as far as the era of World War I when 
people thought that government control of the arms trade would 
promote peace. World War II demonstrated that this was not the case, 
and subsequent events, not least the escalating antagonism of the 
United States and the Soviet Union in the fifties (the Cold War), 
which continues to the present day, has shown how important the 
acquisition of arms is. Not only this, but the economic, 
ideological, strategical and diplomatic struggle of the two 
superpowers to gain influence and create allies, other than with 
their natural allies (for U.S. e.g. Britain/NATO countries, and for 
U.S.S.R., Eastern bloc) has brought about various forms of trade with 
many other countries. Perhaps the most conspicuous form of trade is 
arms, and for my purposes I look at this form of trade between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia. 
The background of the United States/Saudi Arabia arms trade has 
been inextricably bound to American oil interests whether in the form 
of the Arabian American Oil Company's (ARAMCO) exploitation of Saudi 
oil fields in the 1930s, or U.S. government oil negotiations in the 
troubled period of the 1970s and early 1980s. However, I must 
presume a Saudi need for arms in the first place, and I show in 
Chapter Four the Saudi rationale for purchasing arms. But in one 
word, it is 'security', both in internal and regional. Saudi Arabia 
has, since the 1950s, increased its arms imports massively, and one 
(4) 
fact stands out - that Saudi military development programmes have 
been wholly dependent on Western support, and that, overwhelmingly, 
is American. 
I have noted the arms relations between Saudi Arabia and United 
States goes back to the issue of the U.S. realisation of the 
importance of oil. But it was not until towards the end of World War 
II in 1945 that American arms interests were first represented in 
Saudi Arabia. King Abdul Aziz's granted rights to the U.S. to set up 
a military airfield at Dhahran. 3 Later that year, a U.S. military 
mission was sent to Saudi Arabia to determine suitable Saudi military 
. t d t .. 4 equlpmen an ralnlng. 
By 1946 Dhahran airfield was completed and this was followed in 
1951 by the signing of the Mutual Defense Assistance agreement which 
provided, reorganisation and training of Saudi military forces by the 
United States, and most significantly lithe extending of procurement 
assistance to a nation whose ability to defend itself, or participate 
in the defence of the area of which it is a part, is important to the 
security of the United States."5 At the same time, the Dhahran Air 
Base agreement was signed to allow the continued use of the base by 
the U.S. for five years.6 The formal agreement showed several 
crucial elements founded in all subsequent United States/Saudi Arabia 
relations: military assistance, self-defence and regional issues. 
The initial agreements were given more permanent substance in 
1953 by the establishment of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (USMAAG) in Saudi Arabia to train armed forces and advise on 
arms procurements. 7 The USMAAG, heralded a significant increase in 
the American presenceS and contributed to the rising volume of Saudi 
military procurements from the United States. 
Arms transfers of military hardware quickly followed. In 1955 
the first U.S. tanks were bought at a cost of $1.5 million. 9 At the 
(5) 
same time Saudi Arabia rejected a Soviet offer of arms. 10 
As will quickly become evident, this thesis, focuses in 
particular on military aircraft sales by which to evaluate the 
validity of arms transfers/influence relationship. Military aircraft 
were first transferred to Saudi Arabia in the period of 1955/58. 
These included 9 B-26 Douglas "Invader" light tactical bombers 
between 1955/56, 10 North American F-86 "Sabre" jet fighters. 10 
Lockheed T-33A trainers were given by the U.S. to Saudi Arabia under 
the military aid programme (MAP) between 1957/58. 11 This 1957/58 
arms transfers also included an assortment of tanks. 12 At that time 
no Saudi navy existed. 
Due to Saudi Arabia's inadequate revenues to meet its budgetary 
needs in these early years, much American assistance was in the form 
of MAP grant aid, and was characterized by comparatively modest, 
unsophisticated equipment and limited training for Saudi personnel. 13 
At that time, the continued use of Dhahran airbase by the Strategic 
Air Command was the basic U.S. defence interest in Saudi Arabia. The 
lack of perceived threat to Saudi Arabia did not stimulate an 
interest, for the U.S., to embark upon a modernisation programme for 
the Saudi armed forces. 14 
A significant change occurred in 1965 with a joint United 
States/United Kingdom effort to modernise the Saudi military forces, 
particularly the air defence as a result of Egyptian attacks on Saudi 
territory during the Vemen civil war. Reacting to Egyptian attacks, 
the Saudis sought to acquire a modern air defence system. Britain was 
to provide most of the equipment including the advanced version of 
Lightning interceptors, and AEI environmental radar, with technical 
training and support services being provided by Airwork. The u.S. was 
to supply the Raytheon Hawk surface-to-surface missiles. 15 
After the 1967 war, the American/Saudi military relationship was 
(6) 
reduced temporarily when Saudi Arabia turned to France for major 
purchases of armoured fighting vehicles. But by the early 1970s, the 
United States had become much involved in a number of defence 
modernisation programmes with Saudi Arabia. The basis for these 
programmes were cash sales as opposed to grant aid. Among the major 
military programmes in recent years between the U.S. and Saudi 
governments are: 16 
1. Construction projects (coordinated by the U.S. Corps of 
Engineers - COE): 1965-85 
Khamis Mushayt air/army base (1971), 
expenditures est. $81 million 
Tabuk air/army base (1973) 
expenditures est. $81 million 
Hafr al-Batin air/army base (mid-1980s) 
expenditures est. $7.8 billion 
2. 'Peace Hawk' air force programme: 1971-79 
Procurement of F-5s, training and maintenance 
est. $3 billion 
(60 F-5E/F (1975) at a cost of $769 million) 
3. Naval expansion programme: 1972-81 
Procurement of ships, training and maintenance (base 
construction 
included under COE above) 
est. $800 million 
4. National Guard modernisation programme; 1973-78 
Mechanization of infantry battalions with supporting artillery, 
training and maintenance (construction facilities under 
COE above) est. $275 million 
5. 'Peace Sun' air force programme: 1978-1982/83 
Procurement of 60 F-15s, training and maintenance 
est. $2.85 billion 
6. 'Peak Hawk II' air force programme: 1981-1985 
Procurement of 5 AWACS/F-15s Enhancement equipment, training 
and maintenance est. $8.5 billion 
(7) 
2. Arms transfers and political influence relationship 
As stated earlier, during the Cold War years that followed World 
War II the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in (and are 
still in) open competition for influence among the emerging states of 
the Third World. As Third World states' independence began to 
materialise in a post-colonial world, their leaders sought arms, to 
guarantee their state's national security interests, to cope with 
domestic security challenges and to build respect and prestige 
abroad. The superpowers were willing to satisfy these demands and 
thus add new dimensions to their competition for foreign policy 
influence. 
Arms transfers could be used by the superpowers to emphasise 
political support for friends and allies, or to exploit recipients' 
weaknesses in a critical region. Arms recipients were then 
considered to be in the camps of their arms suppliers, and thus 
subject to policy manipulation and under the influence of their 
suppliers. The recent escalation in the flow of advanced 
technological weapons systems from the United States and the Soviet 
Union to the Third World states, emphasises the momentum of the 
perception of arms transfers as a useful, if not a crucial, 
instrument of foreign policy. Arms transfers today, still constitute 
an essential component of international relations because they 
continue to be regarded as a principal instrument of suppliers' 
influence on recipients' foreign policy behaviour and therefore a 
crucial arena of the competition between the superpowers. 
In the previous section I provided a summary history of arms 
transfers between the United States and Saudi Arabia from a 
historical standpoint but this secures no linkage with the concept of 
influence. This I need now to consider. To do this I will give to it 
a conceptual gloss rather than a historical one, for the latter is 
(8) 
the empirical substance of the rest of the thesis. 
I have made it clear that this thesis addresses the relation of 
arms and influence in the context of United States/Saudi Arabia 
relationship. But it has been implied or suggested that influence is 
not the only motive of a power in making an arms transfer. There are 
other motives, not least of which are the suppliers' concerns for the 
domestic economy and security of the recipient state, and the fear of 
loss of influence. But these are not 'other' motives. They are 
aspects of the suppliers' perception of what enhances their influence 
over the recipient state. The supplier's view of influence in 
practical terms is, a way of getting another state to give or lend 
certain advantages (it possesses) to the supplier to enable the 
supplier state to pursue its foreign policy aims. A supplier state, 
however, needs to enhance those aspects of the recipient state, that 
state perceives as important for itself. In other words, influence 
is based on an exchange mechanism. If it did not have a 
'voluntaristic' aspect of exchange-by-agreement, the enabling 
measures provided by the recipient to the supplier would not be 
influence, but coercion by the supplier, or even sycophancy by the 
recipient. Influence has, it seems to me, to be achieved through 
negotiation, not merely granted by a recipient's 'open-house' policy. 
By military means (e.g. threats of military action) a supplier could 
force a state to give it an enabling measure, but this would hardly 
be in line with what one understands by 'influence'. 
Thus a supplier state needs to give advantages to the recipient 
state for the recipient to provide the supplier with advantages. 
Furthermore, the recipient state and the supplier state must create 
or procure a climate in which that relation of exchange is not simply 
one of 'payment-delivery of goods' much as one relates to a shop, for 
when I merely buy goods I do not have influence over a shop. No, it 
(9) 
must be that other suppliers cannot outbid the original supplier by 
arms transfers-advantage procurement because there is a basic 
understood commitment to trade between the states on the basis of 
arms-advantages, rather than on the basis of clearing of debts 
procedure. 
What then, I have done is to fly in the face of Thomas 
Schelling's thesis in Arms and Influence which articulates a view of 
influence as a product of military force. I want to say that 
influence is also a feature of arms transfers in peacetime. (This is 
not to say there are not other things which produce influence, but 
arms transfers are a main contender in the literature as the 
machinery productive of influence). 
The arms transfers literature has not dealt in depth with the 
specific means of arms/influence relationship. For the most part, 
the arms transfers literature has concentrated on determining who is 
buying what from whom for how much. Nevertheless, there are some 
exceptions to this. Among these are research works on the processes 
and patterns of the arms trade by Amelia Leiss, Lincoln Bloomfield 
and Geoffrey Kemp in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 17 There is also 
Lewis Frank's data-base study.lS 
In general, the relationship between arms transfers and 
political influence has been much disputed among scholars. William 
Lewis contended that the political implication of u.S. arms transfers 
are uncertain. William Quandt found arms transfers to Israel did not 
produce positive results. Thomas Wheelock indicated the limited 
impact of arms transfers. Finally, Roger Pajak discovered that 
Soviet arms transfers to Arab states have restricted leverage. 
However, I will consider these references and contributions in 
Chapter One. 
Nevertheless, the United States government continues to believe 
(10) 
arms transfers are directly related to u.s. foreign 
influence. 19 In keeping with this view is the belief that 
policy 
arms 
transfers could serve primary functions. Among these are: 
influencing the political orientation of states of strategic 
resources towards moderation in price and production, to provide 
leverage on certain states on issues of trade and investment, to 
enhance access with governments to provide base rights and overseas 
facilities, and finally to influence the political orientation of key 
states to support diplomatic initiatives to resolve regional 
conflicts. 
Since the United States has been, and still is, a principal arms 
supplier, examining U.S. arms transfers policies and their 
implications should yield insights into the relationship between arms 
transfers and influence. 
3. Data Sources/Problems 
A wide variety of sources have been consulted, though given the 
sensitivity of the subject of arms transfers many facts and figures 
remain classified. It is also important to point out that there is a 
variation of coverage of these sources, i.e. some provide data on 
military hardware (weapons, support equipment, spare parts and 
ammunition) others include military services (training, maintenance, 
technical services and construction work). Therefore comparison 
between them is difficult. Thus, it is necessary to be cautious in 
choosing among them in order to obtain the data most appropriate for 
supporting a particular point. Among the primary sources consulted 
on arms transfers are: the academic body Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Yearbooks, World Armaments and 
Disarmaments, and the government-based organisation U.S. Arms Control 
and Disarmaments Agency's (ACDA) annual publication World Military 
(11) 
Expenditures and Arms Transfers. However, there are other useful 
sources of information on arms transfers. Among them the 
London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) 
which reports on major identified arms agreements and lists military 
equipment found in each country's inventory in its annual publication 
The Military Balance. However, IISS does not aggregate monetary or 
military value of the transfers which is an important element in 
supplier-recipient relations. The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology's Center for International Studies (CIS) provides a data 
set called Arms Transfers to Less Developed Countries. Unlike SIPRI 
and ACDA, which emphasise the monetary value of the transfer, the CIS 
data set stresses the military utility of the transfer. The annual 
U.S. Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency's Foreign 
Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military 
Assistance Facts, unlike ACDA, lists data on military training and 
services. The statistical studies are published periodically by the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress. The 
annual U.K. Defence Statistics identifies defence equipments for 
trade and their destinations. The London annual publication of Janes 
Series, such as Janes All the World's Aircraft, have updated 
inventory data as well as major weapons systems performance. 
Finally, strategic and military journals include: Aviation Week and 
Space Technology (New York), Armed Forces Journal International (New 
York), and International Defense Review (Geneva). 
Neither SIPRI nor ACDA include maintenance, construction and 
technical training data which is an important component of arms 
transfers for a country like the United States. For this 
information, Pentagon publications were consulted. In addition, 
neither examine the military utility of the weapons systems. For 
this, IISS and CIS papers were consulted. Regardless of data 
(12) 
problems connected with SIPRI and ACDA, both have a particular value 
as a source of information for the following reasons: 
i) SIPRI and ACDA use monetary value (in constant current va1ue20 ) 
of actual transfer and deliveries of arms rather than the 
agreements signed. The actual flow of arms is easy to verify. 
In contrast, the signing of an agreement is not only harder to 
verify, but signed agreements may never be consummated. 
ii) Both agencies trace arms transfers globally, regionally and in 
some cases by country. 
iii) Both have a clear-cut terminology applied to major weapons 
systems such as aircraft, warships, tanks and missiles. 
iv) ACDA's statistics are based upon information provided by the 
u.s. intelligence community.21 ACDA is a principal agency 
within the U.S. administration, review requests of purchase for 
American military equipments. 22 
v) SIPRI's worksheets (if available) allow the researcher to 
analyse the supplier-recipient interaction in regard to 
influence and conflict. 
When doing fieldwork in Washington D.C. (December 1982-June 
1983), the researcher interviewed various individuals involved in 
decision-making or negotiations on arms sales or those with 
experience in the field of foreign affairs and Saudi/American 
relations. These included Colonel McKa1ip, senior officer, Pentagon; 
William Quandt, senior foreign policy analyst, Brookings Institution; 
Jim Hoagland, assistant director of foreign news, Washington Post; 
and Faisal Alhegelan, ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United 
States. A list of consulted personnel, as well as those of sources 
of material on military and foreign affairs, will be found in the 
bibliography section. 
(13) 
4. Objectives of the Thesis 
Saudi Arabia provides a laboratory for evaluating the 
effectiveness of U.S. arms transfers, particularly when they are 
thought to protect U.S. economic, strategic and political interests 
in the region. From 1950 to 1972, U.S. foreign military sales (FMS) 
agreements to Saudi Arabia accounted for over $573 million, U.S. 
foreign military construction (FMC) agreements accounted for over 
$603 million. However, FMS and FMC deliveries were $188 million and 
$257 million. 23 From 1973 to 1982 the FMS and FMC were much higher, 
accounting for over $22 billion for FMS and over $18 billion for FMC. 
However, FMS deliveries were over $8 billion and FMC were only $9 
billion respectively.24 The primary rationale for these U.S. arms 
sales was to enhance political influence over Saudi Arabia so she 
would support policies favourable to U.S. interests in the region. 
Have these interests, attributed to arms transfers by the U.S., 
been achieved in Saudi Arabia? This question is difficult to answer 
since the relationship, as I stated earlier, between arms transfers 
and political influence in this context has not been thoroughly 
examined by academic studies. This thesis is an attempt to 
investigate whether U.S. arms transfers produces political influence 
on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour. Further, it examines the 
political structuration of influence between the states, the forms it 
took, and the success or failure of America to maintain its reach of 
influence. 
Nevertheless, any study of the use of arms transfers for the 
purposes of influence must resolve the difficult questions of what 
influence is, and how best to consider it. Once these problems are 
resolved then one should seek evidence to support the assumption that 
a direct relationship exists between arms transfers and political 
influence. However, one might find out that the arms transfers 
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variable is not the only one that might produce influence. Thus, 
there might be several variables other than arms transfers by which 
arms suppliers may have influenced the recipients' foreign policy 
behaviour. Therefore, we need to investigate the place of arms 
transfers and political influence within the context of other 
variables. It may be a broader set of reasons which leads one to an 
effective assertion of a relationship between arms suppliers and 
their recipients, rather than a simple bilateral relationship. 
5. The Scope of this Thesis 
I have chosen the U.S.-Saudi arms transfers relationship, 
especially military aircraft, from 1973 to 1983 for the following 
reasons: 
1. Since 1973, Saudi Arabia has emerged as a principal world oil 
supplier while the U.S. has become increasingly dependent on 
Middle East oil imports. Saudi oil made up 14.3% of American 
oil imports in 1973, and 20.8% in 1977. The percentage rose to 
23.8% in 1980, and 25.3% in 1981. 25 
2. The financial power brought by the oil boom enhanced Saudi 
Arabia's desire for modernisation in the areas of society, 
economics and the military, and the importation of Western goods 
and services. The exchange of high-tech American goods and 
American skilled manpower for Saudi petrodollars and 
investment26 also emphasise a change in the relationship. In 
other words, among other factors, American need for oil gave 
Saudi Arabia a bargaining position in regard to America it did 
not have prior to 1973. Though still asymmetrical, there was no 
longer a one-way dependence of Saudi Arabia on the United 
States. 
3. Oil and financial power was outweighed by the prevailing 
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military weakness of Saudi Arabia to face the development of the 
following crises: a) the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict, b) 
the revolution in Iran, c) the War of Yemens, d) the Soviet 
advancement in Afghanistan in late 1979, e) the Iraq-Iran War in 
1980, and f) the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Thus, 
increased U.S. security assistance to Saudi Arabia and the 
flying of the U.S. flag in the region, emphasised mutual 
concerns and interests that would cement the more nearly 
symmetrical relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. 
4. Finally, it may be noted that the U.s. has a long-range goal of 
gaining influence and impact upon various Middle East states 
through its relationship with Saudi Arabia which in its turn has 
influence with the Middle East in virtue of its fiscal and 
cultural strength. 
6. The Approach of the Thesis 
The thesis is 'realist' in its approach. According to this 
approach, states are involved in struggles for 'power'. Power could 
be described as the ability of actors to affect the behaviour of 
other actors in a favoured manner. A second central concept of this 
realist approach is 'interest'. An actor is one who promotes 
national interests. Thus, to act 1n one's interest is to seek power 
(that is, to have the ability to influence others' behaviour in a 
desired manner). Consequently, arms transfers can be used as an 
instrument by the u.s. to influence Saudi Arabia's foreign policy 
behaviour towards desired interests. 
Nevertheless 'realism' has been attacked for its absence of a 
means of testing its validity. Trevor Taylor in his review article 
(1978) has pointed to the catch-all characters of power and its 
essentially indefinable character in regard to successful 
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policy-making: 
T. Taylor continues to say: 
Taylor's demand for certainty, "ideal behaviour", 
'maximisation', 'full quantification' are extraordinary. Why should 
a realist want these kind of absolutes? What has been overlooked is 
that a realist decision-maker should be a realist - a man who in his 
decision-making capacity is committed to believing that power is the 
basis both for analysis and decision, and that power manifests itself 
in many forms, but that situations may arise which require 
flexibility of decision and longer-term planning. Robert Berki in 
his On Political Realism. 
Berki has an important point to make. He wants, to make political 
activity adequate to reality. Realism as the scholars put it, 
emphasises power-maximisation, but this lacks an empirical referent. 
It is unsurprising that absolutes such as 'maximisation' are 
difficult to get to grips with. Yet among decision-makers is a 
persistent belief that one can use one's resources - one's power - to 
effect the decisions of others. This subjective assertion is an 
intrinsic part of the link between belief and actions, by 
governments, and should be taken as a 'fact' about the decision 
process. If there is a real world referent for any sort of realism it 
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must accord with the character of political behaviour and action. A 
realist may back-off and deliberately not maximize power in one area 
so as to gain a surer basis for power later. The 'realist' must be 
'accountable' to situations, not just pursue a maximisation of power 
policy. To do the latter is the work of a crude, dogmatic realist. 
This thesis shows that America had a tendency to take the latter 
position because it totalised its relations with Saudi Arabia to the 
exclusion of other factors, but due to Saudi Arabia's relations with 
other Arab/Islamic states, was later forced to climb down and 
re-negotiate the structure and mutual understanding of power between 
Saudi Arabia and the United States. What I do here is to offer an 
alternative account of realism that deviates from the standard 
account of the scholars to one that focuses upon the relation of an 
agent to the real world. On the surface, to say that a decision-maker 
should be realistic may seem banal, but it is designed to make a 
pOint about the obstinate configuration of the real world and its' 
resistance to the ambitions of agents who believe in their omnipotent 
power. My idea of realism is deceptively simple perhaps. But it 
surely gains strength because it more nearly reflects its' empirical 
base of facts about a political world. the decision-makers need to 
take ae account of the plethora of diplomatic, military and political 
strategies of nations as related to their interests, and for them to 
take a scholars' line on realism would reduce the subtleties to 
crudities in the manipulation of the resources of power open to them. 
The policy-makers' view of realism in International Relations is 
defined in-use, not as a theoretical pre-disposition (an assumption 
of full power). Power is liquid and cannot be measured before it is 
used - it flows through a network of international relations. 
the anti-realist who wants to show the realists' power 
monolithic structure for each state, who is in error. 
It is 
as a 
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'Realists' power entails no necessary political or moral 
commitments in the minds of the decision-maker; his readings of 
political situations must be fluid, because he knows the dynamic, 
shifting sands of diplomacy and situations. Precisely his 
recognition of changing environments has led him to create 
multi-various simulation models, especially in post-war America (e.g. 
war game research). The desire to assert, even dominate a 
relationship with another country does not mean that this must always 
be done irrespective of the situation. As I have said, this America 
had to learn in its eroding relationship with the Middle East, (of 
which Saudi Arabia is a constituent) when America had a 
self-perception as a militarily and economically strong country who 
wanted friends and strategic bases in an immediate post-war world and 
could purchase them via offers of aid. Not surprisingly it believed 
it was a dominant power in any relationship it struck up, other than 
with countries to which it was ideologically opposed, e.g. Soviet 
Union. But when aid-dependent, tacitly friendly countries gained 
modes of independence through wealth or offers of arms from other 
countries, then America recognised it had to take action to 
revitalise its position. In other words it was aware it had made a 
loss of interest (if it valued the interest being lost) and this for 
U.S. was a mode of power-loss (loss of influence mainly). It did not 
have to have an absolute measure of power or come to that, of 
influence, to realise it was losing-out where its' relations with 
other states were being usurped or strangled. 
I select a form of 'realism' because in essence it is flexible 
in-use. Realism, I want to say, is the practical belief of 
decision-makers, that international order is not constructed by law, 
because laws can be made or abrogated upon more or less 
indiscriminately if need demands it; and moreover the stance towards 
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international laws or rules can be changed unilaterally. The 
struggle between Mrs. Thatcher and the E.E.C. is indicative of this. 
Equally it is not a moral order. The range of intelligence services 
activities are testimony to this. No, the practical beliefs of 
decision-makers are founded in a realism which presents 
power-brokerage as the basis of decisions, and these in turn are 
based on national interests determined by the say-so of executives or 
legislatures. 
The power I speak of, is the capacity of a state to get what it 
wants by fair means or foul through its' agencies such as the armed 
forces, diplomats and intelligence services as well as its 
international and economic resources. This capacity is delimited by 
the anticipated costs decisions could have, and the assessment of the 
capacity for cover-ups or damage limitation exercises. 
In summation, I believe that the critics and advocates of the 
standard theory of realism have produced a caricature of what in 
essence realism should mean. It is in error as to the 'ordinary 
language' use of the term 'realism' and in error in regard of the 
'absolutes' criterion it demands for the theory. If critics demand 
impractical criteria they will get an impractical theory which forces 
a no contest. But in the material world of decisions, caricatures of 
positions are to be studiously avoided, because they are useless. 
In addition to this conceptual realist approach I have also 
taken the historical approach. My main concern is to mention primary 
events within a chronological framework which might explain 
Saudi-American relations before and during the period 1973-1983. 
Continuities with earlier events (1933-1973) determine contemporary 
events (1973-1983). Though the continuities of the relationship are 
not well known due to lack of adequate scholarly literature,30 they 
are central to understanding the nature and direction of current and 
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ongoing relations. Policy debates in the U.S. over U.S.-Saudi 
military relations have been severely restricted by this lack of 
historical dimension. For instance, the Congressional debate over 
the U.S. government's sales of F-5s in 1975, F-15s in 1978, and 
AWACs/Enhancement Equipment in 1981 to Saudi Arabia paid little 
attention to historical developments. All these previous sales can 
be linked directly to the Kennedy Administration's promise to conduct 
an air defense survey for Saudi Arabia, if she would agree to a 
settlement with Egypt over the Vemen civil war. 
Moreover, historical developments of primary events of the 
pre-1973 period playa key role in determining whether there is or is 
not a change in the amount and direction of influence vis-a-vis the 
findings of the investigated period (1973-1983). 
7. Significance - Why This Thesis? 
The relation of arms to influence appeals to our intuitions, and 
seems self-evident and furthermore is a theme regularly referred to 
in International Relations literature. Unfortunately, the details of 
the hypothesis - that arms produces influence - which is a U.S. 
foreign policy axiom, has been little examined. As a Saudi national 
and part of a culture suspicious of, and sensitive to 'colonialism 
and imperialism', but also part of a modernising world involving 
itself in 'nation-building', the idea of dependence is, at least 
theoretically, anathema. However, world opinion, in particular that 
of Saudi Arabia's neighbours (often Soviet-backed), has frequently 
.pointed out, or alluded to the 'immoral' connections with the United 
States. The implication is that for a modernising state in the 
process of establishing its sovereignty, (not in terms of territory 
which is legally secure), but in terms of military security of that 
territory - its ability to control that territory - Saudi Arabia 
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should not be beholden unto another power. 
Thus the academic question of the identity and character of 
Saudi Arabia in International Relations is not, in my case, merely a 
spontaneous gesture to scholarship, but is a genuine problem for 
myself and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, a state of conservative 
disposition seeks neither to publicly assert nor deny, the forms of 
its relationship with the United States. It recognizes the value of 
a 'low profile', but its size, and strategic and economic importance 
give it a significance in world affairs it cannot wish away. 
Having explained in personal terms why I chose to write the 
thesis, we must now turn to the substantive issue of the significance 
of the thesis within the study of International Relations. 
I have mentioned several elements within the thesis which 
propose lines of original inquiry and the procurement of original 
results. Methodologically I believe this thesis offers a modified 
version of realism showing that testability and measurement are a 
demand of an out-dated positivism. Further, this thesis demonstrates 
a concern with the decisions - structures, intentions and 
perceptions. In other words, I produce a rather more cognitive, as 
opposed to a behavioural version of events. 
At the empirical level I attempt to show the change in the U.S. 
understanding of arms - influence relationship post-1973, and argue 
that establishment U.S. decision-making adopted a crude power-realism 
which had to shift after 1973. In other words I am looking at things 
from the point of view of the decision-makers, not the International 
Relations scholars. In connection with this I examine three major 
aircraft sales decisions as inter-actionary, as between the various 
branches of the U.S. government and interested parties, the 
decision-makers in Saudi Arabia and between the representation by 
Saudi Arabia to United States, and vice-versa. I have sought to 
(22) 
overturn and expose the errors in the perception of the U.S. 
decision-makers, and provide insights into the under-researched areas 
of the United States/Saudi Arabian arms transfers. 
Finally, I come to the question of why I have a problem to be 
explained, and this will lead me to understanding the connection with 
what seems to be a commonplace answer. 
It is received opinion by scholars that there is usually no 
direct casual link between arms transfers and influence. In other 
words other factors are invariably present. This is quite true. But 
my problem is, what one makes of the decision-makers beliefs about 
the connection between arms transfers and influence, and this tells a 
different story. In successive U.S. governments, the executive, 
though less so the legislature and oversight bodies, have presented 
the relationship between arms and influence, as direct and causal. 
This in turn has profoundly effected the prescriptions executives 
have made about the aims of arms transfers-generated foreign policy, 
and political decision-making. In part at least, this offers, 
pointers for an account of the history of U.S. perceptions and Saudi 
perceptions of the relationship. But it also suggests that America 
was somewhat credulous in thinking that the future would be much the 
same as the past. If arms transfers really procure the influence 
America thought it did, then would Saudi Arabia have acted quite so 
unilaterally vis-a-vis U.S. in the mid-1970s in siding with its Arab 
neighbours? 
Whatever scholars have said about the complexity of arms and 
influence, i.e. that it is necessarily mixed with many other factors 
strategical, diplomatic, political and economic, the single 
mindedness of U.S. foreign policy-makers to see the arms-influence 
relationship in a vacuum, has made the holding of a coherent United 
States/Saudi Arabia arms transfer policy, but also the U.S. 
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maximizing its influence on Saudi Arabia, difficult. If Saudi Arabia 
takes a much broader view of the relationship of arms/influence and 
connects it with a wide range of factors, then the Saudi response to 
U.S. arms supply is going to fluctuate in accordance with those other 
factors (depending on their significance on Saudi Arabia). It is as 
if two parties, who may want to achieve a common goal have two 
different maps one which portrays a journey as the crow flies, the 
others full of geographical features which have to be negotiated. At 
best the two are not going to achieve the same goal at the same time. 
There is a coordination problem. This is analogous to the United 
States/Saudi Arabia arms/influence relationship. I argue that the 
failure of U.S. foreign policy-makers to take into account the 
fluctuating factors affecting Saudi Arabia (recipient) behaviour, has 
lead to a U.S. misunderstanding of this relationship. This in turn, 
has effected its ability to influence Saudi Arabia to help U.S. in 
its role in such crucial areas as Camp David and on the resolution of 
the 1970s oil crisis. 
As I see it, I am not so much arguing with the International 
Relations scholars view of the complexities of arms/influence 
relationship, as arguing with the decision-makers views of 
International Relations, and this is a real International Relations 
problem, not a second order discourse of the applicability of 
scholar's models. 
(24) 
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CHAPTER ONE 
ARMS AND INFLUENCE: THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR EMPIRICAL STUDY 
Earlier it was made clear that I adopt a particular type of 
realism. It is generally agreed that this appoints the idea of power 
to a main explanatory role in understanding of foreign policy. What 
it does not specify is a particular analytics of power or what 
decision-makers make of power. The latter is the main pOint in 
respect of my argument that decision-maker's 'realism' is an 
understanding on foreign-policy in-use. When analysing decisions one 
needs to reconstruct in some sense what context decision-makers use 
in making and implementing their decisions: what 'idea-ology' they 
use. I suggest that for Americans it is broadly a realist set of 
assumptions, but a set far more attuned to the everyday demands of 
making decisions adequate (as Berki puts it) to reality. Yes - use of 
power and national interest are at the root of understanding 
politics, but these need a de-emphasis of the desirability of the 
naked or crude pursuit of power,and a shift to a more strategical 
view of power - one that adequates to the character of the real 
world. I examine the elements of a modified realist language with 
respect to arms and influence and how it provides an operational 
framework that decision-makers can work with. 
There are two variables in the above title, the understanding of 
which is crucial to my discussion in this thesis. These variables 
are: a) arms transfers, b) political influence. My immediate task, 
therefore, will be to analyse these variables. To be sure, the 
ordinary definitions of these terms might be suggestive of their 
meaning in international relations. But when taken within the 
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theoretical context of international relations, they assume an 
analytical dimension. But their relevance to my discussion must be 
understood within a decision-making perspective and therefore have a 
practical relevance to this empirical study. It should be noted that 
influence as a concept belongs to the much broader spectrum of power, 
which in itself is reflected in the Realist School of International 
Relations. Hence, for a meaningful understanding of the concept of 
influence, one must discuss the theory of power first. 
The Concept of Power 
In his 'Discord and Collaboration', Arnold Wolfers defined power 
as "the ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants 
them to do and not to do what one does not want them to do."1 In 
this definition, Wolfers was only echoing a theme which had been set 
down previously by some authors, notably Nicholas Spykman. In his 
book America's Strategy in World Politics, Spykman contends that 
power consists of the ability to order men to behave in a desired 
manner through "persuasion, purchase, barter, and coercion."2 
Contributing to this debate Hans Morgenthau described power as "man's 
control over the minds and actions of other men."3 
Clearly, power can only materialize in a 'cause and effect' 
situation with the latter being a result of the former. Realist 
authors perceived constituents of power as including: military force, 
population size, level of technological development, national 
resources endowment, geo-strategic location, political leadership and 
ideology. Therefore, the full meaning of a realist theory of power 
can be realized through its context of social, political, economic 
and national elements. 
The pre-occupation of the realists with the concept of power, 
and the context and justification for its employment in international 
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politics, is based on the forms and forces within the international 
environment. Due to the absence of adequate institutions at the 
international level comparable to those in most domestic political 
systems, conflict is the rule rather than the exception. This is 
because each state within the international system always seeks to 
pursue or sometimes to maximise its national interests. But because 
states exist within a community of states, it happens that national 
interests are pursued or maximised at the expense of other nations. 
This does not mean that power is the only relevant variable operating 
under realism, nor is its' maximisation. It is precisely that power 
has a limiting context that determines not only legitimate but also 
feasible channels of the exercise of 'power'. States try to widen 
those channels, lengthen them or open new ones and this is done 
through the deployment of power-resources 1n the form of military, 
diplomatic or economic action. 
In the present day it is usually diplomatic and economic rather 
than military action which is deployed initially, and they are 
essentially forms of power in-use which work upon existing forms and 
relations of power. Thus power begats power. Contrary to the 
critics of realism who charge that realism is the justification of 
naked power, I want to say that it lends itself to being subtle as 
well as a blatant instrument of policy implementation and that one 
identifies the subtle-blatant spectrum by using such names such as 
force, coercion, rhetoric, persuasion, threats, duty, obligation, 
ideology, destruction or influence. It is 'realistic' to tailor 
means to not only ends but to the context within which one is 
operating. The realist may wield power by the scalpel or the knife, 
and this according to his perceptions of the relation of context, 
ends and means. If the realist is a man who exercises power or makes 
sense of the structure of world power in a strictly 'can I get what I 
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want now' way - that is on a rather ad-hoc basis, there would 
probably be a tendency to use whatever instruments of appropriation 
were at hand - most likely the armed forces. But this approach 
provides no investment for the future, no foundation of relations. 
Countries need a working friendship so as to get what they want, when 
they want it, even if there are reasons why a supplier country is 
reluctant to give it. It is for this reason that countries must 
employ subtle uses of power and build up a relationship, not just 
'muscle in'. 
It is only on this basis that one can 'realistically' achieve a 
position that satisfies Arnold Wolfer's definition of power as "the 
ability to move others or to get them to do what one wants to do and 
not to do what one does not what them to do.,,4 I have attempted to 
provide an account of power that interprets "the ability to move 
others or to get them to do ... " in the context of practical 
International Relations rather than purely a logical scenario of an 
analytical concept of 'power'. "Getting others to do" as an outcome, 
is a result which is desirable so long as the costs do not seem 
immediately to outweigh the benefits. 
The sting in the tail of my version of realism is the demand to 
be 'realistic' not 'power-mad'! But this does not mean that 
countries should only react to situations for to suggest this would 
be to imply that a country has no 'national' interests of its own it 
would seek to protect. 
The concept of national interest is indeed a crucial one in the 
literature of International Relations though much debated. For my 
purposes I have to draw a line, if only a heuristic one, between 
national interests which are common to all states in virtue of their 
constitution as states, and national interests which are held by 
particular governments at particular times. 
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I suggest there are some 'national interests' which no 
government could give up or abrogate on, whereas there are others 
such as nationalised industries, the sale of which is regarded as 
necessary in the national interest by some, and as "selling the 
family silver" by others. I shall call the former, basic national 
interests, and these are intuitively-held. Among these are the 
security of the state, the continuity of the state, the institution 
of a government, economic development and continuity, and the having 
of foreign relations. 
Hans Morgenthau in his discussion of national interest seems to 
equate it with power. He writes: 'the acquisition and use of power 
is the primary national interest of a nation-state.,,5 Rather, I want 
to give an account of national interest in terms of necessarily - or 
contingently-held values which a state seeks to protect, reproduce or 
implement, through the use of multi-various forms of power. 
Donald Nuechterlin is more specific than Morgenthau by 
delineating the forms of national interests as: defence, economic 
prosperity, world order, and ideology.6 It is only the last point 
with which I would have any quarrel. It does not seem to me that 
many states have a specific set of values covering the 'correct' 
moral and political values which should be held by all citizens. 
Even the Soviet Union is more variegated than Nuechterlin's notion 
demands. In many countries peaceful ideological debate is legitimate 
and indeed an essential part of a country's democracy and political 
practice. However, defence, the economy and foreign relations 
(world-order interest) are pursuits legitimised and expected of all 
countries by their citizens and this has been so, for most countries 
for many years. (The isolationist tendencies in the U.S. in the 
earlier part of the 20th century have not excluded relations with 
'back-yard' neighbours.) These constitute the basic national 
(31) 
interests expected and practiced by all states. But there are many 
'national interests' which are described as such, but are policies 
and ideological factors which do not represent the national interest 
but only sectional interests, but are argued to represent national 
interest. No one questions that there should be defence, but they do 
question what forms it takes. This has been highlighted in the 
defence debates within the Labour Party, and between them and the 
Conservative Party. It is claimed the nuclear weapons are/are not 
necessary to defence. This is a legitimate debate, but while there 
is a claim that to have weapons systems 'X' is necessary to national 
interest, another side is arguing it is not. In this sense, national 
interest reduces to sectional debates and ideology. Equally there 
being foreign relations is not in dispute, but the forms of foreign 
relations are, and this involves the problem of arms 
transfers/influence relationship. It is argued by some that weapons 
sales are essentially immoral and therefore, the benefits they bring 
to foreign relations normally de-legitimises those benefits. Of 
course this argument becomes a form of rhetorical power in the hands 
of oppositional states who do not want, say U.S., to gain a foothold 
via arms transfers in another country, so they make an issue out of 
the immorality of arms transfers. 
My discussion then, seeks to situate the arms/influence 
relationship in a framework of national interest. What I want to say 
is that the arms/influence relationship is often pursued through the 
rhetoric of national interest and that this relationship is made 
possible through the operation of various modes of power. Power 
enables the pursuit of national interest, but it is not identical 
with it. And national interest is of two sorts: 'necessary' and 
'contingent'. The arms/influence relationship is contingent in that 
the mode of gaining influence - arms transfers - is a much debated 
(32) 
issue and is not recognized as a basic form of national interest. 
In my concept of power I am in sympathy with Raymond Aron who 
pointed out that states do not desire power for its own sake but as a 
means to achieve some goals such as self-survival or peace or to 
influence the future of the international system. 7 It is the forms 
of power and gaining what one wants that are crucial to the 
discussion, and as I have shown, arms transfers and its relation to 
influence are modes of power contingently used to gain a power base 
so as to pursue further aims. Power then, is an enabling factor, but 
is limited, no so much by direct counter-power such as arms meeting 
arms, but by contextual challenges such as diplomatic protocol or 
investments which prohibit the uses of other forms of power that 
would disrupt a diplomatic relation. 
I conceive of arms transfers and influence in two basic ways: 
from the viewpoint of the supplier of arms transfers and the 
recipient of them. 
For just as in one case arms transfers is supplied by United 
States and received by Saudi Arabia, so influence is 'supplied' by 
Saudi Arabia and 'received' by the United States. But arms and 
influence are inextricably linked by the implication that had arms 
not been transferred, the supplier of arms transfers would not have 
received the material realisation of influence, e.g. granting of air 
base use in arms recipient country. Both arms and influence can be 
interpreted as goods which each side tries to gain. As goods they 
are absolute indexes of each country's exchange values, but 
relationally arms transfers and influence are indexes of the priority 
of each country's commitment to the other in the face of competing 
world interests, and requirements to pay attention to factors other 
than those in the immediate circumstances of the recipient-supplier 
relationship. So how much influence 'X' can bring to bear on 'V' is 
(33) 
X's power to get Y to give it things not normally exchanged on 
open-markets for money. 
It has been pointed out by various scholars, but especially 
Andrew Pierre, that arms sales do not just produce political 
influence per se, but produce security and economic benefits. S 
The production of arms is an economic structure which employs 
workers in a variety of industries, i.e. metals, electronics, 
explosives, light and heavy engineering, etc. It also brings in 
significant revenue and as Pierre pointed out, helps to offset 
increased oil prices in the 1970s. Such economic arrangements 
squeeze out the effectiveness of arms transfers for procuring 
influence. The incentive to sell arms will be high enough not to make 
arms a recipient's demand, the granting of which makes receiving arms 
a privilege conferred by one state to another. It is the privileges 
of gaining arms and the recognition (by both states) of the arms 
transfers as a privilege that makes arms transfers suitable as a 
lever to obtain influence. Where supply and pressure to create a 
demand increases, then influence will not be a primary aim or a 
primary effect; it will be revenue. When several countries compete 
to sell arms to one country, then, unless a firm relationship of 
friendship and influence pre-exists between 'X' and 'V', then 'V', 
'W', and 'Z' suppliers are going to compete, maybe successfully, in a 
now open-market structure for commercial and financial gain. The 
link between arms and influence is then broken. 
It is claimed that another function of arms is to promote 
another country's security. However, it is difficult to see this in 
terms other than the supplier's desire to influence either the 
balance of power in the recipient region, or to create an influence 
with the recipient government in the form of supporting and securing 
that regime. One way or the other, this case seems to boil down to 
(34) 
the issue of political influence. 
Finally, arms transfers can take place to prevent a loss of 
influence, but this again must surely be for the purposes of 
procuring or re-procuring influence, so this case is the same as arms 
producing influence. 
Definition of Influence 
Power is the main factor in producing a 'realist' account of 
International Relations. I have shown this is bound up with the 
determination of what constitutes national interest. National 
interest is the motive for pursuing foreign relations, and power its 
means of representation. Power I have implied, is two-fold - power as 
resources, i.e. potential power, and power as an enablement to act 
within specific contexts. Power then, is beholden unto the national 
interest as it is delimited by its specific context upon the 
determination of policy pursuant of national interest. In other 
words, I seek a practical and operational definition of power, 
national interest and foreign relations. 
I have said influence is a mode of power - it enables one to 
pursue national interest, so I must offer a definition of influence 
as an enabling process. In this sense, influence is not absolute but 
relational. In the context of International Relations, influence must 
enable one to bring about a favourable foreign policy situation, the 
procurement of which is to some extent dependent on another state. 
To have an adequate meaning, influence must entail more than merely 
passive acquiescence by an inert state in the granting of another 
state's demands. If this were the case, influence would not be 
needed. 
Influence has to be demonstrated as an in-use context - its 
work-ability. Certainly it is a form of power which enables further 
(35) 
exercise of power, but it is exercised through its invocation. 
However, as an in-use concept it has limits, and those are set by its 
effectiveness in gaining a national interest-serving advantage from 
another state. 
What then is the mechanism of influence? Let me attempt a 
definition. Influence is the relational power between at least two 
states which surrounds an exchange or a gift where that exchange (a 
gift) would not be made with another state, in preference to the 
state in the relationship of influence. 
Influence then is a granting of privileged access, and a mode of 
serving exclusive or exclusionary advantages. It excludes other 
potential exchanges of gift recipients/suppliers. 
In 1955 the Soviet Union offered arms to Saudi Arabia which 
Saudi Arabia rejected partly because of the international relations 
with the United States. Here influence acted as a power to prevent 
the offer and enabled in a weak sense, Saudi Arabia to maintain its 
relation with America, which of course translates into receipts of 
American arms and aid in the future. Influence was the pertinent 
factor here - it raises the counter-factual case of: what if Saudi 
Arabia had accepted, would it still have retained its privileges 
vis-a-vis arms procurement from the U.S. As with all counter-factual 
issues, one cannot say, because it did not happen. But the reasons 
why it did not happen must rely on the evidence at the time, and this 
seems to indicate that the United States/Saudi Arabia pattern of 
influence operated against the Soviet arms offer. So I am saying 
that influence operates as a relationally defined power when one 
country will act in accordance with the explicit or perceived wishes 
of its influence-relative partner, to the exclusion of other 
countries not in an influence relation with it. 
Influence is not specific with regard to event/time, mostly it 
(36) 
is not situation specific, but is a longer-term, enabling measure 
which facilitates specific acts in an ongoing relationship. 
In connection with arms transfers, I may say that influence is 
present where arms transfers as opposed to economic or technical aid 
transfers brought about advantages to the other state, and arms would 
not be accepted or bought from outside states. I am still not 
complete in my definition. Influence needs also to be looked at from 
the other side - how one brings about a change in another, in a 
two-person relationship. That is, if there are only America and 
Saudi Arabia, how would influence operate? Influence not only acts 
as an exclusionary measure, but also to bring about a change that 
would not otherwise have happened. If I influence someone, I bring 
about a set of actions he would not otherwise have done. 
Taylor has written that influence is: 
Michael 
This is a definition which is cast in causal terms rather than 
in terms of a backdrop presence which sets a context of 
understanding. Both notions work on the basis of enabling, but only 
the latter brings out the factor, crucial to International Relations: 
that of excluding other states to establish a 'special relationship'. 
Influence is not to be thought of as purely cost/benefit rational 
choice for this involves explanations in terms other than the 
placenta which influence provides. 
Influence then provides for: 
i) privileged access 
(37) 
ii) advantages not given to others 
iii) long term relations 
iv) possibility of bringing about attitude/decision changes 
The historical and regenerative aspect of influence can be shown 
as follows: 
Time of A 
relation of 
'X' and 'Y' 
Build up of 
relation of 
'X' and 'V' 
Influence 
relation of 
'X' and 'V' 
Action 
because 
(partly) 
of presence 
of influence 
between 'X' 
and 'V' 
feedback 
Enhances 
influence 
relation 
B 
( cement sit) 
Of course it is the historical dimension that M. Taylor ignores, 
but I hope that my comments can provide a corrective to his 
coincident view. 
Arms Transfers 
Arms transfers simply, is the giving (as exchange or gift) of 
arms to another country. From the suppliers' side this may be for 
commercial, military, politico-diplomatic or recipient security 
enhancement reasons. From the recipients' side is to facilitate the 
prosecution of war, enhancement of suppliers' influences, internal 
security, enhancement of trading relations. There are probably many 
other reasons. The recipients may have their own personal reasons 
for involvement in arms trade, or reasons dependent on the reason of 
other state, e.g. enhancement of influence which in turn improves the 
recipients' relations with that state. 
The relative conceptual simplicity of arms transfers leaves me 
to specify what in 'hard' terms, I am talking about when I talk about 
arms, e.g. conventional, nuclear, and this I do now. Here, I aim to 
establish the type of arms supply with which this research is 
concerned. Since both the United States' Arms Control and 
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Disarmament Agency (ACDA) and the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute (SIPRI) are the primary sources of aggregate data 
with regard to our area of concern, I shall adopt their definitions 
of the type of arms involved in international arms transfers. 
According to SIPRI, arms transfers involve major weapons systems 
which include "aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles and warships."IO 
In identifying these major weapons systems, SIPRI specifies the 
criteria for determining which items are included under each of these 
four comoonents. Accordina to SIPRI: 
ACDA, however, broadens the definition of the arms transfers. 
According to the American agency: 
Notable in the primary categories of conventional weapons systems are 
defined by both SIPRI and ACDA is that they both include military 
aircraft, armoured vehicles, missiles and warships. For my purpose I 
shall concentrate on military aircraft. This choice is, of course, 
deliberate and for the following reasons: 
(39) 
I. Military aircraft, given Saudi terrain, have better defensive 
and offensive capabilities (including combat range, ordinance 
pay-load, and speed capacity) than other types of weapons 
systems. These enhance the capability of the state to deal 
effectively with internal and external threats. 
2. Advanced military aircraft provide substantial political and 
military prestige for the air forces of a recipient land act as 
a deterrence against weaker and parity-armed regional 
adversaries. 
These factors mean that such military aircraft, if chosen 
carefully so that they are suited to the geographical and 
environmental conditions of their recipients, can partake in missions 
against internal enemies such as an army or navy in revolt, while 
keeping the airforces loyal and against external aggressors who often 
have similar terrain. 13 
Correlation of Arms Transfers and Foreign Policy Influence 
It should be recalled that the main assumption of this study is 
that major arms suppliers provide arms as an instrument of acquiring 
political influence over the foreign policy behaviour of the 
recipients. In short, there is a relationship between arms transfers 
and political influence. As I argued earlier in this chapter, 
influence occurs when one country, without force of arms can get 
another country to comply with its wishes despite that country not 
wanting to do so, for whatever reasons. This may include provision 
of aid or an interest in maintaining a long-standing relationship. 
The question that follows is: can arms transfers be used to influence 
the behaviour of arms recipients? The immediate answer will be 
'Yes'. The principal reason is because advanced weapons systems such 
as F-5s, F-15s and AWACs are highly specialized. Therefore spare 
(40) 
parts and ordinance supplies can only be provided from the initial 
suppliers and manufacturers. This increases the leverage of the 
original suppliers on the amount of spare parts to be sold. 
Therefore, when one refers to arms transfers and political 
influence, one is more or less saying arms transfers do provide 
political influence and are often used as a supplier's foreign policy 
instrument to induce a recipient to act according to a supplier's 
interests/preferences. Whatever these interests might be, compliance 
with a supplier's preferred policy implies compatibility of 
recipient's behaviour with supplier's interest. 
Having explained the relationship between arms transfers and 
political influence, it should be realised that relations between 
states are complex. It is even more difficult when one is trying to 
measure the causal relationship between arms transfers and political 
influence. This is so because, before a single foreign 
decision/action is taken, a variety of interests may have to be 
considered. This is discussed in Chapter Three. 
Therefore, although a country may behave in a particular way 
immediately after taking delivery of an advanced weapon system, it is 
difficult to determine precisely whether it was the immediate supply 
of arms that caused the decision or whether the recipient in acting 
was taking into consideration others factors. Thus, it is possible 
to believe that the recipient might have behaved in a similar fashion 
without the transfer of arms. One therefore has a problem of 
measurement. One possible way of solving the problem is to compare 
the relationship between the supplier and the recipient before and 
after the supply of the weapon system. Even that is open to 
judgement. Another question which could follow this, is whether 
other means could be used rather than arms transfers, assuming that 
the direct goal of the supplier is to influence the recipient's 
(41) 
behaviour? For example, the supplier could use other instruments of 
foreign policy to influence the recipient. Nevertheless, arms 
transfers are rather pertinent, especially taking into consideration 
the perpetual conflict in inter-state relations. As suggested by the 
power theorists, the only defence against obliteration is power - and 
military power is the inevitable choice, even though other 
non-military factors have been tried. The preference for military 
power is that it brings immediate results. Faced with the dilemma of 
insecurity, arms recipients might yield cooperation with their arms 
suppliers. However, since open intervention by major powers to 
pursue security objectives of their allies and friends is politically 
costly and dangerous, major powers have found it is less risky and 
costly to enhance the military capability of their allies through the 
tool or arms transfers. Enhanced stability, especially of a regime 
threatened either from internal sources or from outside adversaries, 
might induce allies' co-operation towards major powers' wishes. 
Identification of the Problem 
Even then there is hardly any evidence to suggest a direct 
relationship between arms transfers and political influence. Indeed, 
international relations scholars have never denied the use of arms 
transfers as a sort of political leverage, but the effectiveness of 
arms transfers to always produce desirable results is highly 
contentious. Reviewing the U.S.A. policy of arms transfers and their 
effectiveness in pursuing foreign policy goals, William lewis 
observed that: 
While there are few alternative tools of United States foreign 
policy available ... the results of arms transfy~s can be 
uncertain, mixed, or at times, outweighted by costs. 
lewis' analysis, in fact, underscores the difficulty of measuring the 
causal relationship between arms transfers and political influence. 
(42) 
Therefore, it is impossible to make a generalisation about this 
relationship. Each situation cannot be replicated, and in this way 
must be seen as an isolated event. William Quandt, in his study of 
America's arms suppliers to Israel, Iran and Turkey, found that: 
In essence, arms transfers to Iran, Israel and Turkey by the United 
States did not stop the recipient countries from pursuing their 
perceived foreign policy goals during the period studied by Quandt. 
Another study by Thomas Wheelock on the relationship between Israel 
and the United States after arms had been transferred, indicated that 
America enjoyed only limited political leverage on Israel in respect 
of the latter's behaviour with regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict. I6 
Interestingly, both Quandt and Wheelock were looking at an almost 
similar issue, though they came out with marginally different 
interpretations. This is a result of the problem of measurement as 
mentioned above. However, David Pollock's investigation of Israel's 
attitude during the situation indicated that American leverage over 
Israel was effective during crises. I7 Nevertheless, because of 
domestic politics, the U.S. foreign policy-makers are most anxious to 
avoid arms supplies as a tool of political influence. IS 
Uri Ra'anan, indeed, contended in his study of the arms 
transfers relationship between the Soviet Union and Egypt that: 
Ra'anan's study demonstrates the complexity of generalisations when 
commenting on the causal relationship between arms transfers and 
political influence. To underscore this point, Roger Pajak, in a 
(43) 
study on the link between Iraq and Syria on one hand and the Soviet 
Union on the other, discovered that military assistance to Iraq and 
Syria did not provide the Soviet Union with effective control over 
the behaviour of the two Arab states, adding that "Despite receiving 
large amounts of modern weapons and technical support, Iraq and Syria 
have not hesitated to antagonise Moscow when vital interests of these 
countries were at risk.,,20 One must, however, point out the error in 
Pajak's analysis. Control is not synonymous with influence. 
Influence is the willingness or rationalised decision of one country 
to do the bidding of another despite obstacles either through the 
promise of aid or through shared interest. Influence also 
presupposes the right of every nation to act freely in·deciding its 
policy, but without the presence of force, taking into consideration 
the interest of another state. This does not, however, rule out the 
remote possibility of the use of force. Control on the other hand 
connotes the use of force or a colonial relationship. This can 
hardly be suitable in assessing the relationship between the Soviet 
Union on the one hand and its Iraqi and Syrian allies. 
Curiously enough, despite this lack of strong evidence to 
support the claim that arms transfers to a recipient country gives 
the supplier a leverage over the recipient, both the United States 
and the Soviet Union continue to use arms transfers as a key foreign 
policy instrument to maintain and expand influence in the Third 
World. 21 For example, during the Cold War years, the United States 
decision-makers considered American security assistance to its Third 
World allies as a major foreign policy tool for containing communist 
advancement. In contrast to America's perceived goals and actions, 
the Soviet Union regarded arms transfers as a means of undermining 
the U.S.A.'s ideological network by an encircling communism. The 
recent escalation in the transfer of sophisticated weapons systems 
(44) 
from the United states and the Soviet Union to the Third World 
underlines the mutual suspicions between the two superpowers and the 
desire by both powers to maintain their spheres of influence in world 
politics. Today, arms transfers have become an essential component 
of international relations, because they are regarded as a principal 
medium of supplier's influence on recipient's policy in order to 
maintain and enhance interest, and therefore a crucial arena for 
superpower competition. 
Before I conclude this section to make a note about the concepts 
of supply and demand of arms. In the literature they each have a 
specific meaning. Lewis Snider has made these points clear by 
linking supply to influence, and demand to sub-system autonomy. He 
writes: 
The crucial point to note here, is the idea of a clash between 
the arms of the supplier and those of the recipient. It follows that 
demand is not a basis for influence, as the 'demanders' interests are 
supposed to lie outside those of the suppliers. However, it is 
presumed that the supplier does not sell arms out of magnanimity, but 
he will expect to gain an advantage or influence from the recipient 
in terms of the recipient giving the supplier an advantage it would 
not otherwise give, in the absence of arms. The simplicity of these 
identifications, do not really satisfy the analysis of the thesis. 
For as I show, the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States is not that of two sovereign states exchanging, but of two 
states who have built over time, a relationship of goodwill, 
self-interest serving exchanges, and influence. The latter notion 
can often be shown to overcome any struggle for 'autonomy' and 
(45) 
further, the impact of America's determining of Saudi defence needs 
in the first place, makes the surface simplicity of a struggle for 
influence on the one side, and a struggle for autonomy, a nonsense. 
What L. Snider does not make an issue over, are the levels of 
relative autonomy, Saudi Arabia could gain from the United States, 
through arms transfers and the play of other factors upon them. 
A. Demand Side: Influencing Factors 
The foregoing discussion leads me to the main agenda - that is, 
whether U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia have made Washington more 
influential in regard to Saudi Arabian foreign policy behaviour? The 
question which I now ask has been asked by other scholars in 
international relations: Are arms transfers sufficient to produce 
influence? Or more directly, have the United States and the Soviet 
Union always achieved their foreign policy objectives through only 
arms transfers? The answer to this question cannot be 'yes' or 'no', 
because the subject is a complex one, especially when I take into 
consideration the earlier discussion in this thesis. Account will 
have to be taken of such matters as the expulsion of Soviet military 
advisers by Egypt in 1972 despite the Soviet's huge military 
investment in the latter country, or the disgrace the Americans 
suffered in Iran in 1979 despite their sizeable security assistance 
to the Shah. All these suggest that arms transfers may have little 
to do with the ability of the superpowers to have effective influence 
over arms recipients' foreign policy behaviour. 
My contention in this thesis is that arms transfers between two 
countries take place within a much broader inter-state relationship 
and I provide a particular case study: that the under researched 
relationship of Saudi Arabia/United States arms transfers/influence 
relationship. To isolate only one variable in this relationship (in 
(46) 
this case, arms transfers) as the only instrument of achieving 
influence is not only to de-emphasise other important factors in the 
relationship, but is misrepresentation of facts, and this would lead 
to wrong conclusions. In any case, other factors might be as 
important as arms transfers in determining whether the arms supplier 
achieves its objective in the recipient country. This, in fact, is 
the main contention of this thesis. 
Traditionally the arms/influence relationship has been examined 
largely from the supplier to the recipient but I want to balance this 
by also examining the problem as it flows from the recipient to the 
supplier. 
I shall now proceed to analyse the other variables which must be 
taken into consideration in analysing the effectiveness of influence. 
My main contention is that, whether an arms recipient would always 
accept influence from another state (in this case the arms supplier) 
depends on the following interacting variables: 
1. Recipient's alternative sources of arms supplies 
2. ReCipient's conflict/arms race involvement 
3. ReCipient's evaluation of supplier's interests 
1. Recipient's Alternative Sources of Arms Supplies 
My argument here is that the extent to which a recipient country 
is vulnerable to influence by a supplier, will depend on whether it 
relies solely on one supplier. In a situation of alternatives, the 
recipient is in a far stronger position to act contrary to the 
interests of its supplier, whereas if the recipient is dependent on 
only one supplier, it is liable to be influenced, even against its 
better judgement. 
Having said the above, it is pertinent to analyse the 
relationship between arms suppliers and their recipients, especially 
(47) 
when advanced weapons systems are involved. It should be noted that 
most Third World countries (with the exception of Israel, South 
Africa, India and Brazil) possess no capacity to produce advanced 
weapons systems. Therefore they rely on technologically advanced 
countries for these types of weapons. These weapons systems are 
highly sophisticated, specialised and complicated, and this 
sophisticated means it is difficult for them to be installed and 
operated. It is even more difficult to change them. Conversion 
often requires a long transition during which time the recipient's 
military capability is impaired. This creates the tendency to want 
to remain with a single supplier. 23 
Of course, the recipient countries rely on the supplier 
countries because the latter are technologically superior. It is for 
similar reasons that the recipients will have to depend on the 
original arms suppliers for considerable technical assistance, spare 
parts and formal training programmes for possible handlers of the 
weapons systems. This is even more the case with the type of the 
weapons included in my discussion. 
The very specialised nature of these weapons systems might 
render the already acquired weapons virtually useless during the 
after conversion. The immense cost of these weapons systems therefore 
makes any conversion unattractive. This also means that the weapons 
systems cannot be substituted. In fact, in some cases, there is just 
no substitute. For example, the Soviet Union. Its 
counter-insurgency (COIN) aircraft are far less sophisticated then 
the U.S.A.'s A-4 Skyhawk, and A-37 Dragonfly.24 These 'coin' weaponry 
and others in similar categories are used in the Third World against 
popular uprisings and local dissidents. Therefore, the recipients 
may not find an alternative supplier outside NATO. In any case, 
these weapons systems are manufactured by few countries, thereby 
(48) 
further reducing the range of supply. 
Apart from the need for technical assistance and spare parts 
already mentioned, financial problems in fact reduce, or even 
eliminate, the possibility of securing alternative supply sources. 
This is especially the case when seen against the background of the 
high cost of these sophisticated weapons. In general, recipients who 
obtain arms through grants (for example, the U.S. Military Assistance 
Programme - MAP) are often considered to be more susceptible to 
suppliers' manipulation than those who purchase through direct sales 
(for example, the U.S. Foreign Military Sales - FMS). Nevertheless, 
even when recipients purchase weapons systems outright, suppliers, 
particularly the United States, retain the right to control the use 
of weapons. Most of the U.S. arms sale agreements prohibit the 
resale or the transfer of the weapons systems to a third party and 
restrict their deployment (location) and use. 
In addition, political and ideological relations between 
recipients and suppliers may also rule out the opportunity of 
alternative sources of arms supply. For example, countries (like 
Saudi Arabia) opposed to communism may refrain from turning to Moscow 
and its allies for major weapons systems. Furthermore, the 
conservative complexion of these states depend upon American 
political support against domestic as well as foreign adversaries. 
Similarly, states in the international community considered to have 
'pariah' status such as Israel and South Africa have had their 
options narrowed for acquiring major weapons systems, except from a 
recognised and sympathetic ally like the U.S. in the case of Israel. 
Faced with these constraints, it is assumed that a recipient 
prefers to succumb to policy manipulation by the supplier rather than 
incur the supplier's displeasure, which might possibly lead to future 
arms transfers being terminated or restricted. Nevertheless, under 
(49) 
some circumstances, arms recipients may take actions contrary to 
their supplier's wishes. To illustrate this point one could mention 
the Egyptian/Soviet experience. In 1972, Egypt not only expelled the 
Soviet military advisers and technicians and reduced the Soviet 
diplomatic mission in Cairo, but also shifted from the Soviet Union 
as a primary supplier to a consortium of Western arms suppliers, 
particularly the United States, but mainly, after 1978. 25 
2. Recipient's conflict/arms race involvement 
The willingness of a major power to provide a recipient with 
weapons systems, either for an external offensive or a 
counter-insurgency operation, is assumed not only to deter a 
recipient's regional adversaries, but also as gestures of political 
support and commitment to the recipient's domestic and foreign 
policies. Therefore, arms transfers have a two-fold purpose of 
reassuring friends and warning adversaries. 
Given these assumptions of suppliers' political support for 
recipients, it is expected that the recipient, in return, will 
co-operate in a way that is preferable to the suppliers' interests. 
Israel in this case would be the most susceptible to major 
power/influence attempts via the arms connection. Would Israel be 
expected to be vulnerable to American pressure? The reasons are 
many. First, Israel has been in conflict with its Arab neighbours 
since its creation in 1948. Second, Israel is not likely to obtain 
the policy support it needs against its neighbouring states without 
the political support of Washington, hence arms transfers imply 
political support. Third, U.S. economic assistance to Israel enables 
it (Israel) to buy the weapons systems it needs. Finally, since 1967 
the U.S. has been the only source of major weapons systems to Israel. 
Was Israel affected by American pressure during its conflict 
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engagement? The answer is that Israel tended to be more co-operative 
with the United States during crisis situations. 26 The 1973 October 
War represents a good example of a crisis situation in Israel's 
history. Israel in 1973 perceived that its national security was in 
danger, particularly when Egypt and Syria made successful military 
advances in the early days of the war. Israel also recognised the 
fact that the U.S. was, and is still the only power which would and 
could remove the danger. Faced with the 1973 dilemma, Israel was in 
a position to modify its policies towards the Arab states and thereby 
keep with the wishes of the u.S. in return for arms she needed 
desperately at that time. Nevertheless, Israel's concessions to the 
Arab states and thereby to u.S. wishes were generally limited. 27 
It was anticipated that Egypt would be vulnerable to the 
manipulation of arms transfers because of its active foreign policy 
in inter-Arab politics (1955-1978). The activism brought Egypt into 
an ideological Cold War with its Arab neighbours (Syria, Iraq, 
Jordan, Libya and Saudi Arabia). Egypt's pan-Arab commitment was 
further demonstrated by its involvement in military operations in the 
Yemen (1962-1967). Cairo's authority was also challenged by domestic 
insurgents from the right and the left alike. Finally, one may note 
that Egypt had been the leading recipient of Soviet arms in the 
developing world from 1955 to 1973. 
The question to be asked now is, whether Egypt was influenced by 
Soviet arms supplies during its conflict involvement? The answer is 
that Egypt tended to be influenced by Soviet arms during its conflict 
involvement. This is represented by Soviet military access in Egypt: 
"Between 1969 and 1972, the Soviet Union had access to six air bases, 
several ports, and dry dock and other naval facilities in Alexandria 
and elsewhere."28 Nevertheless, Soviet influence over Egypt's 
policies was restricted. 29 
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There is an obvious connection between conflict and arms race in 
the sense that potential conflict or actual conflict will invariably 
lead to greater demand for arms, and this in turn will throw the 
recipient into the arms of the supplier. When regional pressures on 
the potential recipient, expressed as conflict, force the recipient 
to demand arms, then the dependency on a supplier state will be very 
great. This is especially so, when, like Saudi Arabia, a country has 
built up a strong pre-existent relationship with its supplier, 
thereby contingently restricting its arms market. Influence under 
such conditions are very likely to be created. Of course, when 
conflict is present, the influx of arms into a region is likely to be 
very great, and this will in turn further destabilise that region in 
that it will, in fits and starts, enhance the power of conflicting 
states to be aggressors. Equally the distrust of regional states of 
another state's arms acquisition, is likely to lead them to want 
arms, or is the mere presence of regional conflict because of the 
fear of a spillover or there being drawn into the conflict through 
being called on to be allies. 
The most appropriate definition that distinguishes the arms race 
from other arms acquisition patterns is given by Lewis Snider. He 
defines an arms race as "an acquisition of arms intended to alter the 
relative power relationship among competing states."30 According to 
this definition, in a conflict situation like the Arab-Israeli 
dispute, each adversary is looking for suppliers who are willing to 
furnish weapons systems whose effectiveness is equivalent to whatever 
their adversaries are receiving, in order to alter the military 
status quo in its favour or at least to uphold it. 
Responding to such demands the supplier provides the recipient 
with effectiveness weapons systems capable of keeping the military 
balance even and it is assumed that the recipient may be willing to 
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allow the supplier some leverage over their foreign policy behaviour. 
The recipients become dependent on the suppliers for spare parts, 
maintenance and training, particularly when sophisticated weapons are 
provided. 
Before assessing suppliers' attempts to manipulate the arms 
supplies within the context of a recipient's arms race, one might 
introduce Geoffrey Kemp's study of the type and quality of Soviet and 
American weaponry. Kemp suggested that Soviet aircraft and armour 
have limited military utility. Popular Soviet fighter aircraft such 
as MIG-23s and SCUDs surface-to-surface missiles are used for 
'defense missions'. Alternatively, U.S. conventional weaponry sold to 
the Middle east countries such as Israel have often been provided 
with sufficient military air power such as F-15 and F-16, capable of 
warding off external threats, 'offensive operations', keeping the 
political status quo and upholding the regional military balance. 31 
Given Kemp's analysis of the superpowers' weapons systems' 
characteristics Israel was thought to be more vulnerable to the U.S. 
wishes than the recipients who receive Soviet weapons. Israel, whose 
arms race with Egypt has been sustained by conflict since 1948, was 
provided with the most effective U.S. air power system (F-4s, F-15s 
and F-16s) capable of offsetting any military attempts to change the 
status quo in the Middle East region. 
The question now to be asked is, whether Israel has been 
affected by American arms supplies during its arms race in the 
region. Because Israel is sensitive to any improvement of its 
principal adversary's military capability, she tends to withhold 
co-operation from the U.S. by making some concessions towards 
resolving its conflict with its neighbours until additional arms are 
promised. For example, the Golan Heights Disengagement Agreement of 
1974 as well as the Sinai II Disengagement Agreement of 1975 were 
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accompanied by substantial u.s. military credits to Israel. 32 This 
suggests that Israel would not be nearly as responsive to supplier's 
influence, via arms transfers were it not for the intensity of its 
arms race in the Middle East regions. 
3. Recipient's Evaluation of supplier's Interests 
As I have shown the findings generally support the assumption 
that the use of arms transfers might extract co-operation towards 
suppliers' wishes from recipients who are involved in the arms race 
or conflict or dependency on primary source of arms supplies. 
Nevertheless, arms transfers within the context of these three 
variables have not produced a clear positive political influence. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of these three variables to make a 
positive connection between arms transfers and political influence, 
is very likely dependent on the introduction of a fourth variable 
which I shall call 'value orientation' or 'policy priority'. What I 
mean by 'value orientation' is how much and for what reason 
recipient's value the interests that suppliers attempt to achieve 
through the transfer of arms. 
Applying recipient's value orientation of supplier's interests, 
the following major hypothesis, which is to be evaluated in Chapter 
Five, might read as follows: 
The suppliers' ability to influence recipients' behaviour tends 
to depend on the recipients' evaluation of the interests that 
suppliers attempt to achieve through arms transfers. 
If supplier's interests involve questions of the survival and 
existence of recipients, e.g. protection from internal and external 
threats, then recipients might be willing to comply with supplier's 
wishes, simply because the former places high value on these 
questions and situations. On the other hand, if recipients do not 
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feel threatened, or if suppliers attempt to induce recipients to 
support unpopular policies by the use of arms transfers, then 
suppliers might be disappointed by the lack of co-operation on the 
behalf of their recipients. One reasons for the lack of co-operation 
by recipients might be the political cost that recipients may have to 
pay at home in support of such policies. Finally suppliers 
might/might not extract co-operation from recipients when the 
former's interests do not represent either a threat or a political 
cost for recipients. 
Therefore, based on the range of values attributed by recipients 
to certain suppliers' interests, the utility of arms transfers as an 
instrument of influencing foreign policy, varies widely. It is also 
possible that this critical variable orientation of recipients would 
depend on the previous three variables - conflict involvement, arms 
race and primary source of arms supplies - to determine the 
effectiveness of arms suppliers' influence over arms recipients' 
behaviour. One possible explanation for this assumption is that the 
two other variables are the cause for arms demand, and thereby can 
contribute to the linkage of arms to political influence through the 
'value orientation' in a positive relationship. 
A major assumption underlying this hypothesis of 'value 
orientation' is that the United States desires to influence Saudi 
Arabia's foreign policy behaviour, via arms transfers, towards U.s. 
interests in the Middle East region, i.e. Saudi Arabia co-operates 
with U.S. wishes. This will be' analysed in Chapter Five. By the 
application of the hypothesis in Chapter Five, I will examine the 
nature of the structure of influence flowing between U.S. national 
interests and Saudi Arabia's foreign policy behaviour. 
Since the primary purpose of this study is to analyse U.S. 
attempts to use arms transfers to influence Saudi Arabia's behaviour 
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towards American interests, there will be no discussion in regard to 
Saudi Arabia's attempts to influence United States' behaviour 
(reverse influence) despite the fact that the United States cannot 
remain unresponsive to Saudi Arabia's political/military wishes. 
Therefore, one of the spin-offs of this thesis would be to 
investigate how Saudi Arabia can use its strategic and economic 
assets to make the United States susceptible to its political wishes. 
Looking at the result of factors influencing the demand side, 
one might conclude that if arms transfers lead to political influence 
(getting the recipient to do what he would not normally do), the 
effectiveness of such influence is likely to be dependent on the 
'value orientation' variable. But, other variables such as the 
recipient's conflict engagement, arms race and primary source of arms 
supply, are important in determining the arms influence relationship. 
It is ironic, however, that arms transfers as an effective foreign 
policy influence is dependent on variables that are not amenable to 
direct manipulation of arms suppliers. 
B. Supply Side: Influencing Factors 
Foreign policy is not only a matter of Executive decision, but 
often entails accountability to the legislature and its oversight 
bodies. Executive-determined 'national interest' is not the only 
factor at work. A multiplicity of interests ranging from pressure 
groups to Secretaries of State, Defense and Congress have a voice in 
the drama of the decision-making, and these are influencing factors. 
Apart from the roles played by domestic representatives, are the 
issues of policy continuity, security and strategy as it is effected 
by foreign oppositional forces, e.g .. the U.S.S.R. in relation to the 
U.S., and the continuity of an established pattern of influence. 
However, this portrait of a fully operating modern democracy which 
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debates the issues, weighs up the arguments and applies due process 
to decision, is one that does not fit reality. 
Arms transfers are so lucrative for arms manufacturers, who in 
the U.S. are usually major corporations, that inevitably those 
corporations will actively pressurise and squeeze politicians to 
support arms transfers initiatives. This form of pressure can tend 
to override the requirement by statute, for arms sales to be 
accountable in terms of foreign policy.33 This is not to say that 
arms sales goes through irrespective of foreign policy 
considerations, but that domestic factors, sometimes illegitimate 
ones such as bribery, corrupt the legitimate pursuit of 'national 
interest' through arms sales. The diffusion of national interests in 
this way, inveighs against the obviousness of an account of the 
effects of arms sales as procuring, in my case, oil and strategical 
and political influence and advantage. Certainly these 'local' 
factors which are 'below board' can be reduced to the acceptable, 
normative factor of 'national interest', but the means by which this 
is achieved, and the particular interest served by these means, 
indicates the diffraction of arms transfer policy, and a basic 
incoherence foreign policy may suffer 1n its passage from initiation 
to implementation. 
(57) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
UNITED STATES ARMS TRANSFERS POLICIES: INITIATION TO IMPLEMENTATION 
Introduction 
Above I have argued that the U.S. has attempted to apply a 
redundant model of the arms transfers relationship. This, I 
suggested, led to co-ordination problems. What I do in this chapter 
is concretise our claims by providing a historical outline of the 
United States/Saudi Arabia arms/influence relationship as it is seen 
from the American perspective (the supply side) in the pre-1973 era. 
Before I do this, there are several factors which have for the 
most part, been permanent features of the United States/Saudi Arabia 
arms transfers relationship: 
1. Frequent review of Saudi Arabia military needs through the U.S. 
Military Training Mission (USMTM). 
2. U.S. oil needs. 
3. The competition between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to have a 
political, military or economic presence in the Middle East 
ultimately for strategical purposes. 
4. U.S. domestic opposition to arms transfers to Saudi Arabia from 
pro-Israeli groups outside and within Congress. 
The inter-relationship of these factors will be explicated 
within the narrative. 
In the main I deal with the arms transfers policy and process 
from the supply side, but this cannot exclude its underside - the 
demand side (Saudi Arabia), though the secretiveness of Saudi Arabia 
makes the analysis of its policy process difficult. 
Michael Klare in his 'American Arms Supermarket' has argued that 
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the politico-military factors are of primary importance, and insofar 
as this is true, he claims that " ... because many U.S. policy-makers 
believe in the long-term efficacy of the arms transfer instrument, 
these factors retain their motivational power, and thus it is 
important that I examine them closely.,,1 I am, of course, not in 
disagreement with this, for I want to account historically for 
arms/influence relationship precisely in these terms: the beliefs of 
U.S. policy-makers and the impetus their beliefs give to making arms 
sales a major instrument for procuring influence, via the central 
notions of 'national interests', in recipient countries. The history 
of arms/influence is as much as history of intertwinning of foreign 
policy-makers beliefs with 'national interests' as it is of the 
actual sales themselves. 
Post-War Affluence: The U.S. Arms Surplus 
The Neutrality Act of 1939 lifted prohibition of arms sales and 
this enabled the exchange of arms for cash. Thus began the role of 
U.S. as being a major supplier of arms to the world and lifted its 
ranking as an arms supplier from 4th to 1st. The notion of such 
value-free arms sales was quickly compromised by the forming of 
wartime alliances. These were to establish the distribution pattern 
of arms for the following decades. 2 The alliances in a post-war era 
were hardened into formal alliances, under the umbrella of (I) NATO, 
and (2) UN. However, the post-war aims of universal peace did nothing 
to create a post-ideological politics, and the swift setting-in the 
'Cold War' period constituted a global duality of America and the 
Soviet Union, and this has been a dominant factor in the forefront or 
at the back of the minds of U.S. foreign policy-makers since. 
Behind formal post-war organisations lay two significant U.S. 
provisions with regard to arms transfers: 1941 Lend-Lease scheme 
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which enabled enormous amounts of arms to be transferred to Allied 
Forces between 1941 and 1945. 3 It may be noted, perhaps prematurely 
that this scheme was extended to aid Saudi Arabia economically upon 
their providing air facilities to the United States during World War 
11.4 The second programme of importance was the Military Assistance 
Programme (MAP) whereby stockpiled American arms, now surplus, were 
given "free" to friendly countries. This programme was enabled under 
the Mutual Defence Assistance Act (MDAA) legislation passed by 
Congress in 1949. 
Primarily aimed at the defence of NATO and friends of the U.S., 
the MDAA and MAP also found the basis of a policy to oppose the 
encroachment of communism in the form of the Soviet Union. 5 While 
NATO under the dominant influence of U.S. were inevitably drawn into 
the emergent U.S. policy of containment and deterrence of Soviet 
aspirations, the U.N. because of the presence of its halls of the 
Soviet Union and its friends and allies could not be so drawn, though 
undoubtedly America took a lead in devising the U.N. policy of 
collective security and the pursuit of nation-building. Through NATO 
and grants-in-aid, militarily and economically the U.S. has pursued 
its foreign policy objectives as overshadowed by the threat of 
'communism' . 
This policy of "containment and deterrence" dating from 1947 
became formally known as the "Truman Doctrine" having emerged from 
the Truman administration years. The expansion of this policy in the 
1950s and 1960s led to the extension of military assistance to 
non-NATO and non-European states especially to the Middle East and 
the Far East; the latter not least because of the Korean War 
(1950-53) and the Vietnam War (1964-75). 
The absorption of surplus arms by the mid-160s heralded a change 
in arms transfers from these as 'grant' under the MAP to procurement 
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of revenue under Foreign Military Sales (FMS). A few years later the 
largesse of the U.S. declined further such that the 1969 "Nixon 
Doctrine" declared that a country friendly or allied to the U.S. 
would continue to receive aid under treaty commitments, but would 
have to depend on its manpower for its defence. 6 Significantly, this 
underlined the accusation of 'imperialism' thrown at the U.S. by its 
domestic critics, but paradoxically showed the impact of their 
criticisms and protest over the Vietnam War, in addition to which, it 
was anyway a spectacularly unsuccessful war adding, with 
embarrassment for the U.S. with the fall of Saigon to the communist 
forces 1n 1975. 
Though maybe shocked and embarrassed into withdrawing or 
restricting the presence of American troops and manpower in foreign 
countries, U.S. arms sales increased rapidly, and as Roger Labrie and 
others have pointed out, in 1966, 59 nations received FMS deliveries, 
but in 1975 this had risen to 74 nations. 7 In addition, commercial 
sales (CS) from U.S. countries rose from 51 countries in 1966 to 77 
countries in 1974.8 The easiness of arms procurement from the U.S. to 
other states, was of concern to Congress and the passing of the 1968 
Foreign Military sales Act, required successive administrations to 
list clearly FMS with foreign policy objectives. With this went the 
extension of Congressional oversight, though this was circumvented by 
Nixon's instruction in 1972, to satisfy virtually all Iranian 
requests for conventional arms9 and Ford's 1976 instrument to do the 
same for Israel. IO The failure of oversight and the continuing rise 
of FMS suggested that FMS were largely in the hands of presidents and 
their administrations, and that the 'imperial' president, despite 
reverses in active foreign intervention, was Emperor at home. 
Despite the apparent power of Congressional committees, foreign 
policy was largely as it had always been, located in the White House, 
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and the bureaucracy. Only when the Office of the President had been 
disgraced and weakened by the scandal of Watergate, and the 'Lockheed 
scandal' had had full effect, did Congress produce effective review 
measure for FMS. 
The apparent split of Congress and Executive to the diminution 
of the role of Congress in the development and policy process of FMS, 
is a question of the locus of decision-making with regard to arms 
transfers. 
Largely having reviewed arms sales to other countries from the 
supply side, this thesis has rested on the assumption of a homogenous 
and relatively passive recipient. I shall show that with the 
changing balances of regional power, the model became less applicable 
by which presidents could assess the link between foreign policy, 
national interest and regular pattern of influence. However, for the 
purposes of this chapter, I show recipient's behaviours did indeed 
make their responses to arms transfer one of an epiphenomena to an 
initial causal agent. In this way, the who, what, when, how and why 
of selling arms was very much in the hands of the supplier, and I 
require an internal examination of American perceptions of the 
structure of arms transfers to best account for them in the pre-1973 
period. 
Arms Transfers: Motives and Processes 
In a politically and morally differentiated governance such as 
the United States, invariably debates and struggles ensue which have 
the effect of constraining or enabling the passage of a decision via 
'due process'. The structural features of this process are primarily 
articulations of the formal roles of the Congress and executive. But 
the politics of the passage from policy initiation to implementation 
is a different story. This turns on the roles of interests, 
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ideological pre-dispositions and existent policy arrangements. 
Prior even to this is the question of the genesis of a policy 
initiative itself - the motives - I discuss these first. They are 
constant in character in that they are as Michael Klare puts it 
"always present, no matter who occupies the White House".II In other 
words, this is a matter of the factors underlying all policy-making 
in the U.S. or come to that, most countries. Arms transfers then, 
are not just accountable in terms of arbitrary executive-defined 
interests, but should be seen in terms of being a permanent empirical 
feature of a nation's foreign policy. This goes to the core of 
national political consciousness, and the idea of, an implicitly 
legitimated set of actions or purposes, the presence of which in 
themselves are politically indisputable. 
The question for political actors, is not whether the motives 
behind arms transfers should or should not be there, for to abolish 
them or to argue against them is to remove a central plank of the 
rightful practice of government. No, the issue is to what extent 
they should be pursued, and how, and the implications of, and motives 
behind, these motives, and whether these are legitimate. The latter 
in particular entails the operation of a review procedure. But what 
are the 'proper' motives? At this juncture the motives behind 
particular arms sales are not in question, what I seek is to identify 
the general motives behind most major arms sales. 
It is common to divide motives into three types: political, 
military and economic. I2 The location of these motives is within the 
executive and as M. Klare rightly points out, the 
executive-bureaucratic monopoly on arms transfer policy has acted as 
a bulwark against oppositional sectors vis-a-vis particular arms 
sales. The motives to make arms sales are regarded by its 
progenitors as essentially non-negotiable. 
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The political level of common agreements as to the rightful 
motives for arms transfers are: the support of U.S. friends and 
allies, the procurement of anti-communist commitment from those 
allies both voluntary and coerced, the political alignment of other 
states with the U.S. and the deterrence to regional border states not 
aligned with the U.S., the attainment of base rights, overseas 
facilities to support the deployment and operations of U.S. forces 
and intelligence systems, the indirect political benefits brought to 
a particular administration through the effective use of revenues 
from arms sales, the political enhancement of U.S. in regard to its 
standing due to increased economic strength through arms sales 
revenues, the ability of the U.S. to directly or indirectly influence 
the government of a country through its dependence on U.S. for arms 
which enhances its internal and external security. Finally, the 
promotion of regional stability whereby arms sales or withholding of 
arms acts as an incentive to bring warring countries to heel or get 
opposed countries to reconcile differences. However, that does not 
mean that political effects are always in the control of the 
suppliers' decision to sell or not to sell for political purposes. 
This control measure is tempered by the fear that not selling arms to 
the state, may lose a taken-for-granted pattern of influence, and 
instead produce a negative reaction by the now non-recipient who will 
then search for a new supplier. Thereby, the original supplier may 
lose the wider pattern of influence had had nurtured, and which he 
thought he controlled. 
In a variety of statements emanating from the White House and 
the various executive branches of the U.S. government, many or most 
of the points in the above list have been endorsed as contributions 
to U.S. national interests. I3 . Which pOints or 'motives' have a 
higher priority than others is difficult to determine because of 
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different perceptions of different administrations and perhaps more 
importantly the priorities given to certain motives in certain 
situations. The latter are often part of the rhetoric in speeches, 
and designed to allude to, persuade, coerce, satisfy, promise or 
threaten the audience to whom the speech is addressed. But what 
really are the priorities in terms of the logic of foreign policy can 
for the most part only be inferred or guessed at. 
Politico-Military Motives 
It is often not clear how to separate the political from the 
military motives for an arms transfer. Where in my discrimination of 
the political motives, military motives are secondary. It may be 
that when concentrating on military motives, the same political 
motives originally primary, will now be secondary. Again, this 
depends on the purposes and reasons for prioritising one type of 
motive over another, according to specific situations. In other 
words, the constant presence of such motives, is no indication of 
their ordering in active foreign policy. 
However, the military motives which can be discriminated are as 
follows. 
Without doubt, an obvious role of arms transfers is to have a 
measure of military support from a regime in the event of war or 
regional conflict. I noted earlier, the deliberate programme of 
withdrawal of U.S. manpower from other countries as stated in "Nixon 
Doctrine" so that American mil itary aid should as time passes tend to 
be evaluated in terms of U.S. military hardware sales, in particular, 
sales of offensive weapons. 
The moral and political dilemma of "imperialism" through the 
presence of U.S. troops is partially alleviated through this transfer 
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of emphasis from the presence of troops plus arms, to just the sale 
of arms. This at the same time not only signifies a kind of alliance 
between one state and the U.S., to other states, but also directly 
between the recipient and the supplier. Such an implied alliance is 
the basis on which the willingness by a state to act in the 
strategical interests of the U.S., stands. The substitution of arms 
for troops is a point made by Under Secretary of State for Security 
Assistance, James Buckley, when in 1981 he testified to the 
Sub-committee on International Security. He said of the substitution 
that it permitted "them [recipients] in some cases to undertake 
responsibilities which otherwise we ourselves might have to 
assume.,,14 Arms transfers to friendly regimes to complement or 
alternate the provision of U.S. troops is then used to share the 
burden of U.S. military responsibilities with other friendly regimes. 
The fundamental point of this burden-sharing is the bolstering up of 
a regime friendly to the U.S. like many of the motives, it can be 
interpreted in the light of the superpower competition between the 
U.S.S.R. and the U.S. The military aspect of this is strategical 
insofar as a U.S. friendly regime will tend to be opposed to the 
U.S.S.R. and not only rebuff their offers of various kinds of aid, 
but will resist Soviet regional threats. The resulting failure of a 
Soviet Union 'ally' to intimidate or coerce a U.S. ally will rebound 
politically and militarily upon the image or idea of a Soviet 
regional threat, and will therefore tend militarily to have a 
pro-U.S. stability effect in a region. Where there is a perceived, 
indirect Soviet threat, it is likely that countries having these 
perceptions will not be receptive to U.S. advances. When Soviet 
regional presence is strong, countries in that region which are not 
threatened by a Soviet backed regime, and are neutral, may well 
prefer to stay neutral in the face of U.S. offers, lest they draw 
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Soviet attention to themselves by an implied alliance, having 
accepted a u.S. arms transfer. The potential u.S. influence will be 
lost. The u.S. must strongly back a regime in which it has a 
foothold, to take another step. 
These points are in the main strategical, but there is another 
military motive which is limited to military resources. Arms 
transfers-created alliances will tend to lead to intelligence sharing 
both with regard to regional issues and Soviet influence. Not only 
may the u.S. be allowed to maintain intelligence-gathering facilities 
manned by its own personnel, but the regime may share with the U.S., 
intelligence gathered by its own, often u.s. supplied monitoring 
equipment, manned by its nationals. 
Economic Motives 
I have seen the bonding between the military and political 
motives. The economic motives are, I suggest, relatively autonomous 
of the politico-military linkage. 
Arms transfers are intrinsically economic. They are all sales. 
I noted the shift in the mid-1960s from free arms transfers (MAP) 
which absorbed World War II surplus stock, to arms sales (FMS). Arms 
transfers are now a certain form of procuring revenue for their 
producers, and through taxes, the u.s. In regard of the latter 
point, some may want to argue that large corporations in the u.s. 
spend a lot of effort reducing their tax burden such that some highly 
profitable corporations pay negligible taxes. 
Arms are expensive to produce, and due to high demand and the 
political and military cachet of getting more and better, arms are 
expensive to buy. This does not mean that production is low. Indeed 
arms manufacturers produce a formidable arsenal and spend large 
amounts of money on research and development (R & D) in anticipation 
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of domestic government contracts. Should there be a fall in the 
Pentagon's expenditure, arms manufacturers will often be left with 
surplus arms, which due to their high production costs, must be sold 
to get back their costs. IS An unsold weapons system is not like an 
unsold banana, one unsold weapons package may ruin a company which 
has not sold many arms anyway. Due to this phenomenon of occasional 
surplus, market-clearing becomes necessary and this entails selling 
to foreign markets. In this way, firms can recoup potential loses 
before they occur. In such cases, the Defence Department is obliged 
to support foreign transactions lest they create uncertainty, 
distrust and suspicion in the domestic arms industry. In turn, the 
collapse of an arms manufacturer would create political costs for an 
election-conscious administration in terms of unemployed people; 
though this, in terms of numbers would be relatively insignificant. 
Equally, the costs of developing arms can be shared between foreign 
and domestic buyers, thus lowering the costs of purchase to the 
U.S. I6 So again FMS has an economic kick-back accruing to the u.S. 
One somewhat obscure point, but one which the likes of C. Wright 
Mills would make. The support given to the Republican presidents and 
to a lesser extent GOP (the Republican party) by the 
"military-industrial" complex is, in high cost elections, crucial to 
Republican candidates, and a lack of support for arms manufacturers 
is likely to reduce their financial support. I7 
Having dealt with the supply side, which is the main purpose of 
this chapter, I turn briefly to the demand side. 
The demand for arms is necessary for non-arms manufacturing 
countries to provide or enhance their domestic and external security 
needs. This may extend to the acquisition of arms to demonstrate a 
regime's political strength internally and to the world at large, and 
their capacity to prosecute wars. In other words, a demand for arms 
(70) 
may not only be a response to threats and immediate security issues. 
Again, I have broadly, two identifiable clusters motives -
politico-military, and economic. The politico-military motives, 
which dominate, are those I have mentioned. The economic motives are 
not so obvious. But in countries where development as a whole is 
low, the need to maintain and operate arms entails learning 
'industrial' skills which can be put to good use for the economy as a 
whole. Various countries have used the army as a vanguard of 
economic development. 
However, insofar as recipient's economic concerns affect their 
ability to gain arms, it is internal economic ability or possessions 
such as oil that generate sufficient revenue to increase the demand 
for arms. This is especially so when the price of a natural resource 
in a recipient country rises, such as the price of oil did in the 
1970s, that causes a correspondent increase in the demand for arms. 
Where recipient regimes have military governments, (and many do) arms 
acquisition is a priority not only by a virtue of the priorities in 
the military mind, but to ensure support of the armed forces to an 
encumbent military government. To enhance the arms of the military is 
to buy the support of the armed forces. President Aquino is 
discovering this at present. 
Institutional Perspective of an Arms Transfer in the u.s. 
Before I pick up the main purpose of this section, let me draw 
a distinction between institutional and historical explanation. Let 
me call an institutional explanation one which elucidates the due 
process of a policy or decision as it passes from initiation to 
implementation through the formal structure of government. Further 
let me divide this into several broad movements: (I) Formulation, (2) 
Presentation, (3) Review, (4) Approval, (5) Final Approval, (6) 
Enactment. 
examination 
processing 
instruments 
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In other words, institutional explanation is an 
of how a decision ought to be made in terms of the 
of a policy through legitimate and constitutional 
of the decision-making process. Historical analysis is 
an account of how particular decisions are actually made irrespective 
of whether they have passed through the legitimate or 
constitutionally appropriate channels. 'Real' decisions may involve 
bribery, lobbying, influence - all instruments (depending on how they 
are used) which are strictly speaking not properly part of the 'due 
process' of implementation. 
The recent "Iran-gate" scandal has shown how certain appointees 
in the executive branch have attempted to by-pass existing roles and 
regulations controlling the flow of arms and alliances between the 
U.S. and named states. These rules are rules restricting arms sales 
and have the force of law, and thus should be obeyed in regard to any 
future decision. Various Acts or rules having a bearing on arms 
transfers have been in force since arms transfers became recognised 
as a major form of trade with political as well as economic 
significance. As I am dealing with the relationship between two 
countries which has only properly existed on a government to 
government basis since the 1940s, I shall mainly consider arms 
transfer regulations and laws as they pertain to that period. 
The predominance of the Military Assistance Programme (MAP) over 
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) prior to the mid-1960s meant that rules 
regulating arms transfer were mainly a question of who was eligible 
to receive and eligibility conditions of receiving arms rather than 
the conditions in terms of 'due process' and finance, under which 
arms transfers could be made. There have been numerous acts which 
have affected arms transfers, but I shall pick on the most salient. 
The "founding" legislation was the 1951 and 1954 Mutual Security 
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Acts. Within the confines of the "Cold War" division of the world in 
anti-communist/communist, these acts provided for bilateral mutual 
defence assistance. The 1951 Act placed on the Secretary of Defense 
responsibility for supervising the uses to which military aid was 
put. However, the dissatisfaction of Congress with the Act as it was 
presented, led it to determine certain conditions which the recipient 
had to accept. They were rather high-minded, such as promoting 
international understanding and pursuing world peace, mutual action 
with the U.S. to eliminate cause of international tension, fulfil 
requirements of existing agreements with the U.S., contribute as far 
as is compatible with its development, to its own security, and use 
the arms grant properly.lS 
Aid to Iran in 1952 was stopped because Iran refused to meet 
those conditions. 19 A supporting Act of 1951, the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act (Battle Act) added a rider that countries 
threatening U.S. security including the U.S.S.R., and countries under 
its domination, could not receive strategic material. This, however, 
still allowed the president, after careful review, to continue aid to 
countries which aided socialist countries. The 1954 Mutual Security 
Act further empowered the president to waiver the above controls. 20 
These early acts after the 1951 Act were enabling rather than 
controlling in the sense that they permitted the president to 
override the vague, yet in their vagueness, demanding requirements of 
the 1951 Act. Instead of furthering the idea of Congressional review 
these acts maintained that arms transfer policy was to be primarily 
in the hands of the Executive in general, and the president in 
particular. Another means of controlling arms transfers, in 
particular to the Middle and Near East, was the provision of the 1950 
'Tripartite Declaration' regarding the security in the Near East 
which insisted that recipients of arms should "play their part in the 
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defense of the area as a whole,,;21 an example of this was the 1955 
Baghdad Pact. 
The 1954 Mutual Security Act was effective for commercial arms 
sales until 1976 when it was superseded by the International Security 
Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. However, 
FMS were made subject to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act which 
regulated FMS as well as grant aid arms. This itself was superseded 
by the 1968 Foreign Military Sales Act which incorporated most of the 
provision of the 1961 Act. The remaining provisions of the 1961 Act 
continued to be effective on military grant and over and above FMS.22 
The 1961 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) cut down the provisions of 
the 1951 Act and its successors. As applied to military grant aid it 
restricted the cost of defence article to $3 million in anyone year. 
But it also specified that apart from a recipient affirming the 
principles in the U.N. Charter, a country would use the resulting 
arms for its own defence and that "of the free world". It reaffirmed 
that a country maintained its own defence correspondent with its 
social and economic capacity and that the increased defence 
capability of a country is important to the U.S. 23 Still the 
president was given much leeway, and the determination of recipient 
conditions was in terms of U.S. security. Amendments to this in the 
1962 Foreign Assistance Act stated that aid should be cut off if any 
of the clauses were violated and that countries clearly able to 
defend themselves should become ineligible. 24 In 1967 an amendment 
was added to the Foreign Assistance Act requiring that economic aid 
be cut off to any underdeveloped country (except forward defence 
countries) buying sophisticated weapons it does not need and cannot 
afford. This amendment was incorporated into the 1968 Foreign 
Military Sales Act including credit sales. 25 This implied a 
considerable limit on the Executive decisions to sell arms. Third 
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World nations aspired to possess sophisticated weapons, and those 
with military government were especially prone to this desire. 
Required to refuse aid to countries which overstepped themselves by 
their military demands was potentially an embarrassment for the US 
Executive, and a tying down of its control of a major component of 
foreign relations. However, the 'Executive-legislative Consultation' 
on U.S. arms sale document of 1982 judged that "it has only been 
since the rapid growth of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cash and 
credit program in the early 1970s that Congress has focused intensive 
attention on this subject. n26 
The passing of the decade brought increased demand for 
congressional oversight. As the 1982 document puts it nthe executive 
branch increasingly sought to use arms sales as an instrument in 
support of American foreign policy goals. n27 This taken with the 
1973 Arab oil embargo led to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act which 
most notably established Congress' right of review and veto over 
major defence sales. 
The above lands me just over the border of the pre-1973 period I 
am to discuss. It offers an outline of the major acts and 
regulations which were enabling or restricting measures on arms 
sales. With these in mind I now turn to the formal structure of the 
policy process. 
Formal Structure of Arms Transfer - Pre-1973 
The formal process of an arms transfer has held fairly constant 
since the 1950s through to the early 1970s. This constancy is based 
on a comparative absence of extensive oversight, and the granting of 
the president the power to decide who gets what, where, when and how. 
The latter point, 'how' 1s one that sits uneasily between the 
possibility of presidential by-pass of rules and regulations and the 
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formal legislation process. 
One cannot emphasize enough the centrality of the role of the 
Department of Defense (000), though other areas of government were 
involved, as I have implied or stated in several places in the 
pre-1973 period. The formal structure of arms transfer was firmly in 
the hands of the Executive rather than the legislative branches of 
government. However, before I go further I must reiterate the 
distinction to be drawn between Military Grant Aid and Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS). FMS were largely features of the post-1973 
period, but sufficiently significant to mention their implementation 
structure in the pre-1973 period. 
Arms transfers starts with a request for information on u.S. 
arms by a potential recipient, though this is often preceded by a 
U.S. review of a country's defence needs. In the grant aid years the 
process was much determined by the 000 which pooled together the 
information of a recipient country's needs which had been 
investigated by annual report of the Military Assistance Advisory 
Group (MAAG). The 000 then worked out estimates of the size of the 
grant based on the MAAG submission. The required amount would then be 
sent to Congress who would have to approve the appropriation. In 
response to criticism of the way decisions were actually being made 
by the 000, a Director of Military Assistance was appointed in 1960 
with the task of overseeing the administration of all military aid. 28 
The President was in final command of grant aid and the 
organisation of foreign military assistance period. He could 
re-organise the structure and order of responsibilities for the 
execution of an arms transfer. 
The co-ordination of administration with assessment of defence 
needs, strategical implications and defence policy came from the 000 
or as the 1951 Mutual Security Act put it: "The Secretary of Defense 
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shall establish priorities in the procurement delivery, and 
allocation of military equipment ... 1129 
Other than this two major bodies administering arms transfers 
were: (l) Agency for International Development (AID), (2) The 
Department of State (DoS). The former was responsible for the 
coordination of military and economic aid but the latter formulated 
military aid policy in relation to economic and political aspects of 
foreign policy whereas the 000 was supposed to be solely concerned 
with the military aspect of a transfer. The 1959 Draper Committee 
expressed disquiet at the inadequate understanding by the departments 
of their different roles. It was, of course, the president's role to 
implement reforms in the departments and allocate the roles with more 
precision. The role of the DoS was supervisory in the main, since 
the particular military knowledge which decided the nature and size 
of the aid was in the hands of the Pentagon. This, of course, gave 
them leverage over their formal superior, the DoS. It has been 
pointed out by Trevor Taylor (1972) that Eisenhower and Kennedy 
believed the "State Department should have final legal authority over 
military aid". 30 This was reinforced by Eisenhower's establishment of 
an Inspector General to oversee wasted expenditures and supervise aid 
procedures. 
The main role of Congress was the formal appropriation of funds, 
this gave them control over the purse-strings in line with their role 
as protector of the proper use of taxes. But to suggest that this 
constituted 'a determining role' over policy as T. Taylor does is to 
ignore the point that really, the restriction of appropriation only 
sets limits on the size of grant and does not shape policy in any 
specified way other than expenditure. 
It was widely agreed one of the central bodies in arms sales 
policy was the International logistics Negotiations (IlN) unit 
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located in the Pentagon. Established in 1961 under the auspices of 
the International Security Affairs section it primarily had a role to 
assess the economic aspects of arms sales. 
It both encouraged the u.s. arms manufacturers to seek foreign 
markets and stimulated foreign countries to purchase u.s. weapons. 31 
This had the effect of bringing in considerable revenue which would 
cover the costs of u.s. military spending. Again the location of 
arms transfer control question arose - as to whether it was the 
responsibility of the DoD or the DoS. The ILN gave the DoD a 
powerful voice but the office of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) in 
the DoS set up in 1961 acquired a military knowledge so as to provide 
a firmer base from which to supervise the work of the ILN. 
The role of the President in FMS was much the same as for grant 
aid - delegating responsibilities. The actual decision-making is of 
course at the ultimate behest of one man - the President - though he 
is subject to the advice of the various state Departments, National 
Security Council (NSC) and anyone else he feels like taking note of. 
The struggle between the DoS and the Pentagon was not just a struggle 
for administrative control, but also for policy and decision-making 
control, and this was often a reflection of the Secretaries of the 
Departments as they saw fit. 
The United States/Saudi Arabia Relationship - An Historical 
Perspective on Influence Pre-1973 
It is common place to assume that the basis of the United 
States/Saudi Arabia relationship is the exchange of arms for oil. 
This is not as it stands wrong. But it does need considerable 
refining. 
The promotion of arms transfer pre-1973 has a lot to do with 
U.S. arms policy determinants, not least the rules and regulations 
standing over arms transfers. These set out considerations the U.S. 
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had to take in giving military grant aid or making sales. The Cold 
War period and the recently formed U.N. made the international 
ramifications of arms transfers a major policy criterion. Within 
these limits the politics of arms and the ever-present uncertainties 
both moral, and strategical in regard to the Israeli problem, made 
the issue of arms a focus of domestic as well as foreign interest. 
But in a post-war world where the United States and the Soviet Union, 
and most other countries were seeking some form of alliance so as to 
lay down lines of influence or of aid, the demand-push enhanced by 
the formation of regional alliances drew together the 'Superpowers' 
and aid seeking countries, especially Third World countries. The 
domestic political costs tended to be offset by the need to 
articulate a U.S. foreign policy which would not be blocked by the 
Soviet Union. The weakness of oversight and the permissions given to 
the president and the executive branches of government settled few 
restrictions on foreign-policy decisions. Any restrictions as I have 
shown were largely provoked by inefficiency, inter-departmental 
competition to control policy, or indirect security threats to the 
U.S. recipients selling their military grants to states not-friendly 
to the U.S. One further form of restriction, if it could be called 
that, was the encouragement of recipients to agree to the ideals of 
democracy and the U.N. Charter. 
Insofar as I want to evaluate the nature of influence between 
United States and Saudi Arabia one needs to reiterate this in terms 
of the interplay of its two forms: (1) the historical structuring of 
influence so that u.S. can achieve desired foreign policy aims in 
another state with the acquiescence of that state, and that, that 
relationship can help to bring about particular ends with which in 
the absence of the historical relationship, that other state would 
probably not co-operate or comply; (2) the immediate use of influence 
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which gets another state to do something it would not otherwise do; 
(3) behind the emergence of a pattern of influence are the processes 
of the decisions which supplement the construction of influence. 
I examine these three factors from the pOint of view of the 
supplier's intentions. 
Obviously a relationship has to start somewhere such that a 
common domain of interests is discovered and for the United 
States/Saudi Arabia relationship, this occurred in the 1930s. 
In 1933, Ibn Sa'ud, the King of Saudi Arabia, granted an oil 
exploration concession of 66 years to Standard Oil of California 
(SOCAL).32 A subsidiary company, California Arabian Standard Oil 
Company (CASCO), ran the operation and by 1938 oil was flowing. In 
1939 the oil was exported and by 1942 Saudi oil output reached 15,000 
barrels per day, this amounting to about 5% of Middle East oil 
production. 82% of oil came from Iraq and Iran, but Saudi oil fields 
were more important since they were considerably located farther 
south and thus became less vulnerable than those in Iraq and Iran to 
be subjected to German offensive through Turkey. Further, Saudi 
Arabia was capable of much greater output should it be needed. 33 
However, particular concern from CASCO officials was raised by the 
1940 Italian air-raid on Saudi oil installations from the Axis air 
base at Eritrea and contributed to decline in oil output. CASCO 
requested the presence of U.S. troops and anti-aircraft guns. This 
proposal had considerable official support from the U.S. charge 
d'affairs in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. Secretary of State. 34 
This was one of the first manifestations of 'imperial' 
encroachments, the King had worried about. In granting the 1933 oil 
concession, Ibn Sa'ud had believed that a concession to a private 
American company would not be used by the U.S. government to obtain a 
political toehold in the Kingdom in the manner of European imperial 
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powers. 35 That Ibn Sa'ud was less suspicious about u.s. intentions 
than Britain's, led Britain to support CASCO's request. Also Britain 
thought that the u.S. would help negotiate the plugging of the oil 
fields in the face of a German advance into the Middle East. Daniel 
Si1verfarb makes the important point, that in 1942 "the British 
government wanted u.S. troops around the oil fields badly enough to 
accept the probable increase in American influence in Saudi Arabia 
which would result from this dep10yment".36 Britain had sent in 
officers to plan an oil denial scheme, as had the U.S., but it was 
the u.s. who, through their oil experts, got CASCO to plug 22 of its 
wells, leaving 6 in production. These were sufficient to satisfy the 
allied oil needs. 37 
Despite the conflicting manoeuvers between Britain and the u.S. 
in Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia had not declared war on the Axis powers 
though invited by Britain to do so in 1942. It is not clear why Ibn 
Sa'ud would not do so, but it has been speculated that Ibn Sa'ud was 
not certain of the outcome of the war and also he feared that his 
declaration would lead to allied troops in Saudi Arabia. At this 
stage, British and U.S. interference in Saudi Arabia was covert and 
the King remained largely unaware of the manoeuvers. 
What Si1verfarb fails to mention in his article is the extent of 
Saudi Arabia's financial difficulties. Due to the war Saudi Arabia's 
main source of revenue gained from the Hajj Pilgrimage to Mecca had 
been severely reduced. CASCO had lent Saudi Arabia $6.8 million up 
to 1939, but naturally did not want to be burdened with the 
underwriting of the Saudi treasury.38 They turned to the U.S. 
government. In 1941 CASCO through James Moffett, a friend of 
Roosevelt, requested a loan of $6 million for five years to Saudi 
Arabia against a discount on oil products but at the urging of the 
Navy Secretary, the loan scheme was turned down. The Navy had 
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submitted that the oil could not be used for U.S. shiPs.39 However, 
by 1943 the influence of the State Department and CASCO officials 
prevailed. They had underlined the strategic importance of oil to 
the U.S., who at this time was fully engaged in the war. For this 
reason, and that of Washington's concern over Britain seeking 
influence in Saudi Arabia to the detriment of U.S. led to an offer in 
1943 of Saudi inclusion in the Lend-Lease Scheme. 40 
Finally, the U.S. had come to the realisation that oil was a 
crucial resource, not only this but also the competition with Britain 
had pushed the U.S. into furthering its interests in Saudi Arabia. 
What is not clear is whether the U.S. wished to entertain any 
post-war designs in Saudi-Arabia. 
Apart from oil interests, the U.S. was granted permission by Ibn 
Sa'ud in 1942 to overfly Saudi Arabia, which carried no reciprocal 
arrangements, and in that sense was not clearly an affirmation of a 
basis of any relationship. But for war purposes it served to 
maintain lines of communication, and the flow of war materials to the 
Soviet Union, and thus was another reason to incorporate Saudi Arabia 
in the Lend-Lease scheme. 41 
Under the recommendation of Assistant Secretary of State, Dean 
Acheson, President Roosevelt made the necessary finding that the 
defence of Saudi Arabia was vital to the U.S. This done, arrangements 
to formalize the lend-lease scheme to Saudi Arabia were initiated in 
the same year. 42 
It was this that provided the basis on which the first arms 
transfers from the U.S. to Saudi Arabia could take place. However, 
Saudi Arabia's initial requests for arms were planned to be 
implemented by using Britain as the conduit of supply. Once again, 
the conflict of interests between Britain and the U.S. over their 
respective relations in Saudi Arabia, surfaced. Upon this Britain 
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backed off gracefully, and it was made understood that direct arms 
transfers between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were to be effected. 
Under the lend-lease programme, the Saudi government in 1943, 
requested arms assistance consisting of rifles, ammunition, tanks, 
anti-aircraft guns as well as advisers to instruct Saudis in the use 
of the equipment. 43 This was the first direct military connection 
between the Saudi Arabia and the United States. However, the U.S. 
responded by providing only token military supplies, which in type 
and quantity were just sufficient to maintain law and order. 
Included were rifles, machine guns, ammunitions and a small American 
military mission. 44 This now satisfied Saudi Arabia's desire to 
better protect herself internally, but it did not boost the 
confidence of the oil company in regards of protection of its 
essential interests. 
Oespite the paucity of this military assistance, it marked the 
beginning of a long-term direct association between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia in the field of military/oil cooperation. 
Oespite Middle East oil contributing to the recovery of Europe, 
it played a relatively small role in supplying the U.S. with energy 
requirements. For instance, the U.S. in 1948 was importing about 
half a million barrels per day of foreign crude - about 8% of its 
total domestic production. 45 However, it was the fear of Soviet 
advances in the Middle East, characterized as an aspect of the 'Cold 
War', taken in conjunction with the creation of state of Israel 
(1948) were major determinants of the background to the fortunes of 
United States/Saudi Arabia relations. These two areas manifested 
themselves as problems of mutual security and as domestic political 
accountability to a significant Jewish electorate. As President Harry 
Truman was reported to have said to State Department Counsel: "I'm 
sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands, who 
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are anxious for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of 
thousands of Arabs among my constituents".46 
Despite this, in 1949 the American Legation in Jiddah became an 
embassy. This was a sign not of retrenchment in the face of Saudi 
annoyance at U.S. recognition of Israel, but of an expansion of 
United States/Saudi Arabia relations. 
Back in 1943 Secretary of State Cordell Hull had spoken of 
providing the U.S. with 'extensive air facilities,47 but these did 
not show any sign of appearing until 1945 when an agreement was 
reached between the United States and Saudi Arabia to construct an 
air base at Dhahran. 48 This airfield had little interest for the U.S. 
after the war, until 1949. With the advent of the Cold War and the 
Soviet threat to the area, it regained its strategic importance. In 
June of that year a second agreement was concluded which gave the 
U.S. access to the airfield. 49 At the same time an American military 
survey team began an assessment of Saudi military needs. 
In 1951 the Mutual Defense Assistance and Dhahran airbase 
agreement provided for an exchange of arms and military training for 
the continued use of the base. 50 But this was not as direct as it 
may seem. U.S. priorities of oil and the policy of keeping the 
regime in power mediated the exchange. The Mutual Security Act (MSA) 
of 1951 demanded that arms recipients should pursue moves toward 
democratic ideas was forced to take a back seat in the face of 
military and economic considerations. 
When the Dhahran airbase agreement came up for renewal in 1956 
the negotiations included a Saudi demand for $300 million in military 
grants. Most interestingly the inclusion to the request for tanks 
and F-86 Sabre jets. 51 
The transfer of tanks to Saudi Arabia had been agreed, but due 
to the rising tensions between Arab states and Israel which obliged 
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Saudi Arabia to partake in an Arab 'defensive alliance' the sale met 
with a backlash from Israeli-American protest. 52 The day before the 
shipment was due to leave (February 16, 1956) it was temporarily 
suspended so as to give the executive, namely the Under-Secretary of 
State Herbert Hoover, a chance to lobby key senators. Though not 
wanting to face the criticism of the pro-Israeli lobby, Senate 
allowed the deal to go through, and the M-41 light tanks were sent to 
Saudi Arabia. 53 The irony was that most of this small scale arms 
package was obsolete anyway. It was in mid-1956 that protest would 
have had more success. Then the U.S. agreed to a sale of M-47 
'Patton' medium tanks and F-86 'Sabre' jet fighters. 
There could be some puzzlement as to why the U.S. supplied the 
tanks. Perhaps the most fundamental reasons, other than an 
obligation under the 1951 treaty with Saudi Arabia to supply military 
equipment, was (a) that it might make the Dhahran airbase renewal 
easier and (b) that Saudi Arabia had needs of them for training and 
internal security. Both these reasons were linked to U.S. policy 
priorities in regard of Saudi Arabia namely, the crucial military 
importance of Dhahran airbase to U.S. interests in the Middle east, 
the (stated) policy of protecting or rather promoting countries to 
protect themselves internally and their oil, and in particular 
encouraging the continuity of the Saudi pro-Western regime. Given 
the rise of nationalism in the region, that continuity was not a 
certainty and therefore, making the regime secure created a certain 
influence over the future of Saudi stability. The implication is of 
course, that protection of Saudi interests was the protection of U.S. 
interests: oil, military and influence. 
The incident of the tanks demonstrated a certain incoherence, 
indeed administrative disparateness in the executive, but in the long 
term, more significant was the concern of the public and Congress 
(85) 
generated by it. This latter point proved to be the axis on which 
opposition to particular arms sales would line up. But these forms 
of pressure were combatted by the articulation of the 'Eisenhower 
Doctrine' in 1957 which made issue of the 'communist' spectre. It 
was this that asserted the primacy of the executive in the control 
and determination of foreign military policy priorities. 
Despite the relative absence of Congressional oversight of the 
arms transfers process and attempts to secure a distinct 
congressional role, both the tanks and the Dale Smith54 episode 
demonstrated the sensitivities of the executive to domestic 
criticism. It also betrayed the inter-departmental uncertainties 
over who did what in effecting a transfer. This, and the consequent 
Draper Committee report tended to place arms transfer on the 
political agenda of a rather wider group of interested parties than 
the executive would perhaps have liked. It could also mean that the 
granting of arms requests would in future be more circumspect, which 
in turn would potentially limit the willingness of the U.S. 
government to readily accede to requests. But not to show willing to 
recipients requests would tend to be taken as a sign of reluctance in 
the face of friendship and commitment. Thus, there was a political 
tight rope to be walked by successive U.S. governments who for a 
plethora of reasons needed to affirm their commitment to Saudi 
Arabia. I have said that U.S. priorities in selling arms were oil, 
security of the Saudi regime, and access to strategical bases in a 
region susceptible to Soviet pressure. 
Over and above the military reasons for Saudi vulnerability and 
the threat to U.S. influence in the region through Soviet activity, 
was the ideological forces that were flowing in Arab states in the 
form of republican and popular nationalism. Nasser-led Egypt had in 
1963/64 on several occasions flown across and bombed Saudi territory 
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without opposition, thereby demonstrating its strength. But more 
important than this was the reason for opposition to Saudi Arabia. 
Republicanism was obviously deeply opposed to Saudi monarchy, and 
nationalism was inimical to Arab state's ties to Western or foreign 
powers. This ideological challenge posed a two-pronged threat to 
u.s. interests and to Saudi Arabia, and was backed by the superior 
forces (in relation to Saudi Arabia) of Egypt. The u.s. who had, as I 
have shown, a positive programme to encourage states to defend 
themselves through their own manpower were also restricted by 
political costs, of directly interfering in the Saudi-Egyptian 
antagonism. Thus, J.F. Kennedy warned Nasser that U.S./Egyptian 
relations were being jeopardised and further, wrote to King Faisal 
affirming u.S. support and sent out a u.S. training mission and a 
fighter squadron - this was known as Operations Hardsurface. 55 Here 
U.S. was prepared to get Egypt to back-off, at the same time draw 
Saudi Arabia closer to it, and justify the military presence in the 
region, even if it did withdraw its 'training mission' after a few 
months. However the problem was, that such intervention would be 
taken as a firm commitment, to bailout a friend in the event of 
conflictual situations arising involving the friendly state. The 
U.S. wanted Saudi Arabia to acquire its own weapons system so that 
the U.S. would not be dragged into regional conflicts and always have 
to pay a political cost, especially given the anti-American 
nationalist criticism. Clearly it was a relief to the U.S. when in 
1964 Saudi Arabia concluded it needed a comprehensive air defence 
system which would include jet fighters, advanced radar and 
communications system, and (SAM) missiles. 56 This Saudi air defence 
package had been largely conceived within the presence of American 
air defence survey team in 1963. The arrangement as it stood was 
clear cut, the package would be American and three squadron of 12 
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aircraft either Northrop F-5s or Lockheed F-104s would be its 
backbone. 57 But from here on the situation became complicated, and 
showed up the way in which the u.s. could be duplicitous in its 
dealings with Saudi Arabia and largely get away with it. 
Complexities set in when Britain needed a major arms export in 
order to facilitate her purchase of an F-111 package from the U.S. 
From having no preference between Lockheed or Northrop as to who 
should supply the planes to Saudi Arabia, Robert McNamara swung away 
to support a joint U.S./U.K. aircraft package of three squadrons of 
British F-52 lightning interceptors plus radar and communications 
supplies. The U.S. for its part would supply the Raytheon Hawk 
(SAM) missiles. The total package was worth about $300 million. 58 
The Saudis had been persuaded to buy this jOint package. Saudi 
Arabia was vulnerable to western offers of security assistance. 59 
The long struggle from 1958-1964 between King Faisal and his brother 
King Sa'ud over the control of the government left the Saudi defence 
and financial ministries in a weak status with regard to organisation 
and procurement apparatus. Thus, the Saudis were not prepared to 
evaluate or manage Western security offers on their own. This was an 
indication of the weakness of Saudi defence procurement and planning, 
and a sign of the completeness the U.S. had over the terms of Saudi 
security development. It was also an evidence of the dependency of 
Saudi defence needs on the U.S., and the consequent influence the 
U.S. could exert in the specifics of this trade area. 
From the domestic side of American politics, the episode 
emphasized executive autonomy, especially that of the Defense 
department and the ILN in a case which was eminently suitable for 
Congressional oversight. The probable blindness of the Saudis to the 
duplicity of the deal most likely obviated justifiable feelings of 
manipulation and consequent distrust of U.S. action. 
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From the point of view of the arms transfer decision process 
this was perhaps the last deal of significance before my main period 
of interest - post-1973. The cooling of relations between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia due to U.S. support for Israel in the 1967 
Arab-Israel conflict caused a lull in arms transfers between the two 
countries. Saudi Arabia then turned mainly to France for arms. By 
the early 1970s the U.S. was once again involved in arms deals with 
Saudi Arabia. 
I have tried to show in my historical narrative how the 
relationship connecting U.S. oil interests and Saudi 
interests was shaped from the pre-war period to 1973. 
Arabia arms 
The important 
point was the gradual build-up to the realisation of the importance 
of oil for the U.S. and the consequent need for the U.S. to enhance 
Saudi Arabian security if the U.S. was to secure its oil needs, and 
later its defence needs, by which to oppose the spread of Soviet 
influence. There was confidence that Saudi Arabia would supply oil 
to the U.S., but the U.S. was concerned about Saudi Arabian security 
and its own military advantages which protected the flow of oil from 
Saudi Arabia. It was this in particular which pushed the U.S. into 
making arms transfers, rather than the threat of an oil embargo at 
the time. 
(89) 
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CHAPTER THREE 
u.s. FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS IN SUPPLY ARMS TO 
SAUDI ARABIA, POST-1973 
The previous chapter outlined the nature and regulations of arms 
transfer decisions in the U.S. It also offered a brief account of 
the character and politics of particular arms decisions pre-1973 and 
the circumstances which censtituted and affirmed the relationship and 
influence-structure operating between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia. The major points made were, that America seeks for oil from 
Saudi Arabia and to achieve this enhances Saudi Arabia internal and 
external security. The U.S. attempts to dissuade (1) the Soviet 
Union from advancing in the Middle East region, (2) enhance Saudi 
security which in turn (3) ensures the flow of oil and (4) advances 
U.S. military and strategical interests in the region, (5) creates 
the opportunity for U.S. foreign policy initiatives in the region. 
The last point embodies much of what one means by historical 
influence working upon immediate influence. That is, the conditions 
of, at least, partial dependency of Saudi Arabia upon U.S.-provided 
security the facilitation of which is rooted in the historical 
relationship, creates circumstances of obligation towards U.S. 
initiatives even when Saudi Arabia does not want to accede to those 
particular requests because of perceived costs to Saudi Arabia, it 
may bring. 
Further, I noted the weakness of Congressional oversight and 
the acts which confirmed that the process of decision are largely 
absent of interference by committees of Congress. In other words, it 
is at the behest of, in the main, the Departments of State and 
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Defense, and the President. 
Since my main purpose is to examine the post-1973 period 
concentrating on 3 major arms deals, the last chapter of necessity 
was skimpy, compared to this one which will make a detailed analysis 
of the post-1973 arms deals. 
What I do is to elaborate a model of the arms transfer process 
for the post-1973 period which is cognisant of the basic theoretical 
issues of the linkage between foreign policy and arms transfers. The 
primary focus is on foreign policy interests and how they are 
processed and made coherent or incoherent and, in turn, how they 
become considerations in effecting an arms deal with another state, 
in this case Saudi Arabia. 
This chapter attempts to explore the nature of the interests 
that the United States seeks to achieve through its arms transfers to 
Saudi Arabia. Section A attempts to find answers to a set of 
questions designed to provide an analysis of a state's foreign policy 
objectives in relation to the transfer of arms. Among these 
questions are the following: what constants determine the framework 
of arms transfers? Which rules and laws determine, restrain or enable 
arms transfers? What is the process of making an arms transfer? 
Historically, what has characterised the domestic politics of arms 
transfer? With respect to Section A, Section B will examine the 
nature and implications of the three major aircraft arms deals 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. By this, one is led to 
ask whether the United States achieves its foreign policy objectives 
in Saudi Arabia. 
Before I move directly to Section A, we must make a note about 
the character of foreign policy insofar as it is relevant to this 
chapter. 
While 'real-politik' obliges one to recognise that a dividing 
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line between foreign and domestic policy is often very thin, and 
subject to trade-offs and the overriding of domestic restraints, one 
must acknowledge a realm of foreign policy exists wherein one country 
makes a decision so as to facilitate a certain type or set of 
relational positions with other countries. 
United States' foreign policy refers to actions undertaken by 
the government of the U.S.A. in the international or 'global' arena. 
The question that might arise now is, What is the purpose for which 
actions are taken? A foreign policy then is not only a course of 
action but also the purposes it is intended to serve. The purposes 
these actions are supposed to serve are usually called goals or 
national interests. In other words, foreign policy refers to "a 
course of action developed by the decision-makers of a state 
vis-a-vis other states, aimed at achieving specific goals defined in 
terms of national interests".l But foreign policy is not made in a 
vacuum. It is influenced by internal and external forces and 
effects. 
Within the ever-shifting balance of International Relations, 
States will attempt to take decisions which are teleological in 
character, that is, they are goal oriented by design, and are 
intended to achieve that policy-goal. Relative to its political and 
economic strength a country will have a relatively successful or 
unsuccessful policy initiative without incurring too many costs or 
externalities. In this way it can serve its national interests and 
preserve existing ones. The United States, better than most, is in a 
position to exert and carry out a vigorous and robust foreign policy 
with regard to many countries. Of course, this is based on a 
relatively stable groundwork of rules and procedures. Foreign policy 
may be defined within the national setting as the formulation of 
decisions with regard to economy, political structure, ideology an 
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resources,2 and within the external setting, as that which tries to 
influence the behaviour of the global system and more especially the 
intentions and actions of other states. Here foreign policy may be 
described as "a response to external challenges, and opportunities".3 
Finally, what means are available to a government of a state to 
achieve its national interest? Here one may describe foreign policy 
as the representation by a state to another state of one's national 
interest, the usage of appropriate means to materialise the desired 
interests and the preservation of existing interests. It is worth 
noting that achieving goals outside a state boundary implies that the 
intention of a state's foreign policy vis-a-vis other states is to 
affect their behaviour in order to get the desired outcomes. Foreign 
policy can then be expressed in terms of goals and actions, as well 
as the national and international settings that are linked to them. 
Means to effect interests can result from a policy only if the 
policy-makers in a state clearly understand what they have in mind, 
what these interests are, and the factors that influence them, as 
well as possible consequences of such a policy. A model can 
illustrate policy or behaviour that relates national/international 
factors to a state's objectives/means and potential outcome. Foreign 
policy can be represented as follows: 
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Figure 1: Foreign Policy Behaviour Model 
Relating national/international factors to foreign policy objectives/actions 
(1) 
I 
Conditions: 
Factors Influence 
Foreign Policy 
Objectives 
A. National 
-Belief 
-Economic 
-Political 
-
Interest 
groups 
- Political 
parties 
B. International 
-Global 
-Regional 
Feedback 
I 
(2) 
I 
Enda: 
Foreign Policy 
Objectives 
A. Defence/ 
security 
B. Political/ 
diplomatic 
c. Economic/(oil) 
I 
(3) 
I 
Means: 
Actions in 
Pursuit of 
Foreign Policy 
A. Force 
B. Diplomacy 
C. Trade 
Including 
the transfer 
of arms. 
service and 
maintenance 
D. Executive/ 
legislative 
Feedback 
(4) 
I 
Outcomes: 
A. Success 
B. Failure 
with 
regard 
to 
(1) stated 
policy 
(2) case 
by case 
intentions 
Note: Oil is the biggest single dominant of policy initiative 
in regard to American-Saudi arms transfers. 
Explanation of the Model 
Figure 6 suggests how a foreign policy behaviour model is 
conceived. The model is divided into four stages identified by Arabic 
numbers. These are (l) (2) (3) (4). One includes a set of 
internal/external situations/events that might instigate responses by 
the government of a state to take actions in regard to these 
Situations/events. The elements of inputs of the first stage are 
mainly specified for the developed/industrial countries, particularly 
the United States. This is largely because First World states have a 
more complete access and coherent control over a wider range of these 
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elements than do, say, Third World or underdeveloped nations. This 
is of course a pragmatic distinction. 
(I) Inputs - Influencing Conditions 
A National Conditions 
Among the national conditions that influence foreign policy 
behaviour are as follows: 
1. Belief - The Role of Ideology and Culture 
K.J. Holsti describes ideology as "any explicit set of beliefs 
that purports to explain reality and usually prescribes goals for 
political action".4 He adds that ideology not only establishes goals 
but justifies action. S Therefore, there are two essential elements 
of ideology: a set of beliefs, and its relationship to political 
action. One can assume that in order to explain the behaviour of a 
state one must understand how a state adheres to an ideology such as 
capitalism or communism. The foreign policy of a state reflects its 
belief system - the values it holds. The adherence of the United 
States President, Woodrow Wilson, early in this century, for 
instance, to the principle of self-determination6 as an expression of 
nationalist ideology was surely, at least in part, a reflection of 
American traditional sentiment of Anti-Imperialism, Isolationism, and 
Democracy - of the sovereign and constitutional nation. Today, 
America's changed attitude to foreign policy - a policy of activism 
in world politics - has led American to intervene in various states' 
affairs, not least in South East Asia - a traditional area of 
interest to the U.S. and Latin America. Partly to prevent the Soviet 
Union from gaining a hold in various states, and partly to achieve a 
pro-American stance by these states, America has used a variety of 
influencing or interventionary strategies such as the offering or 
removing of economic aid, or the sending in of troops to prop up an 
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ailing regime (Dominican Republic 1965). While this shift away from 
an ideology of absolute sovereignty seems to be a shift from 
ideological reasoning, in fact it could be argued the ideological 
goals have shifted such that America conceived of democracy as a long 
term achievable goal of capitalistic regimes which happen to be 
pro-American. Of course this is not the whole picture because the 
rhetoric still proclaims that subjects of American intervention are 
being aided in their move towards self-determination. The gap 
between ideological rhetoric and reality is an inevitable aspect of 
foreign relations; contradictions abound in the desire to obtain 
influence. The Soviet Union has supplied military assistance to 
states that prohibit communist organisations and activities -
Nasser's Egypt, Hussein's Iraq and Gaddafi's Libya and others. 
Therefore, ideologies are (despite strategical shifts) forces of 
political relations that are taken into consideration when 
formulating foreign policy behaviour. 
A subsidiary consideration is that of culture. Though 
undoubtedly a factor in social and political explanation, it seems 
largely to have been traded off against ideology by the U.S. Insofar 
as culture is a set of fundamental norms and beliefs which underpin 
the whole of a society or are recognised as valuable and inviolable 
by that society, there is little reflection of domestic cultural 
considerations in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Of course 
culture is a far more relevant consideration when developing a policy 
for another country. In dealing with a traditional society such as 
Saudi Arabia, diplomatic sensitivity and high protocol towards 
cultural norms and values of that country is often required. A 
classic case of cultural insensitivity (though this refers to 
Britain) was the British sponsored film "Death of a Princess" which 
appeared to question the morality of Saudi society and leadership. 
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Relations with Britain were nearly severed. 
2. Economic - The Search for Raw Materials and Foreign Markets 
In order to stay in power, most governments of industrialised 
states have to develop policies of economic growth and social welfare 
which reflect an increase in the nation's Gross National Product 
(GNP) as well as improvement of employment. These domestic needs can 
possibly be fulfilled through economic expansion abroad since most of 
the developed states, and super powers, have not yet proven to be 
economically self-sufficient in terms of raw materials and markets. 
Thus, access to foreign markets and searches for raw materials and 
opportunities of investment abroad, are necessary for increasing a 
state's economic welfare. 
The Marxist view of American "imperial" capitalism is of 
exploitation of the Third World countries in a search for markets for 
its goods and services, cheap raw materials for its industries, and 
high return investments for its capital. These capitalistic 
interests, for the Marxist, explains American imperialist behaviour 
in the international scene. 7 Equally the Marxist-leninist who 
resists claims about the Soviet Union does not behave towards the 
Eastern Bloc as America does towards the countries it "exploits". 
Eastern Bloc countries provide the Soviet leadership with markets and 
investments. Therefore, regardless of ideological orientation, a 
state, of needs, must enhance its economic base, and ensure its 
people's welfare, and this can only effectively be done through 
economic engagement abroad. 
3. Public Opinion - Interest Groups and Political Parties 
Public opinion on foreign policy may be described as the views 
and attitudes of the public in relation to the foreign affairs of a 
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state. However, the transformation of public views and attitudes 
relies on representations by persons and organised groups that desire 
particular policy goals. These extra-executive or legislature bodies 
are terms interest groups and political parties. The question now is 
whether interest groups and political parties can affect foreign 
policy decisions. One may legitimately ask this question because of 
the vast immigrant population in the u.s. Since the end of the 19th 
century the immigrants in successive generations have retained a 
sense of origin and heritage-of-roots in another country, such that 
they are not only American but, say, Irish or Central European, or 
Arab, e.g. Edward Said. This leaves many Americans prone to taking 
an active and practical interest in foreign policy, especially when 
it deals with the country of their origin; thus the motives behind 
the powerful Irish or Jewish lobbies in New York. These factors can 
significantly affect the formulation of foreign policy. Of course, 
whether groups do affect policy decisions depends on the preparedness 
of a government to permit pressure groups and political parties. In 
the case of the U.S., pressure groups and political parties are an 
essential component of the political structure. 
i) Interest Groups 
The primary reason for organising an interest group is lito 
reach and influence the decision-making agencies of the 
government toward predetermined goals". 8 But it is not only an 
interest group that sets the goals. Governments may set the 
goals and anticipate opposition to them. Through lobbying, 
foreign policy interest groups, for instance, may have the 
opportunity to appear and testify in front of their 
congressional representatives (legislatures), the media, the 
bureaucracy, and the like, in an effort to have policies adopted 
that are beneficial to them. Among the most powerful interest 
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groups in foreign policy are the ethnic groups and the 
military/industrial establishments. Ethnic groups are active in 
influencing foreign policy decisions which result in favourable 
positions towards their countries being adopted. In the U.S.A. 
for instance, the most powerful lobby groups are the 
American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the 
Anti-Defamation League (ADL). These interest groups have sought 
and still seek, through lobbying the administration, the 
Congress, and the political parties, U.S. economic and military 
assistance to Israel. These groups also have attempted to block 
U.S. arms sales to Arab countries hostile to Israel, such as 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan. 
There is a strong linkage between the military 
establishment and industrial corporations. This linkage can 
simply be identified in terms of the dependence of the military 
interest groups on the industrial interest groups for the 
manufacturing of armaments since armaments in most Western 
states, particularly the U.S., is a private business. Armaments 
in the U.S. means profits for the industrial groups and power 
for the military ones, and vice-versa. It is at least a 
bi-lateral relationship. C. Wright Mills' The Power Elite has 
shown that the politico-military-industrial complex expresses a 
multi-lateral relationship.9 Within this context, arms sales to 
other countries means making profit for the former, and testing 
new weapons systems as well as buying friends abroad for the 
latter. For this reason among others, arms manufacturing 
companies and military elites lobby through the Congress and the 
administration to facilitate the sales of arms. And since they 
provide a government with the necessary means, such as 
armaments, to implement foreign policy decisions, a government 
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might find it hard to avoid their leverage. 
ii) Political Parties 
In Western democracies, the foreign policies of political 
parties often assess the views of their supporters and take note 
of certain interest groups. In the U.S., for instance, the 
Republican or the Democrat Party proclaims a set of proposals 
and policies that attract to its banner the maximum number of 
votes of all interest groups and others. However, these 
proposals and policies, particularly the controversial ones, may 
be modified during or after the election. 
Generally speaking, the Republicans stand for heavy outlays 
on foreign aid, particularly economic and technical assistance, 
as well as on the stationing of American troops abroad. The 
Democrats favour foreign aid and commitments abroad. 10 With 
respect to military assistance, both the Republicans and 
Democrats favour U.S. arms sales to allies and friends in an 
attempt to win their support for U.S. objectives. Examples are 
President Nixon's arms sales to Iran in the 1960s and the 1970s, 
and arms sales by Presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan to Saudi 
Arabia in the 1970s and 1980s. 
B. International Conditions 
These are divided into two sub-groups: one the Global system and 
the other, the Regional system. 
1. Global System 
This system might be described as the "pattern of interactions, 
and relationships among the major territorially based political 
actors existing at a particular time".11 But who are these major 
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political actors that compose the global system? Today, the global 
system, taken as a pattern of major political and economic actors, 
would include the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, 
and China. The point here is to draw a practical as well as a 
conceptual distinction between a dominant system of international 
political and economic forces, whose actions have multilateral global 
effects, and regional sUb-systems whose foreign representatives tend 
to be unilateral, or epiphenomenal in character as a result of 
another's input. Especially since World War II the number of actors 
included in the global system has increased, but it is evident that 
the United States and the Soviet Union dominate the global system. 
This global system is still largely characterised by competition 
Though often in competition for influence and strategical 
superiority, action by one superpower triggers responses by the 
others, and thereby unintentionally tending toward a balance of power 
between them. This balance between the two super powers is also 
applicable to their relations towards regional sUb-systems. A super 
power's actions to pursue its national interests in the Middle East, 
for instance, must take into consideration, at least formally,12 the 
affect of these actions on the other super power. In this case both 
the U.s. and U.S.S.R are obliged, in taking note of each other's 
actions in the Middle east, to take especial cognisance of oil 
supplies and the Arab-Israeli conflict. And since both super powers 
are the key suppliers of arms to the Middle East, and have obvious 
strategical, political and economic reasons for supplying arms, they 
continue and extend this arms market. 
2. Regional System 
Just as 'global' actors respond to each other, so may regional 
actors similarly respond to each other. Equally, as I have suggested 
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above, regional actors may perform actions which are epiphenomenal to 
'global actors' inputs. A possible response by a state of the global 
system towards a state of a regional system could be explained within 
the context of national interests. If a state of a regional system 
is to ask a state of the global system for economic or military 
assistance in order to cope with its internal/external challenges, 
then this might constitute an opportunity for a state of the global 
system to maximise its national interests in the international 
environment. Among these interests would be, to influence the 
behaviour of a regional state or to neutralise the actions of another 
global state. For example, the attacks in the 1960's of North 
Vietnam and the Viet Cong forces, supported by the Soviet Union and 
China, on South Vietnam prompted the latter to seek military and 
political backing from the United States. The U.S. viewed these 
attacks as an attempt to disturb the balance of power of the super 
powers in South-East Asia. In addition, the U.S. regarded South 
Vietnam's request for assistance as worthy since its positive 
response would keep the latter as an ally to the former. The U.S. 
also perceived that a defeat for South Vietnam could lead to defeats 
for other friendly governments in the South-East Asia region (domino 
theory), i.e. if one state in South-East Asia is taken by Communism, 
nearby states will be taken over, one after another. 
(2 & 3) Ends and Means 
In my model in regard of boxes 2 and 3, I list the main 
categories which predominate in foreign policy discussions as means 
or ends. We will see in the forthcoming narrative, how security, 
political and economic priorities have been ends pursued in making 
arms transfers. One end may take priority over another according to 
the conditions obtaining at the time, but from the point of view of 
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stated policy it is frequently the case that all three, security, 
political and economic objectives are tied together. I examine this 
clustering effect in relation to actual policy separation of them in 
the historical analysis of various presidential arms transfer 
policies. In regard of means, the categories mentioned are for the 
most part formal alternatives as they often do not playa part in 
actual foreign policy processes. It is obviously preferred that force 
is not used. Though it is true that Thomas Schelling's book Arms and 
Influence has set out to demonstrate how force may be used to procure 
influence in my case studies force hardly features at all. 
Diplomacy is of essence. It is the mode of communication linking 
policy-makers with those affected by decisions and acts as a means of 
persuasion to accept, and representation to the affected of the 
policies agreed upon. Trade can be an end where it represents the 
benefits gained from say, an arms sales. But usually it is a means 
when cast in the form of military and economic essentials for the 
recipient. 
The final category - Executive/legislative power is something I 
focus upon extensively, for it reflects the way in which the 
Executive has tried, and for the most part succeeded, in dominating 
and controlling the legislatures attempts to have a say in foreign 
policy decisions. Through executive control of foreign policy and 
their measures to maintain it, the means to effect foreign policy in 
whatever way the executive determine, has been consolidated. In my 
analysis I show how executive predominance has been sustained despite 
the legislature's valiant attempts to restrain it. 
(4) Outcome 
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I consider outcome with respect to stated policy and 
case-by-case intentions. This gives me leverage upon the difference 
between rhetoric and reality, and thus a means of assessing the 
performance of the supplier state's government. Clearly, policies do 
have measures of success and measures of failure, and it is my 
responsibility to sort these out. But I have to do this with 
reference to particular indexes. Thus: (1) stated policy intentions 
, 
on arms transfers as they relate to the idea of having a general arms 
transfer policy; (2) case intentions - i.e. the considerations and 
aims of particular arms sales as they are perceived in their time of 
conception and execution. Since there can be changes of aims between 
conception and execution because of changing circumstances, I try to 
monitor these shifts. The final version of aims agreed upon by a 
government, will of course be the one that most concerns me. 
Finally, the role of feedback is important in that the 
possibility of its occurring may provide risks because of retaliation 
by other goods suppliers or by other countries with whom one is 
trading, but equally well, feedback can provide a mechanism of 
information by which a supplier may get warning of problems or better 
opportunities for new trade. 
Rules and Laws Governing Arms Transfers - Post-I973 Period 
I showed in Chapter Two the increasing presence of rules and 
laws as they affected the development of arms transfers policy and 
policy process. I now look at the same type of phenomena as they 
relate to the post-1973 years. 
"The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 authorizes the President to 
provide military assistance to friendly nations, while his 
authority to make government to government (FMS) sales and to 
licence commercial sales derives from the Foreign Military Sales 
Act of 196'3 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, 
respectively". 
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In this short lucid summary, Paul Warnke and Edward Luck spell 
out the legislative inheritances which launch me into the post-1973 
period. 
What is striking about the arms sales policy process is the lack 
of firm guidelines on arms transfers 14 or as Michael Klare puts it 
"an overall policy framework for arms transfers".15 Responsible for 
this lack as Congress and commentators saw it, was the Nixon 
administration. The 1967 amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act in 
1961 provided the legal machinery to curtail aid to countries which 
spend excessively on sophisticated weapons. These amendments were 
incorporated into the Military Sales Act of 1968 and expanded to 
cover military credit sales as well. 16 However, as the 1970s began, 
political and economic situations shaped U.S. arms policy. In the 
light of the Vietnam fiasco, Washington, guided by Nixon's Doctrine, 
sought to enhance its military capabilities of selected Third World 
countries through accelerated arms transfers. Similarly, in order to 
improve the balance of trade vis-a-vis oil producing states of the 
Middle East, Nixon sold sophisticated armaments. Furthermore, Nixon 
lifted the restraints on sales of high-tech munitions and encouraged 
U.S. arms firms to sell arms to the Middle East oil-producing 
countries. 17 This continued under President Ford. FMS rose from $1.1 
billion in 1970 to $15.8 billion in 1975. 18 
The apparent lack of control encouraged a Congressional reaction 
post-1973. It was first manifested in 1974 by the sponsorship of an 
Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which gave Congress a limited 
veto over major FMS. Known as the Nelson Amendment it was 
incorporated into what was to become the centre-piece legislation 
covering the arms transfer and the control of arms transfer 
policy-making - the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 1976. 
Most significant in the Nelson Amendment was its demand for 
(109) 
legislative veto. The rationale behind it was to provide Congress 
with an institutionalised mechanism that would give Congress the 
opportunity to study the circumstances surrounding each major arms 
sale, and to assess the foreign policy impact of each such 
transaction. 19 
Further formalised by the 1976 Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 
the Act aimed to shift the emphasis from selling arms to controlling 
the sales of arms. 20 The Act emphasized public disclosure and review 
procedure. The Act required Congress be given 30 calendar days to 
review proposed sales of $25 million or more if they are "defense 
articles or service" and of $7 million or more if they are "defense 
equipment".21 If, within that 30 day period, Congress voted to block 
the sales, the they could not proceed. The Act also provided for the 
supplying of information on arms sales to Congress if it was 
requested. 22 
On the face of it, Congress was attempting to restrict Executive 
autonomy in matters of arms transfer. In February, the Department of 
Defense (000) agreed to allow an informal 20 day preview of 
forthcoming arms sales that might be submitted under AECA. 23 The 
purpose of this 20-day informal notification was to pave the way for 
proposals that otherwise may have a rough ride through Congress. 
As one may begin to see, the history of arms transfer 
legislation is the history of Congressional oversight, and this was 
largely effected through amendments to AECA. The author of the study 
on 'Executive-legislative Consultation' on U.S. arms sales, 1982, has 
noted that between the years of 1977-1980 there were a string of 
successful amendments to AECA that for the most part improved the 
control of arms transfers by Congress. 1977 saw the provision of veto 
for 3rd country transfers, and 1980 saw the right of veto over 
commercial sales. But 1979 was perhaps the most interesting of the 
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group of that period because it demanded that the Executive "submit a 
detailed report estimating the level of arms sales in the coming 
fiscal year, noting which specific sales are most likely to occur".24 
This seems to be a formalisation and extension of the informal 20-day 
'pre-review' offered to Congress in 1976 by the 000. 
The one amendment which gave ground was the 1981 amendment 
increasing the threshold limit at which transfers are subject to 
review. The threshold on defense article and services rose to $50 
million, design and construction services rose to $200 million and 
major defense equipment rose to $14 million. 25 
To indicate the extent of marked attempts to oversee 
Presidential and Executive control of arms transfer policies I will 
consider two major amendments: (1) the Javits amendment, (2) the 
Hamilton amendment. 
The Javits amendment, 1978, paid attention to Section 25 of 
AECA. It required the President to submit to Congress an "Arms Sales 
Proposal". This was "expected to be an authoritative projection of 
all sales the executive branch contemplates as being eligible for 
approval during the fiscal year".26 
The justification for this rather demanding order for 
legislative review was, that normally Congress, as the International 
Security Act of 1978 puts it, "makes its decisions on the basis of 
information provided about individual sale decisions and without the 
framework of an integrated plan and rationale in which to judge the 
broader significance and potential ramifications of the sale under 
consideration".27 
This, in effect, was a Congressional resolution upon how to 
articulate its fears that arms transfer policy had 'run riot' and was 
largely either a response to individual country's demands or to the 
particular shape of the international relations scene as perceived by 
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the executive at anyone time. By insisting ex-ante, on plans of 
arms sales, Congress could oblige the President not only to stick to 
his stated intentions, but force on him a policy framework and plan 
that was relatively independent of other country's demands and global 
political events. In some sense, the measure tried to make an 
'honest woman' out of arms transfers. Before, it was beholden unto 
events economic, political and military outside the foreign policy 
aims of the U.S.: now arms transfer was required to have a line of 
development. 
The 1979 International Security Assistance Act improvised on the 
Javits amendment by its insisting that in the annual report, the 
President identify all arms sales "deemed most likely to result in 
the issuance of a letter of offer" during the coming fiscal year. It 
further required the President to notify Congress every six months of 
"any changes in the arms sales proposal "for a given fiscal year and 
the reasons for these changes".28 This would not only effect a 
coherent oversight strategy but would of course hand over, to 
interested parties, much of the information they needed to know to 
effectively opposed proposed arms transfers. 
The Hamilton amendment, again to AECA in 1979, was particularly 
tough. It specified that quarterly reports were to be submitted which 
listed prices and availability estimates with respect to possible 
sales of major defense equipment over $7 million or defence articles 
and services over $25 million to foreign countries. Further, each 
listing was to specify the name of the country, the equipment 
involved, the quantity involved, and the price estimate. The 
amendment also insisted that the above quarterly report list each 
request for arms received by the U.S. 29 It was argued that, by 
gaining such an early review, the U.S. could save itself from 
upsetting its foreign relations had Congress vetoed a sale at the 
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last minute. 
It is agreed that the effectiveness of the legislation discussed 
above has been mixed, particularly on controversial sales, but it 
nevertheless charts the progress of Congressional oversight and the 
potential shift in control as Congress has not so much demanded a 
bigger role in arms transfers though this is so, but as it has 
insisted on its right of earlier review and earlier in the policy 
process. 
Formal Process of an Arms Transfers - Post-1973 Period 
I have shown how the process of an arms transfer is 
circumscribed by various acts and amendments which have considerably 
improved Congress' leverage over the process. However, in analytical 
terms there is a line of review from the initial request for data of 
U.S. arms and services through to a transaction. 
The review bodies have multiplied since the 1960s and now 
involve not only the DoD and Department of State (DoS) and their 
sub-units, but also the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), 
National Security Council (NSC), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Agency for International 
Development (AID), Office of Management and Budget (OMS) and Treasury 
and Commerce Departments (TCD). 
Before a sale reaches any of these bodies it must first be 
appraised by the President, if only formally. As in the pre-1973 
era, the President is charged with the overall command of arms 
transactions. 
As the chief foreign policy-maker, the President can conclude 
arms sales agreements with other states. The U.S. Arms Export 
Control Act (AECA) of 1976, for instance, places in the hands of the 
U.S. government vested control over conventional arms sales. "In 
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furtherance of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the 
United States ... the President is authorised to control the import 
and export of defense articles and defense services".30 The AECA 
also identifies two distinct channels for arms transfers, Foreign 
Military Sales (FMS) and Commercial Sales (CS). 
In regard of FMS, the government functions as a middleman 
whereby she buys military equipment from American arms corporations 
and resells them to foreign governments. FMS involve total value of 
defense articles (combat aircrafts, missiles, tanks, battleships) and 
defense services (training, maintenance). FMS continue the bulk of 
American arms transfers, which increased from a figure of $3.8 
billion in 1973 to $19.6 billion in 1982.31 
The U.S. government also provides credits to some other foreign 
governments to enable them to purchase arms through the FMS 
programme. Another channel of arms transfers as recognized by AECA is 
commercial sales. Here, the U.S. arms corporations sell directly to 
foreign governments. However, these corporations have to apply to the 
State Department's Office of Munitions Control (OMC) for a licence to 
export their military items. Examples of items transferred through 
commercial sales include spare parts, ammunition, and small arms 
(rifles, shotguns), support equipment (jeeps, transport planes) and 
police articles (clubs, teargas, prison hardware). CS constitutes 
10% of American arms exports - about $2 billion per year. 32 
Having cleared these preliminaries, one can now begin to offer 
an account of the process itself. The starting point is the official 
request to the DoS from a foreign government ambassador or military 
attache. Former DoD's Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA) , 
General Howard Fish, has observed that countries in practice often 
make an appropriate request through diplomatic channels to the 000 
and then to the DoS.33 Michael Klare though, made the point that "all 
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such requests theoretically go first to the Office of Security 
Assistance Sales (SAS) in the DoS's Bureau of Politico-Military 
Affairs (PM)".34 Whichever route is taken by foreign governments in 
regard of the initial requests, it is the DoS which has official 
responsibility for the first links forged in the arms transfer 
process between the U.S. and another country. This is not dissimilar 
to the process in the 1960s when President Kennedy recognized that 
the DoS had formal superiority over the 000. 
After a request is made, it is subject to a basic evaluation 
through 000 and DoS consultation to determine whether the request is 
consistent with U.S. policy, and whether it will serve the national 
interest. This part of the process starts by the SAS deciding which 
sales categories apply, i.e. whether the sales are FMS or CS, whether 
by cash or credit, if they are weapons or services. This done, the 
proposed sale will be put through an appropriate succession of review 
agencies. What is most significant is, what M. Klare notes in 
'American Arms Supermarket': "Although the DoS theoretically retains 
ultimate control over all military export transactions, the Secretary 
of State has authorized the 000 to assume full responsibility for 
military sales to the NATO powers ... as well as to Australia, Japan 
and New Zealand".35 
So for the most part, the 000 is very much in the driving sat. 
The powerful role of the 000 has been set out thus: "DoD is involved 
in detailed force planning, in considerations of pricing ... and 
training deliveries, payments, and continued support of arms 
sales".36 
Within the 000 itself, prime responsibility for arms transfers 
lies with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs (OASD/ISA). Its fundamental role is 
in formulating 000 arms transfer policy. Within the DoS the main 
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agencies are the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (PM) and the 
Regional Bureau (RB). The PM serves as the Secretary of State's 
support staff for supervision of arms transfers to review and 
evaluate requests. The RB's participate when countries under their 
charge are affected. In regard to Saudi Arabia, for example, it is 
the Near East Section that is brought into play. 
Upon a request which takes the form of a letter (LOR) for 
planning and review data and price and availability data, the PM and 
the RB and ACDA in co-ordination with the DoD decide whether such 
data should be released. If it is released, it is not surprising 
that, as Roger Labrie and others (1982) note: "the issuance of the 
data is often perceived by potential recipients as an indicated that 
the United States is prepared to sell".37 
Should this information prove satisfactory to the purchaser, 
then the foreign government must submit another request, this time 
for a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) from the U.S. This 
confirms that the U.S. is willing to make a sale. Written by the 
appropriate military service, a LOA must be issued with the DoS 
approval. However, before the initial request for data is granted 
many months may pass, and the requests will channel down through the 
various review agencies I named earlier. Let me consider some of 
them. 
Despite the expertise of many commentators the process and its 
time-structure is not agreed on. M. Klare, for instance, spends 
little time on the agency review programme, yet this seems to be the 
centrepiece of the whole process. What one can assert is, that the 
main work of the agencies is done after the request for data is 
received. 
In the previous chapter I suggested that the DoS through its PM 
can assert itself more effectively against the inbuilt expertise of 
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the 000. By 1980, Joel Husbands was claiming that : lithe Bureau [PM] 
is the centre of the arms transfer decision-making within the 
executive branch". 38 Other agencies, nationally peripheral to the 
arms transfer process may be brought in at such time as required. 
The Bureau of Human Rights have a say, if arms transfer is going 
to a country with a bad human rights record. The Treasury Department 
participate when a sale draws on the FMS credit programme, and the 
Commerce Department becomes involved when arms equipment such as 
computers, data-processing materials, and cargo planes are sought. 
The latter two Departments have to review arms transfers in the light 
of both economic and security interests of the U.S. Where arms are 
sought from a country in receipt of U.S. economic aid then AID's 
advice on the impact of the arms transfer to that country is 
required. 
The agencies at the centre of the pre-LAO review are those 
concerned with 'threat' analysis. These evaluate the military and 
security aspects of a sale. Crucial are ACDA, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
NSC and CIA. 
The ACOA is empowered by the Arms Export Control Act to "review 
pending U.S. arms transfers, and to advise the Secretary of State to 
any adverse implications of arms transfers that would trigger arms 
race or conflict escalation in a region which might jeopardise u.S. 
security interests".39 ACDA also functions as one of the primary 
sources of data on the arms trade. 
The CIA is involved in reporting on the stability of intentions 
of the would-be U.S. arms recipients. 40 The OIA prepare an analysiS 
of the military threat facing the prospective arms recipients. 41 
The NSC is to advise the President on a wide range of domestic, 
foreign and military affairs relating to national security. Although 
the NSC reviews arms transfers on a regular basis, its main function 
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is to review controversial cases. 
The main assessments of the threat factor comes from the Office 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and, in Husband's view the CIA is 
usually only asked to supplement the office's analysis. 42 
Only after the full range of appropriate analyses are done, is a 
letter of offer and acceptance received and approved. The President 
usually only takes an interest and a final review in cases that must 
be reported to Congress. 
This concludes my 'objective' account of the arms transfer 
process from gestation to approval. It has sought to highlight the 
role of the review agencies. As I shall show in the next section the 
formality of my description does not reveal the underlying politics 
of an arms transfer. 
The Character of Arms Transfers in the Post-I973 Period 
This section will act as a preface to the next section which 
discusses the three major aircraft deals between the United States 
and Saudi Arabia. Here then, I will examine successive presidential 
and executive changing attitudes and stances towards arms deals 
highlighting the American-Saudi arms transfer relationship where 
appropriate. 
The 1973-1983 period in the relationship between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia was a deeply perturbing one for both, but 
especially so for the U.S. The notorious oil embargo of 1973/74 
pushed Saudi Arabia from the "back-bench of inter-Arab politics,,43 to 
Prime Ministership. If Saudi Arabia had been part of the Arab 
opposition to the U.S. the sudden elevation would not have been 
politically so difficult but the strength of Saudi Arabia relations 
with the U.S., the course of which I charted in the previous chapter, 
threw Saudi Arabia into a confrontational position with the U.S., it 
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did not want to assume. If nothing else, this forced upon the U.S. a 
re-orientation of their 'taking Saudi Arabia for granted' attitude 
predominant until then. The background to the embargo lay in U.S. 
positive response to Israeli requests for military aid by which they 
could prosecute the 1973 October war. President Nixon, as was his 
want in regard of arms transfers, had requested from Congress $2.2 
billion in emergency arms aid to Israel,44 and this was too much, 
even for Saudi Arabia. The Arab protest, and response was vigorous 
and swift and on October 20th Saudi Arabia announced the oil embargo 
against the United States. 45 
The War had begun properly on October 6th, but it had been 
building up for some months prior to this. Action by the Israelis in 
April against Palestinians they considered to be terrorists, and the 
shooting down of a libyan air liner the previous February had caused 
mobilisation of Arab forces and the preparation for war. Saudi Oil 
Minister, Ahmed Yamani, had warned Washington on April 19th that an 
oil output increase would not be forthcoming if the U.S. did not 
change its stance on the Arab-Israeli tension. 46 But Nixon had 
pressures against him, not least Watergate, and did not want to 
alienate the influential Jewish lobby who were considerably more than 
merely Rabbi Karff. 
Given the build up it was not surprising that voices of 
opposition were raised against the sale of Saudi Arabia of F-4 
Phantom jets in June 1973, Secretary of State Williams Rogers told 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee that Saudi Arabia would not 
deploy them against Israel, the opposition arguing, they would. 47 
This measure of support for Saudi Arabia did not prevent OPEC from 
raising oil prices by about 10% in July 1973, i.e. from $2.29 to 
$2.48 per barrel. 48 President Nixon underscored at a news conference 
between the oil situation and the Middle East dispute declared that 
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his new Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would make a strenuous 
effort to bring about a Middle east settlement. 49 
Two days after the hostilities had broken out, Kissinger not 
having had any time to begin negotiations, King Faisal ordered Aramco 
to cut by half, the outflow of Saudi oil, ostensibly to prevent huge 
petroleum losses if the pipelines were sabotaged. But this had the 
effect as Benson Grayson puts it, of Saudi Arabia and United States 
finding "themselves in unwanted position of being virtual 
adversaries".50 Despite these pressures on the U.S., Nixon began the 
shipping of emergency arms to Israel. His $2.2 billion package that 
followed the hostilities was a final straw that broke the camel's 
back, and an embargo began and oil prices rose, and production was 
reduced. 
The succession of moves against the U.S. by Saudi Arabia were 
indicative of a new footing for the relationship - one that 
previously had not been crucial in terms of what was to be 
anticipated of Saudi Arabia, namely the pulling of the oil lever. I 
have been clear in stating that the flow of Saudi oil was important 
to the U.S. and arms transfers to Saudi Arabia interacted strongly 
with the guarantee of oil, but it had been little thought that Saudi 
Arabia would force an oil embargo. In this case oil became a factor 
independent of arms crucial to Saudi Arabia and tied to the regional 
interests of the Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The 
threat to the U.S. came not so much in the form of Arab unity, as the 
unilateral potential of Saudi Arabia to become more than merely a 
significant regional power. The agenda of the economics of oil, had 
now become one of the politics of oil. 
The oil embargo forced on the U.S. the realisation of the need 
for an integrated energy po1icy51 and the overall nature of domestic 
and foreign supply and demand factors. However, on the issue of arms 
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transfers, the embargo brought home the controversial, indeed 
devastating impact, they could have in relation to other states. This 
was a damning indictment of two widely held perceptions that Paul 
Warnke and Edward luck have identified as creative of a pro-sale 
disposition. The two perceptions are: "(1) the assumption that 
selling arms is the normal course of action, while refusing to sell 
is abnormal; and (2) greater sensitivity to the possibly negative 
consequences of denying particular sales than to the adverse effects 
of approving them".52 These perceptions are only valid if an arms 
transfer is made relatively independent of the foreign relations 
context of the recipient, and the supplier belief in his power and 
autonomy to act in his national interest. The problem of the oil 
lever upset the stability of oil supply as a constant in relation 
between United States and Saudi Arabia when it became a variable. 
Then, U.S. autonomy in making arms transfers and the U.S. ability to 
quieten, say Arab opposition to a sale to Israel, or vice-versa by 
redressing the imbalance with a later sale to the Plaintiff became 
unviable. The unilateral character of America as an arms supplier 
was jeopardised and worse still, the break in U.S.-Arab relations 
left doors ajar through which Soviet influence could pass. More than 
anything the oil embargo showed the disarray into which American 
foreign policy could be put. From the standpoint of arms transfer, 
its aims of enabling recipient states remain U.S. friendly, gain 
military capacity and offer regional strategical advantages to the 
U.S. collapsed. And further Arab states could always turn to Moscow 
or others for arms. 
Of course, the impact of the Israeli lobby in the U.S. is not 
the only aspect of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. The foreign policy 
connections are overwhelming. As Philip Groisser puts it, Israel has 
"the most effective army in the Middle East, is vital as a deterrent 
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to possible Soviet aggression, and thus essential to American 
national interest",53 The conjunction of Israel's army and its 
democratic habits have made it a reliable ally for the U.S. in the 
stance against Soviet advances in the Middle East. Thus the 
reluctance of the U.S. to be seen by Israel to undermine its 
relations with her is considerable apart from the criticism of 
domestic lobbying. In any discussion of arms transfers to Arab 
countries, this deep-founded connection with Israel is crucial for an 
understanding of it. But equally the oil demands of the U.S. upon 
Saudi Arabia in particular, and OAPEC in general, tend to make arms 
transfer intrinsically destabilising of U.S. relations with both 
sides. U.S. is in effect caught in a double-bind. 
So far in this section I have concentrated on the impact of the 
1973 oil embargo and the lessons it taught the U.S. with respect to 
foreign relations and arms transfers. But arising out of my analysis 
of the controversies arms transfers can generate in an increasingly 
unstable Middle East situation at the beginning of the period I am 
particularly interested in, one may ask, what differences this made 
to successive executive arms transfer policies? The discussion will 
encompass the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, offering a 
brief outline of the post-1974 policies. 
In their account of Watergate, "The Final Days" Woodward and 
Bernstein54 suggested that the prospect of Gerald Ford taking over 
the Presidency, particularly at such a crucial time for the U.S., was 
viewed with great trepidation by the Nixon administration and may 
have had some part to play in Nixon's reluctance to leave office. 
Whatever, Ford could really, only push the wheelchair for the 
crippled office of a Republican presidency towards defeat in 1976. 
We have seen so far, that for Congress it was a time of advice and 
consultation as regards to oversight of arms transfers. The Nelson 
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Amendment and later incorporated in AECA ensured this. However, the 
crippling of the presidency did not mean paralysis of presidential 
politics and withdrawal in the face of Congressional vigour. 
The executive realised that the failure of the American 
presidency could besmirch the trust Saudi Arabia and Israel had in 
the U.S. To counteract the loss of faith, one month after Ford took 
office, he assured Israel that close support of U.S. to Israel would 
continue as before. 55 Later in September, both Ford and his Secretary 
of State Kissinger assured the visiting Saudi Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of its continued support. 56 For the Arab nations, the support 
offered them by the U.S. entailed an even-handed settlement of the 
Arab-Israeli dispute. In his shuttle-diplomacy trips, as Benson 
Grayson notes, "Kissinger ... took pain to insure that Saudi Arabia 
was kept fully briefed on the status of his efforts, meeting with 
King Faisal on October 13th 1974".57 The upshot of this meeting was 
that Faisal indicated Saudi willingness to try to secure a reduction 
in the price of oil, if the U.S. could secure greater concession from 
Israel in the Middle East negotiations. Ford put pressure on Israel 
when in January 1975 he opined that he could not assure security for 
Israel unless further progress was made by Israel in eroding the 
tensions. 58 Clearly the Ford administration was favouring the Arabs 
at this time by showing that the U.S. considered Israel the difficult 
partner in the negotiations. The nightmove of the oil embargo, and 
the temptation for Saudi Arabia to use it again had to be countered 
and to this end, in January 1975 the U.S. agreed to sell Saudi Arabia 
a $769 million arms package of 60 F-5E/F Tiger fighter aircraft. 59 
The elements of reverse influence effected by Saudi Arabia at the 
time of the embargo were paying a double dividend. Firstly, the U.S. 
was attempting to establish a settlement of the Middle East conflict 
which would enhance Saudi security given that she had taken a high 
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profile in 1973 and therefore made herself a potential target for 
Israeli attack, and secondly, the U.S. was going to make the largest 
arms transfer to Saudi Arabia to date. 
Despite the position of strength attributable to Saudi Arabia, 
Saudi Arabia herself could not escape her dependency on the u.S. 
arms. The access to military hardware and expertise, and the u.S. 
commitment to her security in the Middle East made the U.S. a far 
safer bet in any arms relation than adopting one with Moscow. Her 
perception of her military needs and the continuing relationship with 
the U.S. were probably a not 'inconsiderable' influence upon her 
refusal to agree to a 15% increase in oil prices at September 1975 
Vienna Meeting of OPEC. 60 later, in June 1976 at Bali Meeting, Saudi 
Arabia refused another oil increase of 20% by OPEC states. 61 In 
August the executive notified the Senate that it intended to issue a 
letter of offer to Saudi Arabia for the sale of Sidewinder air-to-air 
missiles for the F-5s, Maverick air-to-air surface missiles, Dragon 
and Tow anti-tank missiles and other defense articles at an 
approximate cost of $830 million. 62 In the case of the Sidewinder 
and Maverick missiles, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
questioned the need for 850 and 650 respectively (pared down from the 
original Saudi request of 1000 and 1500)63 because the missiles 
"would have a potentially destabilising effect on the military 
situation in the Middle East".64 Only after hearing Secretary 
Kissinger's testimony regarding the potential negative consequences 
of denial of the missiles to Saudi Arabia did the Senate approve the 
sale. With the Senate and the House approval, the sale of reduced 
number (850 sidewinder and 650 Maverick) missiles was allowed to 
proceed. 65 
On the domestic front arms transfers politics as usual was 
running apace. These were in the form of executive opposition to 
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AECA. Ford made clear his unhappiness with having to approve the 
1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act. 
In the second paragraph of his statement of approval, he implicitly 
defends the "Constitutional responsibility of the President for the 
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States".66 He does this 
by referring to a previous incarnation of AECA which in his view 
would have undermined the Constitutional role of the President. More 
significantly, he expressed his disapproval of the legislative veto 
on arms sales and noted that "I reserve my position on its 
constitutionality if the provision should ever become operative n • 67 
Thirdly, and in a defiant mood, Ford expressed his distinct 
opposition to the ending of Military Assistance Advisory Groups 
(MAAGs) by September 1977 and indicated that he would circumvent this 
measure by exploiting the provision in the bill to retain MAAG's in 
specific countries. 
This very distinctive statement makes clear antagonism existing 
between Congress and President on the rightful range of Congressional 
control over arms transfers. It summarises the Ford Administration's 
attitude towards arms transfer policy as one of affirming the status 
quo reaching back to immediate post-war precedent; that arms transfer 
is the executive's proper sphere of determination and policy, not 
Congress'. Ford's rather defensive attitudes towards the furtherance 
of oversight were to be re-iterated by Carter, though ironically 
Carter so actively wanted to restrict arms sales that Congress was 
led to oppose Carter's proposed reductions. 
The ascendence of Jimmy Carter to the Presidency was the 
inevitable outcome of a disgraced republican administration. Though 
symbolising a distinct change 1n the moral and political atmosphere, 
the necessary continuity 1n foreign relations and for my purpose 1n 
arms transfers would be found to be a restraint on his early attempts 
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to reduce arms transfers. When campaigning in 1976 Carter had 
emphasised the contradiction between America's role as the peacemaker 
and arms salesman when he said: "I am particularly concerned by our 
nation's role as the world's leading arms salesman... the United 
States cannot be both the world's leading champion of peace and the 
world's leading supplier of the weapons of war". Carter promised he 
would emphasise "peace ... and reduce the commerce in arms".68 
Through Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, Carter proposed massive arms 
sales reduction, but after Congressional wrangling, this was modified 
and scaled down, and by May 1977 a presidential directive was 
approved by the NSC and made public in Carter's statement on it. 
Exploring the moral dimensions, Carter again emphasised the "threat 
to world peace embodied in this spiralling arms traffic".69 
The thrust of his stated arms sales policy was distinctly 
contrary to his predecessors. Carter argued that FMS should be 
abnormal rather than normal as an instrument of foreign policy. His 
rider that arms transfers required clear demonstration of their 
contribution to national interests must presumably be taken as an 
indication that national interest would not be used as an excuse to 
make an arms sales, but as an excuse not to make one. 70 
He affirmed U.S. treaty obligation and most importantly the 
"historic responsibilities to ensure the security of the state of 
Israel". Furthermore, he called for radical restrictions of the sale 
of advanced weapons. But to cover himself against the charge that he 
demanded an absolute and massive reduction in arms sales, he linked 
reduction to the idea of multilateral cooperation with the policy, 
i.e. the U.S.S.R. 
Though he reduced arms sales to countries outside of treaty 
commitments, the sales to countries involved in treaties with the 
U.S. outweighed the reductions and thus it was that FMS rose from 
$8.8 billion in fiscal year 1977 to $11.2 billion in fiscal year 
1978. 72 The 1978 decision to sell some 200 combat aircraft to the 
M"d 1 dle East served to confirm the retreat from arms sales reduction. 
But even if thl·S were excused as good intentions some bad through 
counter-pressures of the armaments industry and vested interests in 
the 000 and DoS, one cannot ignore the fact that as early as May 
1977 f 
, ive months into his presidency, Carter had promised the Saudi 
Crown p. 
rlnce Fhad that the U.S. would sell an F-15 package Saudi 
Arabia had been seeking. 73 Further, Carter was determined upon this 
sale desPite the obvious opposition it would generate. Congressional 
°PPosit· 10n to the sale was on the grounds that the Saudi aircraft 
package would upset the Arab-Israeli balance of power. In 1977 Carter 
had had the "gruelling experience of the Iranian AWACs sale fight,,74 
and he stl·11 pursued the sale of 60 F-1Ss to Saudi Arabia, though in 
delaYing it to work and how best to circumvent the worst of the 
oPPOsition, he incurred Saudi Arabia annoyance at the delay. Now 
under S d· au 1 pressure, Carter advanced on Congress, getting Secretary 
Vance to threaten that if the Saudi part of the total 1978 arms sales 
Which included 90 aircraft to Israel, was vetoed, then the sale to 
Israel would be withdrawn. 75 The Israeli deal would of course add 
strength to the executive argument that the regional balance would 
not be Upset, since Israel would be getting the main portion of the 
arms sale. The irony was in Secretary Vance's remarks to the press 
corps when he linked arms to the pursuit of peace. He said "These 
proposals are an important part of our search for peace in the Middle 
east".76 
It is hard to escape the point that Carter's policy of restraint 
had broken down. It had in effect foundered on the need to continue 
arms sales as an intrinsic aspect of foreign policy. 
Though the Congressional Quarterly saw the success of Carter to 
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$8.8 billion in fiscal year 1977 to $11.2 billion in fiscal year 
1978. 72 The 1978 decision to sell some 200 combat aircraft to the 
Middle East served to confirm the retreat from arms sales reduction. 
But even if this were excused as good intentions some bad through 
counter-pressures of the armaments industry and vested interests in 
the 000 and DoS, one cannot ignore the fact that as early as May 
1977, five months into his presidency, Carter had promised the Saudi 
Crown Prince Fhad that the U.S. would sell an F-15 package Saudi 
Arabia had been seeking. 73 Further, Carter was determined upon this 
sale despite the obvious opposition it would generate. Congressional 
opposition to the sale was on the grounds that the Saudi aircraft 
package would upset the Arab-Israeli balance of power. In 1977 Carter 
had had the "gruelling experience of the Iranian AWACs sale fight,,74 
and he still pursued the sale of 60 F-15s to Saudi Arabia, though in 
delaying it to work and how best to circumvent the worst of the 
opposition, he incurred Saudi Arabia annoyance at the delay. Now 
under Saudi pressure, Carter advanced on Congress, getting Secretary 
Vance to threaten that if the Saudi part of the total 1978 arms sales 
which included 90 aircraft to Israel, was vetoed, then the sale to 
Israel would be withdrawn. 75 The Israeli deal would of course add 
strength to the executive argument that the regional balance would 
not be upset, since Israel would be getting the main portion of the 
arms sale. The irony was in Secretary Vance's remarks to the press 
corps when he linked arms to the pursuit of peace. He said "These 
proposals are an important part of our search for peace in the Middle 
east ll • 76 
It is hard to escape the pOint that Carter's policy of restraint 
had broken down. It had in effect foundered on the need to continue 
arms sales as an intrinsic aspect of foreign policy. 
Though the Congressional Quarterly saw the success of Carter to 
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get the 1978 arms sales proposal through Senate as a "major Carter 
victory"77 one would have to take it 'in vacuo' to see it as this. 
In relation to the whole of Carter's policy it was one more disparate 
element in a programme of 'restraint' which had failed. Despite the 
contradictions, Carter, in February 1979, was still insisting that: 
"Conventional arms transfers restraint is an important objective of 
this administration and Congress". 78 
It was left to Leslie Gelb, Director of the Bureau of PM to 
admit that Carter's arms transfer policy had failed. He said liThe 
rhetoric promised a revolution ... [but Carter] ... continued a 
large-scale sales program [and] it was inevitable ... that the 
administration would be seen as a naive or hypocritical, or both". 79 
Carter was assailed on both sides. Initially Congress had 
disapproved of his massive arms sales reduction, then, and this was 
the dominating feature of Congressional response to Carter's actual 
sale policy, Congress had vigorously opposed arms sales to Arab 
states, in particular Saudi Arabia, and Carter had the weight of 
commercial interests and those of the 000, and DoS not entirely 
favourable to his reduction. The 000 through the MAAG to Saudi 
Arabia could influence Saudi Arabia to seek U.S. arms and the 000 
could indirectly pressure Carter - a sale denial would or could harm 
foreign relations. A 1977 Report of Staff survey mission to 
Ethiopia, Iran and the Arabian Peninsula made similar pOint: 
As a final turn around; in 1980, not least as a response to the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of the Shah's regime, 
Carter began negotiations to sell Saudi Arabia AWACs. Carter had 
told Congress it would not sell F-15 enhancement equipment, but in 
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late 1979, meetings between American and Saudi officials were held to 
discuss further enhancement of Saudi air defense capabilities. 81 To 
justify embarking on such a negotiation, Carter could draw on the 
provision of the 1977 statement wherein he stated that "reductions in 
the worldwide traffic of arms will require multilateral 
cooperation".82 The Afghanistan and Iranian affairs were sufficient 
to exemplify a lack of multilateral co-operation and justify moving 
towards AWACs deal. 
In fairness, this policy was more than justified by the Middle 
east regional instability arising out of the above two factors, but 
this was not to deter Congressional and pro-Israeli pressure groups 
from opposing this sale. This sale to Saudi Arabia was one part of 
Carter's arms policy which could be seen to be consistent with his 
1977 statement of intention, but it was no triumph for Carter for it 
was Reagan who was to see it through, having defeated the hopeless 
Carter in the 1980 Presidential elections and denied him a second 
term of office. 
Under Ronald Reagan - a gut conservative - it was evident the 
administration was going to do to Carter's policies what Carter did 
to Nixon's - reverse them. His motto was not peace through sales 
reduction, but peace through strengthening the armaments of friendly 
nations. The beligerance of his policies were to be directed against 
communist regimes, in particular the U.S.S.R. - 'the evil empire'. 
The expressed policy was one of re-linking arms sales to foreign 
policy initiatives. Upon taking office, Reagan entrusted his Under 
Secretary for Security Assistance, James Buckley, to produce an 
alternative policy to Carter's. Before Buckley's work was complete 
Reagan approved several major sales, not least the AWACS/F-15 
Enhancement to Saudi Arabia. 
Buckley defended the Reagan turn around in his evidence to the 
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Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1981. He argued that 
substantial sales were justified because of the build-up of arms at 
the regional and global levels: 
Rhetorically his submission is fascinating. He turned away from 
U.S. interests, to stress the 'West's' interests. He stresses both 
the global and regional impact of Soviet advances, and further, he 
invokes a relationistic justification of crude use of arms sales by 
appealing to states' perceptions. Lying behind his rationale is the 
assumption of the simplistic character of other nations' foreign 
policies - they are crudely utilitarian - they need bigger and better 
arms. Implicit is the suggestion that the U.S. knows the truth of 
the matter, it is sophisticated, but the possibility of a coherent 
planned arms sales policy is impossible given the calculative 
character of others. What can you do when our friends are grabbing 
at bigger and better arms? Buckley sidesteps the possibility that 
the U.S. actively wants to sell the arms, and transfers 
responsibility for more sales onto the unsophisticated heads of other 
states. As I have noted, the transferance is backed by the 
'objective' truth of Soviet expansionism about which he proceeded to 
furnish a string of facts and figures. 
Later in his submission Buckley recognises the links between 
arms sales and influence when he says that the administration will 
use arms sales for several purposes, not least "arms transfers ... as 
political capital to be deployed without reference to the military 
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needs of the recipient". This he says will avoid or rather judge each 
perspective transfer in the light of both u.s. interests and its own 
particular merits. He lists four factors to take into account: (A) 
How defence article would help repulse a threat, (B) whether regime 
was able to absorb a transfer in the light of its development, (e) 
the effect on regional stability, (D) adverse effects of a transfer 
on U.S. forces. Bar one, all these account for arms transfers in 
terms of effects on recipients, yet a few lines later he really 
spells out U.S. perception: "It should be kept in mind that our 
principal purpose in transferring arms ... is not to help a particular 
regime but to buttress our own security and serve our own 
interests".84 
A more clear and crude assertion of realism could barely have 
been made. This if nothing else demonstrated the retrogressive step 
in arms policy taken by the Reagan administration. Thus, the basic 
points made were: (1) there is to be no coherent U.S. arms sales 
policy - it was to be made on a case-by-case approach period. (2) 
National interest takes precedence over most other reasons for arms 
sales. (3) The Soviet threat was the obstacle to be overcome as the 
'objective' reason for an arms transfer. (4) The dialectic of 
security of the U.S. in balance with the security on arms transfer 
brings to another state was abandoned for the view that arms 
transfers were evaluated in terms of what they did for U.S. 
interests. The U.N.'s conceptions of harmony, and development and 
security of Third World nations was of secondary importance, if not 
placed on the shelf. 
None of these measures served to restrict arms sales and indeed 
Reagan introduced three measures to enhance arms sales as an 
instrument of U.S. foreign policy. He offered FMS credit to favoured 
regimes, to be paid back over 30 years. He established a stock pile 
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system of weapons for future exports, and pushed through measures 
which reduced the specificities for Congressional oversight. The 
dollar threshold over which Congressional oversight was mandatory was 
doubled, and Reagan requested that NATO members, Japan, Australia and 
New Zealand be exempt from prior 30-day notification of sales to 
these countries.8S Reagan does not mention human rights. He 
maintains: "The best way to promote human rights is through 'quiet 
diplomacy' that does not dogmatically link a nation's right record to 
arms sales or other assistance".86 Sales more than doubled in the 
period of 1981-82 from $7.3 billion to $19.6 billion. 87 
In relation to Saudi Arabia's issues, the centrepiece was the 
1981 sale of AWACS/F-IS Enhancement equipment. This did much to 
raise Congressional alarm at the escalation of arms sales. In view 
of enormous priority given to national interest, it is difficult to 
determine how much the historical commitment to Saudi Arabia 
mattered, and how much the administration was concerned with the 
immediate relationship between arms sales and influence. 
Though one may be uncertain as to how much difference political 
pressure and situations made to Nixon and Ford policy of arms sales 
such that they were obliged to sell arms to secure foreign policy 
initiatives, there can be no doubt that Reagan pursued an active, 
voluntary policy of arms sales, thus reversing the Carter policy and 
taking the u.S. back to the situation of arms policy before Carter. 
Whether it is a good or bad thing morally was of little concern to 
the Reagan administration, what mattered was the re-enforcement of 
the belief in the active pursuit of foreign policy influence through 
arms sales. It is this view be it a structural or an intentional 
phenomena, that has characterized much of the U.S. arms sales policy 
since the War and which I have suggested is based on naive 
perceptions. 
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I have argued that despite contrary intentions, U.S. sales under 
Carter rose substantially and that this is perhaps an inevitable part 
of foreign relations. I have given an overview of the arms sales 
policy trajectories of four presidents in relation to various arms 
sales decisions, especially as they relate to Saudi Arabia. The 
three major arms sales to Saudi Arabia must now be examined in detail 
for they will stand as my index of assessment of the arms 
transfer/influence relationship. 
These decisions were outstanding in their complexity, and for 
the way they brought together the various factors which have 
especially joined Saudi Arabian interests to U.S. interests. 
In order to illustrate U.S. foreign policy interests in 
supplying arms to Saudi Arabia, one might reconstruct the arguments 
that were advanced by the national factors - Executive, Congress and 
interest groups - as well as competition/pressure created by the 
international factors in major U.S. aircraft supply to Saudi Arabia 
which included F-Ss, F-1Ss and AWACS/F-IS Enhancement. Table 1 
presents the relevant information on the three major aircraft deals. 
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Table 1. Saudi Arabia's Major Aircraft Acquisitions from the US 
(1973-1983) . 
~ear of Approval 1975 1978 1981 
Item of weapon Northrop F -5E/F MOD ( a) F-15 Boeing E-3A 
C/D Sentry/F-15 
Enhancement 
Number of Item 60 60 5 
pescription of Ground attack/ Ai r Superi ority Airborne 
~eapon tactical fighter with warning and 
(b) 
reconnaissance capabilities control system 
for air-to-air (AWACS) 
interception/ 
ground 
interdiction. 
~otal Price $769 million $2.85 billion $8.5 billion 
including including including 
spares/support training, spares, support 
spares/support and training. 
~ear of delivery 1976/79 1981/84 Begun in 1985 
a. McDonnell Douglas 
b. F-1S Enhancement equipment includes: 6KC-135 tanker aircraft, 101 
sets of CFT's (conformal fuel tanks for F-15s), 1177 AIM-9L 
Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and 22 ground-based radar 
installations. 
Sources: 
SIPRI, World Armaments and Disarmaments, Yearbook 1983 (London: Taylor and 
Francis, 1983) pp.330-331; IISS, The Military Balance, 1977-1978 (London: 
IISS, 1977) p.40; US Congress, House, Proposed Aircraft Sales to Israel, 
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia Hearings before the Committee on International 
Relations, 1978, (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.D., 1978) pp.29-31; US Congress, 
Senate, The Proposed AWACS/F-15 Enhancement Sale to Saudi Arabia Hearings 
before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 1981, (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.D., 
1981) pp.1-2; United States Department of State Bulletin (Washington D.C.: 
U.S.G.P.O., October 1981), pp.52-57i Congressional Research Service, F-1Ss to 
Saudi Arabia - Pt.1 (November 8th, 1977) pp.37509-10. 
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I. F-Ss 
The adoption of 'Nixon's Doctrine' in the late 1960s and the 
OPEC oil price in 1973/74 motivated President Nixon to supply 
security assistance to friendly countries strategically significant 
or with energy sources such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. This helped 
the Nixon administration to cope with a budget deficit and trade 
imbalance caused primarily by U.S. military expenditure in Vietnam 
and a rise in energy costs. This was reflected most clearly in the 
increased U.S. desire to be responsive to Saudi arms requests and 
military modernisation programme in the early 1970s. One of the most 
notable areas of increase in U.S./Saudi military co-operation was in 
the air defence. 
Upon the setting up of a joint commission in 1974 on Saudi 
defense and training requirement, headed by Saudi Minister of 
Defense, Prince Sultan, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs, Robert Elseworth, the U.S. Air Force 
(USAF) prepared a series of studies for a comprehensive modernisation 
programme for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) known as 'Peace Hawk'. 
These studies and other supporting studies, examined the air threat 
to Saudi Arabia and Saudi air defense requirements. These studies 
dealt solely with Saudi air power and not with overall saudi defence 
1 ' d d . t' 88 P annlng an mo ernlsa lon. 
The 'Peace Hawk' programme was based on the need to protect the 
country's far reaching coastal zones and the oil facilities which 
only had small military installations. Superiority in air defence 
could compensate for smaller numbers. However, the combat 
performance of F-SEs and dual seat F-SFs varies depending on the 
armament configuration and the type of mission being flow. Major 
armament that can be carried with the F-Ss include AGM-6S Maverick 
air-to-surface missiles, various guided bombs and AIM Sidewinder 
(13S) 
air-to-air missiles. With this payload, the F-SE Tiger II with a 
range of 620 miles with 2 AIM-9Bs and 2,500lb bombs,89 from Khamis 
Mushayt, Taif, Tabuk, Dhahran bases, could with other support 
aircraft better protect Saudi air spaces in the South, South/West, 
North/West and North/East. 
The willingness of the u.s. to sell the F-Ss aircraft 
articulated largely in terms of security support to a moderate state 
country which was a friend of the u.S. The Director of DSAA, General 
Howard Fish, in his 1975 testimony to the House Committee on 
International Relations stated that the rationale for the sale of 
F-Ss was the basic "fact that we have perceived them [the Saudis] as 
a moderating influence in the Middle East" and that "this was an 
attempt to begin to modernize their airforce".90 Further assessment 
by General Fish of the rightness of such enhancement sales was cast 
in terms of the potential threat to a country perceived as weak, the 
enemy generated by that country having "significant resources" and in 
the case of Saudi Arabia the difficulties of its foreign relations 
with Iraq, Syria and the Yemen. 91 But it is acknowledged in the 
Report of Staff Survey Mission to the Arabian Peninsula, December 
1977, that the 1974 000 survey of the RSAF played a key role in 
recommending the purchase of the F-SE aircraft. Further to this, one 
may note that the Saudis did not want the F-5s but had been seeking 
the more powerful F-4 Phantom multi-role fighter aircraft which only 
then were being used to modernise the USAF (though it was anticipated 
that F-IS air superiority would quickly supersede the F-4s in the 
USAF). However the restricted flying distance of the F-Ss to 220 
miles tended to satisfy the Israeli lobby that they would not be used 
to attack Israel. 92 
Each major increment of U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia led 
to a more serious debates in the U.S. Congress than had occurred over 
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the previous sales. For instance, the sale of AWACS/F-ISs 
Enhancement in 1981 triggered more heated Congressional debates than 
the sale of F-1Ss in 1978, and the former sale created more debates 
than the sale of Maverick and Sidewinder missiles in 1976. At the 
same time, as I stated earlier, new laws were created to give the 
Congress a more effective oversight on U.S. foreign military sales. 
The most important act was the AECA of 1976 which obliged the 
Executive to release more data than had previously been available to 
Congress and the public. The release of technical information on the 
weapons systems helped trigger more intense efforts by various 
pro-Israeli groups, and in the Congress, to attempt to block the U.S. 
administration's propsals to sell advanced 'high-tech' weapons 
systems such as the F-1Ss in 1978 and AWACS/F-IS Enhancement in 1981. 
While members of the Senate Foreign Relations and the House Foreign 
Affairs committees were most concerned that increased U.S. arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia would represent a threat to the security of Israel 
and upset the military balance of the region, they were not aware 
that the Saudis' large requests for weapons systems were based on 
U.S. assessments of Saudi air defence needs which in turn, and 
ultimately, were U.S. military planning factors. By advising on 
'restricted' F-Ss, and not F-4s, the 000 clearly did not always 
respond on the basis of Saudi air defence needs, but had also to 
consider the concern for profit by the U.S. arms corporations and the 
minimisation costs to the USAF R&D. Furthermore, Congressional 
hearings on arms sales to Saudi Arabia illustrated that Senators 
participating in these hearings seemed not to be aware of the history 
of the Anglo-American air defence package in the mid-1960s, and the 
commission payments by Lockheed, Raytheon and Northrop for their 
C-130s transport planes, Hawk missiles, and F-Ss aircraft in the late 
1960s and early and middle 1970s. 93 Instead Congressional hearings 
(137) 
placed the blame of commission payments on senior Saudi officials and 
arms dealers such as Adnan Khashoggi of Saudi Arabia. 
It is clear from the text of 1976 Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee that Saudi Arabia was often blamed for making large weapons 
requests (60 F-5s in 1975) when it was simply following the advice of 
the USAF. 94 Consequently the Senate hearings referred to possible 
Saudi motives such as piling up arms for the Arab states threatening 
Israel. It is obvious from the Saudis requests published in the 
hearings that the 000 was encouraging the Saudis to buy more aircraft 
(Saudi Arabia had 70 F-5Es in 1977 and 114 in 198395 ) than it needed 
and that the U.S. MAAG in Saudi Arabia was probably not tailoring its 
work to Saudi military needs and operating conditions. 96 
II F-15s 
A Influencing Factors (National) 
1 Executive Branch 
In early 1978, President Carter proposed to sell as 'Jet 
Package' of two hundred advanced aircraft: sixty F-15 
fighter/interceptors to Saudi Arabia at a cost of $2.85 billion 
including spare parts, training and support, fifteen F-15s to Israel, 
which already had twenty-five, along with seventy-five F-16 
fighter/bombers and fifty F-5 fighters to Egypt. 97 The 'Jet Package' 
was submitted by the Carter administration later that year to the 
Congress which could, under the terms of AECA of 1976, veto the 
package of sales proposals within 30 days. President carter warned 
the Congress that he would withdraw the whole arms package proposals 
if the Congress should accept a portion of it and reject another. 98 
President Carter's warning against congressional veto underlay his 
conviction of the utility of arms transfers in promoting American 
political and economic interests in the Middle East when he stated 
(138) 
that congressional veto would lead to "turn aside those in the Middle 
East who work for moderation and peace ... shattering their confidence 
in us".99 Apparently President Carter believed that arms transfers 
would dissuade Sadat's Egypt from breaking away from the American 
supported peace initiative in the Arab-Israeli conflict after that 
initiative seemed to go nowhere. Implicitly the American President 
hoped that Saudi Arabia would not back an oil embargo against the 
U.S. if the peace initiative failed. IOO As would have been expected, 
both the 000 and the DoS backed the deal unreservedly. Secretary of 
State, Cyrus Vance, argued that arms transfers served U.S. national 
interests by asserting that the 'Jet Package' would increase 
confidence in the recipients to defend themselves and thereby would 
move them towards a negotiated peace settlement. IOI later the 
Secretary, in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, defended 
President Carter's position in selling the jet planes to Saudi Arabia 
when he referred to Saudi Arabia's importance to the support of U.S. 
dollars (i.e. Saudi Arabia sells oil for American currency) and to 
Saudi moderation on OPEC prices. 102 
Since the Department of Defense's military survey in the early 
1970s in Saudi Arabia established the latter's defense needs,I03 the 
000 argued in favour of the Saudi military aircraft sales. Also the 
sales represented a powerful financial incentive for the 000 since it 
would help the 000 to reduce its unit cost of weapons systems through 
longer production lines,] and to recoup Research and Development (R & 
D) costs by passing on a share of the costs of weapons to Saudi 
Arabia. 
However, the three main interested agencies held reservations. 
ACDA advised restraint by arguing that the sales of advanced jet 
aircraft to Saudi Arabia would lead other countries in the Middle 
East to seek comparable aircraft, i.e. the sale would accelerate the 
(139) 
arms race in the Middle East region,104 and thereby might jeopardise 
U.S. security interests. 
Because of the possibility that advanced military aircraft might 
be lost to unfriendly hands in case of a change of government in 
Saudi Arabia, both the CIA and the DIA supported the sale as long as 
a U.S. sharing of the F-ISs classified technology with the Saudis 
would be permitted. 
The departments most concerned with economic aspects expectedly 
supported the race. Both Treasury and Commerce Departments 
emphasised the importance of the jet sale to Saudi Arabia. Saudi 
Arabia had invested $30 billion in U.S. government securities and $10 
billion in U.S. industries, thereby recouping America's energy import 
costs. In addition to military purchases, Saudi Arabia purchased $S 
billion in non-military goods and services from the U.S. 10S 
The Energy Department described Saudi Arabia as the most 
important source of foreign oil for the U.S. Saudi Arabia provided 
one-fifth of of total U.S. imported oil in 1977. 106 Moreover, Saudi 
Arabia is the largest oil producing country to defend the use of U.S. 
dollars in determining oil prices. Therefore, a Saudi switch to 
other currencies would be likely to send the value of the dollar 
downward with the possible consequence of a loss of international 
confidence in the American economy. Finally, Saudi Arabia, by 
producing more oil than she needed for its development, was 
satisfying the American as well as the Western countries' energy 
needs. Below is Table 2 showing the percentage of U.S. oil inputs 
from Saudi Arabia. Thus, the executive branch was not as one on the 
decision, though as I have shown, in their view, there were no 
substantial objectives to the sale despite the obvious second-term 
electoral worries. The uncertainties in Iran made electoral 
considerations rather redundant. 
(140) 
Table 2 U.S. Crude Oil Imports 1973-1983 (millions of barrels 
annually) 
Year Total Imports from Per cent of Per cent 
Distribution 
Imports Saudi Arabia Saudi oi 1 1970 1973-83 
1970 483 15 3.1 3.1 14.3 
9'6 
1973 1184 169 14.3 
1974 1269 160 12.6 
1975 1498 256 17 .1 
1976 1935 447 23.1 
1977 2414 501 20.8 
1978 2320 417 17 .9 
1979 2380 492 20.7 
1980 1926 458 23.8 
1981 1605 406 25.3 
1982 1273 194 15.2 
1983 1215 117 9.6 
Sources: U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information 
Administration, 
Annual Report to Congress, Statistics and Trends of 
Energy Supply, Demand and Price (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 
1978), p.27; Central Intelligence Agency, International 
Statistical Review (IESR) 83-0033, 31 May 1983, pp.11-12; 
U.S. department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1986 
Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1986), p.564. 
2. Legislative Branch 
Senator Jacob Javits (R - NY) warned that the sales of F-15s to 
Saudi Arabia would make the Israeli leader Menachem Begin less 
flexible on the U.S. supported Middle East peace initiative. 107 
Senator Henry Jackson (0 - Washington) argued that the sale of 
advanced jet aircraft to Saudi Arabia would have "a profound and 
destabilising effect on the delicate military balance between Israel 
and her neighbours". 108 Senator Daniel Moynihan (0 - NY) warned that 
the sales of the planes to Saudi Arabia would make the security of 
Israel an item of barter in American-Arab relations. 109 However, 
Senator Abraham Ribcoff (0 - Conn) stressed that "a strong and secure 
Israel is in our national interest ... but a strong United States, 
military, economically and diplomatically is also in Israel's 
interests" .110 Senator George McGovern (0 - Sth Oak) warned that 
(141) 
Israel supporters should not press too hard against the arms sales to 
Saudi Arabia lito the point where America loses its capacity to 
influence the Arab leadership toward the peace tab1e". 111 
3. Pressure Groups 
The Saudi lobby in Washington D.C. led by the then Saudi 
military attache, now the present Saudi Ambassador Bandar Bin Sultan, 
argued that the Saudis needed arms to replace their obsolete fighters 
for the defense of the Kingdom's huge, but vulnerable, oil fields 
which were of great importance to Western energy needs. In 
interview, Sheikh Faisal Alhegelan stated clearly that Saudi Arabia 
needed arms to protect its vital interests and that Saudi Arabia and 
the United States had a common interest in protecting the oil fields 
and the sea routes for oil exports. He pointed to the disastrous 
consequences for Saudi Arabia and the West should there be a lack of 
military protection. 112 Further, the Saudis stressed that they had 
the cash to buy replacements elsewhere such as Britain, France or 
others if the U.S. turned them down. The Saudi lobby also aimed at 
raising American consciousness about the friendship and common 
strategic and economic interests that bound the U.S.A. to Saudi 
Arabia. 113 John Richardson of the NAAA, for instance, linked arms 
sales to Saudi Arabia to U.S. national interests when he urged that 
America as an industrial giant had to "face up to the fact that 
interests include continuing access to the one commodity - oil - that 
makes this whole thing go".114 
Counterposed to the Saudi lobby was the distinctly more powerful 
Israel i lobby. In his visit to Washington, the Israeli leader, 
Manachem Begin, commented that "Saudi Arabia will be turned 
automatically into a confrontation state", and that Israel regarded 
the proposed arms sales as "very, very dangerous"115 and these would 
(142) 
escalate and not reduce tension in the Middle East. This notion was 
echoed by the Israeli ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, in Washington when 
he stated that the sales of F-15s to Saudi Arabia represent "a 
potential threat". 116 Morris Amitay of the AIPAC warned against the 
sales of warplanes to Saudi Arabia as a 'reward' for Saudi moderation 
in regard to oil prices and to the Arab-Israeli conflict: "A cycle of 
blackmail could be established as the United States attempts to keep 
Saudi Arabia moderate".117 It may be noted that Israel would resent 
most forms of support for an Arab state, such that their objection at 
root would not be just the military threat Saudi Arabia could pose. 
Above the political particularities of Saudi and Israeli lobbies 
were the highly influential arms co-operations. In the U.S. much 
research, development (R & D) and production of arms is done by 
private industries such as McDonnell Douglas (produces F-15), 
Northrop (produces F-5), and Boeing (produces AWACS). Most of these 
arms corporations' products are consumed by the Pentagon. Logically 
then these corporations and others expand their foreign arms sales 
whenever the Pentagon fails to consume their total products. Without 
this foreign outlet any continued downturn in the Pentagon outlet 
would cause a fall-off in the arms industries and eventually lead to 
the closure of major plants and assembly lines. The importance of 
this foreign outlet proved critical to U.S. arms firms after the U.S. 
withdrawal from South East Asia in the mid 1970's, and Pentagon 
cutback in military programs. Thus, instead of closing plants or 
assembly lines, the arms corporations launched an aggressive campaign 
with the U.S. government to sell arms to foreign countries such as 
Iran and Saudi Arabia. These corporations were also aware that if 
their countries did not make arms sales agreements with foreign 
countries then they would lose their share in the arms market to 
other international corporations. Therefore, the arms corporations 
(143) 
lobby argued that the sale of F-15s at a cost of $2.S5 million meant 
profit, work and an increased share of markets. lIS 
B. Influencing Factors (International) 
Not only was the justification of the Carter administration to 
sell arms to Saudi Arabia based on strategical factors, i.e. to help 
governments in the area to meet the threats of their security from 
the Soviet activism in the Southern Arabian Peninsula, the Horn of 
African and later in Afghanistan,119 but was also because she lost 
ground to some aggressive competitors particularly the Soviet Union, 
in the Third World arms market. 120 If one accepted the assumption 
that arms sales symbolised friendship and political commitment to 
recipients, then Soviet capturing a share of American Third World 
markets meant Soviet attempts to establish arms-supply relationships 
with these countries. Of course, there was no possibility of Saudi 
Arabia turning to the Soviet Union, but the advancement of Soviet 
arms trade in the Middle East region was an implicit threat to Saudi 
Arabia. Thus she needed to be assured of U.S. support and moreover, 
U.S. commitment. 
Saudi officials used the sale of F-15s as a test of this 
friendship and commitment to Saudi security. For instance, oil 
minister Ahmed Zaki Vamani expressed concern about the lack of 
appreciation by Washington to Saudi Arabia's security needs when he 
asserted that if the sale of F-lSs was rejected by the Congress "we 
will have a feeling that they are not concerned with our security and 
do not appreciate our friendship".121 Minister of Information, 
Muhamed Abdul Vamani, added that "approval of the aircraft sale would 
lead to a strengthening of the bonds of friendship between the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United States".122 The foreign 
minister, Saud Al-Faisal, warned that rejection of the sales would 
(144) 
lead to a re-evaluation of relations with the U.S. 123 King Khalid 
wrote to President Carter pointing out that U.S. arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia were a symbol of American security commitment against 
communist expansion in the region. 124 It appeared that Saudi's 
request for the F-1Ss reflected more than a military significance. 
It was a demand for political responses and reassurance that could 
not be understood only within military terms. 
III AWACS/F-1Ss Enhancement 
A Influencing Factors (National) 
1. Executive Branch 
In early 1981, President Reagan proposed the sale of AWACS and 
materials to upgrade the existing F-1Ss to Saudi Arabia. He stated 
that the sale was essential "to protect our interests in the 
region ... and because a serious deterioration over the last year or 
so of security conditions in the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf 
region and the growing threats there to our friends from the Soviet 
Union and other pressures".12S Therefore, in order to meet the 
growing threat of the Soviet Union after Afghanistan, the uncertainty 
of the Gulf after the fall of the Shah in the late 1970s and the 
onset of war between Iraq and Iran in the early 1980s, the President 
announced an arms package to Saudi Arabia. This was composed of five 
Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft (AWACs) and F-15s 
enhancement (fuel tanks, bomb racks, and air-to-air missiles) at a 
cost of $8.5 billion. 126 President Reagan believed that the arms 
package to Saudi Arabia was of paramount importance to U.S. national 
security interests since it would help to counter the new alliance of 
South Yemen, Ethiopia and libya which was formed in the early 1980s. 
Among the objectives of this new alliance was to eliminate western 
influence in the Arab world, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. 
(145) 
The strategic linkage of South Yemen and Ethiopia would enable these 
two pro-Soviet states to control the Southern straits of the Red Sea. 
The Red Sea has been and is becoming increasingly important to 
the West due to the new Saudi oil terminal at Yanbu127 which exports 
1-2 million barrels a day at present with a capacity to increase this 
output if necessary. 
If the strategy of the alliance is to eliminate Western 
influence then one way to do it is to put military pressure on the 
pro-Western oriented governments such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the 
Sudan. If as a result the pro-Soviet alliance was able to change the 
political system of one of these states, similar changes might occur 
in the neighbouring states (domino theory). 
Reagan, in proposing the arms package to Saudi Arabia, also 
expressed his political commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia. 
Later in the year, President Reagan defended his decision to sell 
arms to Saudi Arabia, stating that he would not allow Saudi Arabia to 
turn into another Iran. Illustrating Western dependence on Saudi oil 
he stated, "There is no way we could stand by and see that country 
[Saudi Arabia] to be taken by anyone that would shut off that 
oil". 128 Commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia was asserted 
later when the President stated, "I am convinced that providing Saudi 
Arabia with this equipment will improve the security of our friends, 
strengthen our posture in the regions, and make it clear to both 
local governments and the Soviet Union leadership that the United 
States is determined to assist in preserving security and stability 
in South East ASia".129 Finally, the President was convinced that 
the U.S. arms package to Saudi Arabia would " ... enhance the 
atmosphere and prospect for progress towards peace and the 
initiatives towards the peaceful resolution of disputes in the 
. 11130 
reglon ... 
(l46) 
The defence of this AWACS package was more problematical, but 
unlike Carter's stated policy of arms reduction, the Reagan policy 
was more aggressive and u.S. centred. The Secretary of State, 
Alexander Haig, in defending President Reagan's decision to sell 
AWACs and the F-15s Enhancement equipment to Saudi Arabia, stated 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "We must not let our 
friends' worries about one another diminish our commitment to their 
security or hinder our plans to extend strategic co-operation with 
them".131 Haig asserted that arms sales "can move the peace process 
forward and protect our vital interests in an unstable area 
exposed ... to threats from the Soviet Union and its proxies".132 The 
proposed arms sales, he added, wi 11 increase the Saud is' "abil ity to 
defend themselves against local threats, they will directly assist 
the U.S. forces deployed in the region just as the U.S. AWACs 
today".133 Saudi Arabia also provided itself as an essential partner 
in broader U.S. interests: "Saudi assistance has been important in 
the past to states that broke away from the Soviet embrace. Saudi 
Arabia has provided important financial assistance to moderate states 
such as the Sudan and Pakistan ... it has played an essential 
diplomatic role in negotiating the recent ceasefire in Lebanon ... we 
expect Saudi co-operation in fostering peace and stability".134 
James Buckley, State Department Under Secretary for security 
assistance, stated that the Reagan administration "believes that arms 
transfers serve as an important adjunct to our own security ... by 
helping to deter acts of aggression and by enhancing the self-defense 
capabilities of nations with which we share close security ties".135 
In the aftermath of the lack of American responses to the fall of the 
Shah, the American hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, James Buckley asserted that the proposed arms package 
sales to Saudi Arabia is the 'corner stone' of the Reagan policy of 
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reviving American "strength and credibility in the region ... the best 
long guarantee of security ... of states in the area wishing to remain 
free from Soviet pressure". 136 
The DoD argued similarly as it did with the sale of F-lSs in 
1978, that the Reagan proposed 1981 arms sales to Saudi Arabia would 
reduce the aircraft's unit cost and thus provide budgetary savings. 
Strategically, the DoD after the fall of the Shah in Iran and the 
Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan, hoped that arms sales to 
Saudi Arabia would strengthen the military co-operation of the Saudis 
with the United States. 137 Moreover, the DoD believed that American 
advanced defense systems would soften Saudi opposition to the U.S. to 
acquire docKing privileges or overflight rights in Saudi Arabia or in 
the neighbouring states for the American Rapid Deployment Forces 
(RDF). 
Once again, among the advisory agencies there was uncertainty 
and divisions. The NSC was in line with Reagan's policy - whereas 
ACDA and the CIA gave vent to fears in terms of potential problems at 
the regional and global levels. 
In a television programme (Macneil-Lehrer Report) in September 
1981, the National Security Council adviser, Richard Allen, stated 
that the arms package sale to Saudi Arabia serves U.S. foreign policy 
interests by enhancing the defences of Saudi Arabia in a situation 
that is threatened by a number of factors including the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan, war in the Gulf and Cuban advisers in 
Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia could be drawn to a network of nations that 
seek peace and stability in the Middle East. 138 
ACDA on the other hand expressed caution that the sophisticated 
arms package to Saudi Arabia would undermine the military balance in 
the Middle east by bringing other states of the region into an arms 
race. (Michael Klare, 1984). 
(148) 
The CIA director, Stansfield Turner, warned of the AWAC's 
technological secrets being exposed to Soviet intelligence 
activities: "If the Soviets gain access to AWACs, they could 
advantage five to seven years in certain technology and learn any 
now-contemplated version of the AWACs". 139 
In their role as a judge of matters economic, the Treasury and 
Commerce Departments supported the sale. The payment of $8.5 billion 
for the AWACs deal in cash by Saudi Arabia meant creating jobs and 
improving the balance of trade. Table 3 indicates the net advantage 
to Saudi Arabia from U.S./Saudi Arabia trade. It will be seen that 
only recently has the U.S. gained the advantage. 
Table 3 U.S. Trade with Saudi Arabia 1973-1983 ($ millions) 
Year Exports ( a) Imports (b) Balance 
1973 442 1670 -1228 
1974 835 1670 -835 
1975 1502 2623 -1121 
1976 2772 5213 -2441 
1977 3575 6347 -2772 
1978 4370 5307 -937 
1979 4875 7893 -3108 
1980 5769 12509 -6740 
1981 7327 14391 -7064 
1982 9026 7443 +1583 
1983 7903 3627 +4276 
a. Excluding military items and services 
b. Mostly in form of oil 
Sources: 
Adapted from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 99th ed. (Washington D.C.: 
USGPO, 1978), p.878. Figures from 1977-1982 adapted from U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 104th ed., 1983, p.836. Figures for 1983 adapted 
from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical 
Abstract of the United States, 105th ed., 1985, p.818. 
In addition, Saudi Arabia by retaining investment of a major 
part of its surplus funds in dollars would strengthen the U.S. 
dollar. Saudi Arabia also provides a market for U.S. advanced 
(149) 
technology, such as for the Saudi nation-wide computer information 
systems, water desalination plants, and projects in solar power. 
2. The Congress 
The u.S. Congress was again divided on whether or not the arms 
package of AWACs and the F-15 enhancement served U.S. national 
interests. Congressional critics140 of the arms sales to Saudi Arabia 
urged that the F-15s equipped with fuel tankers, would be able to 
strike deep in Israeli territory and the AWACs would provide a 
command platform in the air to guide the F-15s for attack. AWACs 
also would be able to monitor Israeli defense installations and 
activities within the Saudi skies. 141 Critics also opposed the arms 
sales on the ground that if the sale is a test of friendship, that 
friendship should be reciprocal and thus political and economic 
concessions from Saudi Arabia on U.S. initiatives such as Camp David 
as well as Saudi restrain on oil production and price policies should 
be met before approving the arms sa1es. 142 It was further argued that 
the sale of sophisticated AWACs package necessitated the presence of 
American servicemen and personnel to service and maintain aircraft, 
and train pilots in Saudi Arabia, and if Saudi Arabia should get 
involved in a local or regional conflict, then these American 
servicemen are possibly subject to involvement in the conflict. "If 
for example, they [the Saudis] used their AWACs in a regional 
conflict, that would necessarily involve American servicemen and draw 
in the United States against its will and against its interests".143 
Congressional proponents of the arms package argued that arms sales 
to Saudi Arabia served the economic as well as the political 
interests of the United States in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, for 
instance, froze its oil prices at $32 a barrel, (the lowest among 
OPEC), in 1981. 144 William Quandt has made the point that the U.S. 
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wishes to exercise restraint on the Saudi oil policy by stating that 
arms sales to Saudi Arabia represent an attempt by the U.S. to 
influence OPEC over oil price and production. 145 Some in Congress 
argued that AWACs do not necessarily represent a military threat to 
Israel since, according to General David Jones (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff) Israel has the military capability to jam the AWACs 
radar146 as well as knock them down. Proponents of the arms sales 
added that Saudi Arabia executed political efforts to moderate the 
PLO and other radical regimes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Senator Edward Kennedy (0 - Mass) stressed that the arms sale package 
to Saudi Arabia is not in the national interest of the U.S. since the 
"arms package offensive weapons could endanger the U.S.'s closest 
ally in the Middle East - Israe1".147 Senator Bob Packwood (R -
Idaho) stated that Saudi Arabia is not committed to the course of 
peace in the Middle East. Instead, Saudi Arabia condemned the 
Israeli-Egypt peace accords, financed the PLO and called for a holy 
war against Israel. 148 Senator Patrick Moynihan, concerned with the 
loss of sophisticated weapons to unfriendly hands in case of social 
disorder, pointed out that the U.S. almost sold its sophisticated 
radar planes (AWACs) to the Shah of Iran in 1977, and he demanded to 
know: "where would we be if the Ayatollah had the AWACs".149 Senator 
Alan Cranston (0 - California) concerned with the arms race in the 
Middle East, stated that "the introduction of these sophisticated new 
weapons in the Middle East can only escalate the arms race and place 
Israeli military force on a hair trigger".150 The fall of these 
sophisticated planes into unfriendly hands, according to Senator Rudy 
Boschwitz {R - Minnesota} would hurt the Pentagon's ability to 
counter Soviet planes in Europe and e1sewhere. 151 However, other 
Senators argued that the arms sales to Saudi Arabia does not 
represent a security threat to Israel. Senator William Cohen {R -
(lSI) 
Maine) who changed his vote from opposition to support, said that his 
support of the sale was based on President Reagan's assurance that 
"he would not permit Israel's military superiority to be eroded".152 
Senator Barry Goldwater (R - Arizona), on the other hand, stated that 
AWACs "is not offensive. it is designed to give Saudi Arabia 
information of what potential enemy forces are up to". Moreover, 
"Israel could sent jets up to shoot down AWACs any time it wants". 
He added, "It is about time for us to worry about the United States" 
and stressed that "the defence of Saudi Arabia ..• is more important 
to America than the defence of any Arab country in the Middle East" 
because "if Soviet power ever gains domination over the Indian Ocean 
and the Persian Gulf we will be through as a world power".153 
Senator James McClure (R - Idaho) urged that since the Western 
World depends largely on the Middle Eastern oil, particularly from 
Saudi Arabia, then the arms sales to the latter country serves the 
national interests of the United States. He added that "if Congress 
rejects the $8.5 billion arms package that includes AWACs, Saudi 
Arabia will reassess its oil policy. The Saudis may also look 
elsewhere for weapons".154 
3. Pressure Groups 
James Akins, a former U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, agreed 
with senator McClure when he said that "the Saudis will re-examine 
their oil production policy if Congress rejects the deal". He added 
"if, as some people say, the Saudis produce as much oil as they do 
because they economically have to, then rejection would make no 
difference However, if the Saudis feel they can produce less ... the 
rejection could result in a cut in Saudi output".155 
The Saudi Ambassador, Faisal Al-Hejelan, argued in the 1981, as 
he had done concerning the F-15s in 1978, that the United States is 
(152) 
constantly putting Israel's interests before its own. 156 Former U.S. 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Robert Neumann, observed Saudi's peaceful 
efforts in the Middle East, citing the Saudi sponsored negotiations 
that led to the indirect ceasefire between Israel and the PLO in 1981 
and the cooling of the Syrian-Israeli missile crisis in 1982 and 
helping the Western Sahara dispute to move towards a peaceful 
settlement. 157 
The clear moderation of Saudi Arabia compared to the radical 
nationalist or Pan-Arabist ideologies of other Soviet-backed states 
is in firm contradiction to Senator Packwood's comments about Saudi 
Arabia cited above. Indeed, Jim Hoagland of the Washington Post 
noted that "Saudi Arabia is willing and able through its growing oil 
wealth to counter radical trends and Soviet influence in areas of the 
Middle East, Africa and even Europe".158 
The main thrust of the Saudi case was in terms of their 
non-aggressive intentions and moderate political outlook in the 
Middle East. This line was met head-on by the Israeli lobby. The 
Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, warned that the sale of AWACs 
and extended range equipment for F-15 fighter/interceptors to Saudi 
Arabia could cr~ate a grave danger to the security of Israel since 
the AWACs can monitor Israeli aircraft, airfields, and military 
installations from Saudi territory, and the extended equipment such 
as fuel tanks and the air-to-air missiles would increase the range 
and power of the F_15s. 159 The Prime Minister also attacked the 
claim by the u.S. administration that Saudi Arabia played a useful 
role in crises: "Saudi monarch is bent on Jihad, or holy war, against 
Israel, and not capable of playing any useful role whatsoever". 160 
The Israeli foreign minister, Yitzhak Shamir, disputed U.S. 
administration of Saudi moderation, asserting that the Saudis were 
extremely motivated by a "fanatic hatred of Jews and Israel". 161 The 
(153) 
Anti-Defamation league (ADl) opposed the arms sales to Saudi Arabia 
on the bas is that Saudi Arabia is" an oil arrogant ... opposed Camp 
David and financed PlO terrorism".162 
Any economic lobby was likely to push invariably for a highly 
lucrative sale. The U.S. arms manufacturers were deposed to the sale 
as were the Treasury and Commerce Departments. The arms corporations 
lobby argued, as it did with the F-15s of 1978, that arms sales to 
Saudi Arabia would serve as an outlet for their product, whenever the 
Pentagon fails to consume their total product. Arms corporations 
found support from the Reagan administration which exercised less 
restraint on arms transfers policy. 
B. Influencing Factors (International) 
According to President Reagan on the arms transfer policy of 
1981, the U.S. "must not only strengthen its own military 
capabilities, but be prepared to help its friends and allies to 
strengthen theirs through the transfer of conventional arms".163 
Strategically then, the President's willingness to sell sophisticated 
conventional weapons such as AWACs to a friend of the United States, 
i.e. Saudi Arabia, emphasised his real intention for using the arms 
sales as an instrument to challenge the Soviet Union and gain 
influence after the latter succeeded in having influences in 
Afghanistan, Southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. Economically, 
the President's flexibility in transferring advanced weapons to Saudi 
Arabia was intended to compete with the Soviet Union in the Third 
World markets. This intention was backed by Reagan's inflexible 
attitude towards characterising the Soviet Union as the enemy. This 
taken with the emphasis upon U.S. domestic strength be it through 
direct or indirect military enhancement, meant that American 
intentions and Saudi intentions diverged, through their particular 
(154) 
major domestic interests converged. The bitter experience of the 1978 
F-15s sales did not deter Saudi Arabia from requesting U.S. military 
assistance in the early 1980s in order to continue improving their 
own defence capabilities. A commitment to military aid from the U.S. 
to Saudi Arabia in the 1980s symbolised, for the Saudis, friendship 
and a demand for reassurance and reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to 
Saudi security in the wake of unstable conditions in Southern Arabia, 
the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. These threats necessitated an 
acceleration of military aid to Saudi Arabia by the United States. 
Though Saudi Arabia spent massively on defence modernisation there 
still remained a very limited ability to meet its territorial 
integrity.164 In other words, Saudi military capacity did not match 
Saudi defense expenditure, which was in excess of $20 billion per 
year. I65 One reason is that Saudi Arabia spent 50% on constructing 
military bases and infrastructures, 20% on purchasing military 
hardware, and only 30% on developing fighting capability.I66 
Therefore, the maintenance of American military assistance and advice 
was at the least necessary as a symbol of American political 
committment to the security of Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis regional as 
well as global threats. Logically then, the AWACs and the 
improvement equipment to the F-15s in 1981 became once again a symbol 
of American friendship and support to Saudi Arabia. To illustrate 
this point one may mention the Saudi official's statement to an 
American delegation visiting Saudi Arabia that, if the package sales 
were to fail, the larger security commitments would be in 
t . 167 ques 10n. 
Conclusion 
From my analysis of the long-term politics of the US Congress and 
Executive, the following policy interests, which are also reflective 
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of Saudi interests and responses, are brought into relief. 
One could summarise that the national and international factors 
have characterised the following national interests of the United 
States vis-a-vis Saudi Arabia, through its arms transfers of F-5s in 
1975, F-15s in 1978, and AWACs/F-15s Enhancement in 1981, as follows: 
I. Economic/Oil 
A To ensure Saudi co-operation on oil production and price 
policies. 
B To absorb the surplus output of arms corporations as well 
as to assist in the cost of research and development 
of new weapons systems. 
C To encourage Saudi trade and investment. 
II. Military/Defense 
A To ensure the safety of the Saudi oil fields which are 
of immediate concern to the U.S. 
B To promote a regional military balance and stability. 
C To acquire military bases/facilities on a regular 
or emergency basis. 
D To assure the security of the regime internally and 
externally. 
III. Political/Diplomatic 
A To provide leverage on the Saudi leadership by the 
pursuit of important diplomatic initiatives in the 
Middle East. 
B To maintain the pro-Western orientation of Saudi Arabia 
and thereby to exclude Soviet attempts of influence in 
Saudi Arabia. 
C To contain Soviet influence. 
It must be noted here, that one, in describing political 
'reality', cannot separate off US ends from Saudi ends. For the most 
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part, insofar as there is a relationship between US and Saudi Arabia, 
they are in a dialectical relationship of mutually determining 
interests. There is little doubt that at the initiating point of the 
relationship, US shaped Saudi responses through the US setting of US 
interests. But the emergent historical relationship set within global 
politics from the War onwards, bound them together. Thus, for 
instance, the protection of Saudi oil is what Saudi wants for its 
economic interests, and it is what America wants Saudi to do through 
the American arms supply. But what America wants Saudi to do, what 
Saudi Arabia wants America to do (supply arms) and what Saudi wants 
to do for itself, (oil/domestic security) are inextricably linked 
together historically. The 'immediate' causal structure of influence 
is set against an historical structure of influence, and it is this, 
which determines the interplay of the two states, and the limits of 
the causal structure of influence. As I have said, one must examine 
this in dialectical, not one-way causal terms. The meaning of what US 
wants Saudi Arabia to do, is as such, indeterminate without a global 
and an historical setting. 
It is clear that the United States' interests in supplying arms 
to Saudi Arabia are influenced and shaped by a number of significant 
factors, including national as well as international ones. Amongst 
national factors, there are: the executive, the legislature, pressure 
groups, and arms manufacturers. As for international factors, one 
has to remember that the U.S.A., as a super power, has a position to 
defend vis-a-vis the other super power (Soviet Union). Furthermore, 
as a global power, it has a vested interest in determining the 
relationships with and between regional states (Saudi Arabia). 
To put it into perspective, the U.S.A.'s attempts to influence 
are shaped and limited by these very factors. Similarly, although 
the U.S.A. may wish to become the significant party in the use of 
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arms transfers to influence Saudi Arabia's behaviour, it would always 
be faced with the conflict of interests vis-a-vis the situation in 
the Middle East. For instance, domestic constraints require the 
United States to maintain the security of Israel. The external 
pressures (regional conflicts of Southern Asia, the Gulf, the Middle 
East) require the United States to preserve the security of Saudi 
Arabia. 
Finally, the question remains: Does the United States achieve or 
fail to achieve the intended economic, military and political 
interests, through the three major aircraft deals vis-a-vis Saudi 
Arabia? This is tackled in Chapter Five where an attempt is made to 
provide an in depth analysis. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SAUDI ARABIA'S SECURITY DETERMINANTS IN SEEKING U.S. ARMS 
This chapter attempts to explore . Saudi Arabia security 
determinants in seeking American arms assistance. Section I attempts 
to provide an analysis of the concept of security by asking questions 
such as: What is security, at what level? What challenges might a 
state face at home and abroad? What policies, in terms of objectives 
and actions, might a state implement to cope with these challenges? 
Section II applies the analytical framework of security to the case 
of Saudi Arabia and is divided into two main periods of pre-1973 and 
1973-1983. The first period broadly analyses the development of 
security/defence policies in terms of threats and strategies. It is 
crucial to note that the pre-1973 period sets the scene and functions 
as a context for my central period: 1973-1983. 
I. THE SECURITY ANALYSIS 
A. The Meaning of Security 
Security is a basic concept in the field of international 
relations. It helps to connect usually separate studies such as 
strategy, sovereignty and foreign policy. Security is a modern term 
in political discourse broadly meaning the protection of all state 
interests against internal and external threats. Therefore, security 
is a central concept. Prominent studies in the 1970s on oil and 
Islamic politics which have been largely concerned with strategy, can 
also be seen as a part of security analysis since security can 
include the political and economic, as well as military dimensions of 
these studies. Also foreign, military and economic policies of a 
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state are largely based on the perception of threats to state 
security since such policies are formulated to lessen these threats. 
As I have shown, the concept of security plays a central role in 
the field of international relations. However, scholars in this 
areas have neglected research in comparison to other concepts. A 
lack of attention by scholars to the concept of security compared 
with the amount of work done on such concepts as 'power' and 'peace,1 
creates a gap in the literature. However, I employ a working 
definition for the concept, and then apply it to the state I am 
concerned with - Saudi Arabia. 
One may look at the following definitions in order to examine 
the concept of security: 
1. Websters Dictionary defines security as "freedom from danger ... 
freedom from fear or anxiety ... something that secures 
Protection".2 Whilst this definition is useful in illustrating 
that the essence of security is to protect from danger or 
attack, it 1s very broad and general. 
2. John Herz describes security as the "ability of the Political 
authority (the State) to provide both pacification of and 
control over, internal relations and protection from outside 
interference".3 Herz's definition of security is specific and 
deals with security at one level - the State. 
3. Michael H.H. Louw states that "national security includes 
traditional defence policy and also the non-military actions of 
a state to ensure its total capacity to survive as a political 
entity in order to exert influence and to carry out its internal 
and international objectives".4 
4. For my purposes the concept of security is the use of specified 
state organs, normally the armed forces, police, and 
intelligence services to reduce internal vulnerabilities and 
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external threats. 
Whilst both my own and Louw's definitions specifically address 
the responses of the state to various challenges, the use of 
resources to that end, I also encompass the source of such challenges 
as stated in Herz's definition. Also, my definition of the concept 
of security is applicable to the case of Saudi Arabia, as will be 
discussed later. One point which should be made, is that the 
definition of 'security' involves both the employment of the agents 
of security and the discursive modes of ensuring the continuation of 
security, e.g. foreign relations/diplomacy. 
This attempt to define the concept of security is useful in two 
ways: Firstly it(2/4) focuses on one level - the State, which I will 
discuss further, and secondly, it(2/4} clarifies the ends and 
of State security policies towards challenges, which I will 
analyse more fully. 
B. The Level of Security - The State 
means 
also 
In this Chapter I will attempt to examine the issue of security 
at one level - statehood. Largely this thesis deals with relations 
between two states, Saudi Arabia and the United States, rather than 
its internal plurality of individuals, groups, factions, tribes and 
the like. But below I consider the bearing such elements have upon 
the security of the state. 
In order to illustrate the link between individuals, groups, and 
state security, it could be said that whilst some states provide 
security for the populace - such as protection from disease, crime, 
unemployment, others may intend threats to individuals or organised 
groups. Among these threats are imprisonment and torture, denial of 
civil rights and self-determination for ethnic groups. While there 
is implication of harmonious relations between individuals and state 
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in the first case, a definite disharmony exists between individuals 
or groups in the second. Moreover, the actions of individuals or 
groups (the Basques in Spain, the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Turkey and 
the PLO in 8 Arab states) may pose serious internal security 
problems. Equally states are, or feel threatened by other states: 
Iraq/Iran, U.S.A./U.S.S.R. One concludes then, that security 
policies of States must be formulated in relation to both domestic 
and foreign contexts. 
The association of the international system (external 
environment) and state security could be similar to individual and 
state security - i.e. it could be a relation of harmony or 
disharmony. When a state refuses to take account of other states, a 
system of anarchy may prevail. Such anarchic relations will generate 
endless struggle between states to consolidate sovereignty and 
thereby provoke endless conflict and war between them. On the other 
hand, where there is mutual recognition, and acceptance of 
sovereignty, territorial boundaries and other national determinants, 
then war and conflict is less likely. In addition, other norms such 
as settling disputes by peaceful means, non-interference in the 
affairs of others and respect for ideologies stabilise relations 
between states, enabling them to enjoy order and security derived 
from attempts to regulate relations in a harmonious and balanced way. 
Once again, one might state that since there is a linkage between 
state security and international system (environment), security 
policies of states must consider the interests of other states. This 
relation between the international system and state security will be 
discussed later when examining the external threats facing Saudi 
Arabia. 
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C. State Security 
1. Security Challenges5 
a) Internal 
b) External 
2. Security Policies 
a) Objectives 
b) Actions 
1. State Security Challenges 
a) Internal 
The previous definition of security assumes that security is a 
primary value for most states since this value involves their 
existence and survival. Though this value is shared by most states, 
some will experience different problems in their search for security. 
One reason for this is that states are different in nature. When 
this is the case, security challenges vary from one state to another. 
In order to understand the challenges confronting them, one must 
analyse the nature of these states. 
The nature of states consists of different elements, and I will 
now consider some of the more essential: 
Elements of States -
i) A Distinction6 
What are the functions of the state? It must provide law and 
order, goods and services, and defence for its people. But 
underlying the material benefits a state can provide, is a 
requirement of political and economic stability - harmony among 
its people. It may be noted that some patterns of stability 
will be the result not only of common material desires, but 
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common cultural and ethnic underlinings. These obtain in the 
idea of a "nation". A state on the other hand is the assertion 
of a dominant political, military and economic force over a 
territory which may contain many "nations" e.g. U.S.S.R. Thus 
the distinction; nation-state, and state-nation. The latter, 
from the point of view of intra-state opposed groups, tends to 
be more unstable. Its proneness to internal conflict also makes 
it subject to external aggression. 
It can be seen, therefore, that different forms and 
formations of states can be exposed to varying probabilities of 
security problems. Some states derive great strength from their 
link to the nations, whilst for others, the link between state 
and nation might expose them to vulnerability and threat. 
ii) The Governing Institutions of States 
A governing institution of states includes the executive, 
legislative and judicial branches. While the executive in a 
democracy is organised to carry out domestic affairs and to 
conduct foreign relations, the legislature and judiciary having 
primary duty to forge law and execute it, and also keep the 
executive responsive and under control. On the other hand, in 
states not adhering to democratic principles, one might find 
that the dominant branch of government is the executive, and all 
other branches are drawn towards this. The concentration of 
power in the executive then, leaves the other two branches 
ineffective in carrying out the roles and duties with which they 
are constitutionally charged. They become rubber stamp for the 
executive or party leaders. For instance, in many states of 
Latin America, Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East. The 
primary functions of the legislature and the judiciary here, are 
to reflect and legitimise the executive decisions and positions. 
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Also, there is a tradition in these countries that nothing must 
be permitted to stand in the way of the policies of the ruling 
elites. 
Frequently undemocratic governments of a single man, party 
or military executive are unstable in that they do not have, or 
cannot ultimately command popular support (other than by extreme 
measures/secret police) and are often resistant to delegating 
decisions and authority. The absence of checks and balances and 
of a state-wide legitimation processes, removes a plurality of 
support and removes a spread of communication and information 
channels adapted to decisions in local conditions. Imposed 
decisions without regard to such conditions frequently harm 
people and thus cause discontent. This in turn may lead to the 
crushing of discontent which will then lead to a further 
collapse of good government-populace relations, and the rise of 
more militant opposition and internal conflict. Sources of 
internal threat might come in the form of militant dissidents 
(Sha'is in Iraq), military coups (Ghana and Nigeria), guerilla 
movements (Dhofar in Oman), or full revolution (Iran and 
Nicaragua). Also, lack of public support (lack of legitimacy) 
for these governments might give the external adversaries an 
opportunity to intervene on behalf of the domestic opposition. 
For example, Amin's Uganda was overthrown by the military 
intervention of Tanzania in 1979. 
iii) People of States 
Of course, a state consists of people, but how many people are 
needed to make a state? Can it have too small or too large a 
population? A state with a small population is likely to face 
more security problems than a more populous and powerful state. 
Acquisition of modern weapons systems by small states may serve 
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to balance the scale of power against a populous and strong 
state. However, the procurement of advanced arms by the latter 
might be fatal to the former. 
The introduction of other aspects of population is 
important in relation to security. For example, what kind of 
people comprise a particular state? Are they literate, 
technologically advanced? Are they technically-technologically 
skilled? Are they an homogenous people, made up of one, rather 
than many nationalities or races? Do they speak one rather than 
many languages? Are they multi-religious? Do they embrace the 
same customs and traditions? 
Homogeneity plays an important role in the security of the 
state. A homogenous society is likely to have internal cohesion 
and national consensus on issues related to war and conflict 
with other states. Alternatively, a state made up of societies 
differing in language, race, religion and tradition, is likely 
to be subjected to internal polarization, particularly in times 
of crisis and war. 
iv) Territory of States 
Territory is essential to the state since it provides a physical 
base for state institutions, people and natural resources. 
Territorial characteristics such as size, climate, terrain and 
geographical location play an important role with regard to the 
security of the state. A small geographical area, for instance, 
would be more vulnerable than a large one, because it would be 
less difficult to occupy and hold. Climate and terrain 
contribute similarly to explanations of the security of states. 
Past failures by France and Germany to invade Russia 
successfully testify to the importance of vast space and harsh 
climate. One wonders if all these factors have been somewhat 
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lessened by the creation of sophisticated weapons-systems? But 
the experience of the United States in Vietnam demonstrated that 
even a superpower with high technology of weaponry can be 
hindered by an adversary fighting in difficult terrain. 
Geographic location may also affect the security of a 
state. This location factor might create conditions of security 
or insecurity. For example, a state that has borders with one 
or two neighbours is likely to be more secure than one that has 
five or more neighbours since the latter has to confront the 
probability of multiple sources of threat to security. 
Switzerland, despite being landlocked, is a classic case of a 
state possessing an advantageous geographical location - it is 
partly surrounded by mountains. However, there are exceptions; 
such states as Nigeria or Brazil are relatively secure because 
they have a hegemonic position vis-a-vis their many neighbours. 
Their security and hegemony are due to the fact that they are 
buffered on all sides by smaller, weaker states. Weak but 
strategic states such as Oman, South Yemen and Somalia, located 
on important maritime choke points leading to the Gulf oil, 
attempt to improve their defence through arms assistance from 
the superpowers which use their territories as a quid pro quo 
for assistance. 
v) Resources of States 
This analysis is limited to resources that are related to state 
security. These related resources are as follows: 
v.i Economic wealth7 
v.ii Military power8 
v.i Economic wealth 
The sale of such natural resources as crude oil in 
states like Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Iran enabled them to 
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accumulate vast wealth, particularly since 1973/74. Wealth 
plays an important role in conditioning attitudes and 
behaviour of states towards security. For instance, wealth 
often enhances the stability of a state. Wealthy states 
buy modern weaponry and have their armed forces trained 
abroad, or by instructors from western armies. They embark 
on foreign aid programmes to make friends and isolate 
adversaries. Saudi Arabia, for instance, has since the oil 
boom of the seventies continued to assist financially North 
Yemen, Jordan, Egypt, Syria and others. 
On the other hand, poor countries are unable to build 
modern military establishments or to influence other actors 
through the use of economic assistance programmes. 
One can, however, challenge the implied connection 
between massive wealth and military capability by asking 
why wealth states, rich in natural resources, are 
relatively weak in certain of their military resources. 
v.ii Military power 
Reviewing the economic factors one might assume that 
wealth was important for improving military positions. 
Another factor would be the state's ability to produce its 
own weapons. Let me test this factor against states in 
situations of crisis and war. States with indigenous 
weapons systems are less vulnerable to the threat of arms 
cut off, than states which import finished weapons or their 
components, from abroad. In this case, the cut off of arms 
or the resumption of arms supplies, will determine the 
outcome of crises and wars for states that import weapons. 
However, one may note that the relation between the 
suspension of military aid and influence is not a simple 
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one, but often mediated by the character of the regime in 
recipient of arms. A regime such as Israel or South Africa 
may often be prepared to go on with military strikes and 
call the bluff of the 'global' power that is threatening to 
cut off arms. 
1. State Security Challenges 
b) Externa1 9 
As I explore the internal vulnerability within the context of 
the state, I will also explain the nature of external threats to 
state security. 
External threats to state security come from many different 
sources. The following are some examples: 
i) Military Threats 
The use of direct threat of military action is usually an 
attempt to bring about a change in another country's policy. 
Should the threat be transformed into successful military 
action, then the paramount value of the survival of the state is 
partly (attack) or wholly (total invasion) subverted. Unless a 
threatened state is overwhelmingly more powerful than the issue 
of the threat, then the state would be advised to consider the 
implications of the threat and make reply. Implied or indirect 
threat is when one country persuades, induces, or overtly 
supports the action, or threat made by one country to another. 
Israel's role in training and supporting Phalangist militias 
against the Syrian-backed Shi'ite militias during the 1975/76 
Lebanese civil war provides an example of Israel issuing an 
indirect threat to Syria's influence over the Lebanon. 
ii) Political Threats 
External military threats can produce internal political 
threats and ultimately, change. For example, if a state siezes 
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a territory or threatens to use force in order to change the 
behaviour of a certain state, this might lead to its collapse. 
Political threats are basically threats to ideas or ideologies, 
for example, capitalists versus communists; monarchial versus 
republican; seculars versus theology, and so on. Such states 
are engaged in ideological disputes about the right structure of 
society. Therefore, there are more boundaries than territories 
for states to be concerned with. 
The spreading of contrary ideas or ideologies by an 
external force could be very disruptive. For example, if a 
state's propaganda supports a political group of similar 
persuasion in other states, then this could possibly be followed 
by the funding and multiplication of such groups leading to 
military assistance and training. For instance, the radio of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran called upon the Sha'is dissidents 
to unite and overthrow the secular regime in Iraq and to 
establish a revolutionary Islamic republic. This ended with 
military training and assistance to that group in Iraq. A 
further example can be found in American Anti-Sandanista 
attitudes which initially gave anti-government groups in 
Nicaragua moral and political support, and ended with military 
training to overthrow the regime in Managua. But equally, 
political threats can be played out in the international forum 
when a country or a group of countries proposes or imposes a 
non-recognition agreement upon another country. This in effect 
delegitimates one country so that it is deprived of a voice in 
world affairs, and possibly access to world markets; e.g. South 
African boycotts. The threat is thus one of political 
isolation. 
iii} Economic threats 
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Specific economic threats can be related to national 
security. Firstly, threats to strategic assets, if one accepts 
that military capability rests on economic success either by 
generating revenues from exchange of resources, or by use of 
these resources for purposes of natural importance than the 
threats to cut off the supply of these materials, is considered 
of concern to national security in the final analysis. The Gulf 
states consider any restriction of oil supplies to the 
international market as a national security problem for them. 
In conflicts between Gulf states, notably the Iran/Iraq war, one 
of the major military objectives has been to launch attacks on 
oil terminals, e.g. at Kharg Island, so as to deny the relevant 
country oil revenue. This in turn denies oil states wealth to 
buy more military hardware and training. The absence of these 
threatens national security. Secondly, let me consider threats 
to domestic stability. Since the welfare of the Gulf states 
depends largely upon the revenue of oil, any substantial drop in 
scales of oil might make them vulnerable to domestic instability 
as the socio-economic structure of these states has become so 
dependent on the sustained growth of oil revenue. 
To sum up, then, the insecurity of a state reflects a 
combination of vulnerability and threats. Vulnerability is concerned 
with the nature of the state and is associated, for instance, with 
state-nations, weak institutions, indefensible borders, limited 
population and poor resources. These weaknesses expose the state to 
domestic disruption and therefore may be a relevant causal condition 
for a foreign threat in military political or economic forms. 
2. State Security Policies (objectives and actions)lO 
As discussed earlier, security challenges vary from one state to 
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another, according to their conditions and capacities. Security 
policy also varies from one state to another for the same reasons. 
However, once a state recognises its vulnerability and threats, then 
the next step is to work out strategies to cope with these 
challenges. By security policy then, I mean a regime which carries 
out a set of defined objectives (ends) and actions (means) to create 
or preserve an internal or external order consonant with its own 
interests. State security policy refers to ends and means, - 'ends' 
in terms of desired outcomes and 'means' in terms of affecting the 
behaviour of its own people and those abroad, towards desired 
outcomes. The two are needed to formulate a policy that makes the 
state internally and externally secure. 
Since it is stated that security policy consists of ends and 
means, one should be reminded of the limitations of the ends-means 
chain. Firstly, things that are believed to be objectives are also 
means for further objectives. The objective of the Iraqi regime, for 
instance, to win the war in Iran, is only a means to contain the 
spread of revolutionary Islam. This in return seeks to preserve the 
balance of power in the Gulf favourable to Iraq, thus protecting 
Iraqi security. Clearly then, the relationship between ends and 
means is ambiguous. Secondly, means might be ineffective, producing 
opposite results to those intended. Alternatively, means might be 
effective and produce the intended ends. This shows that means might 
create negative or positive consequences. Thirdly, states may have 
objectives, some of which are in conflict with each other. Thus, the 
means to achieve an objective might require the abandoning of another 
objective, illustrating that certain means should be used for certain 
ends. 
Despite these limitations, a national security policy process 
must formulate a clear and reliable means-end chain (means actually 
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leads to desired ends), controlling the tendency of means to become 
ends, making means to create positive consequence and selective 
objectives that are not in contrast with each other. The following 
figure illustrates a suggested security policy process: 
Figure 2: State Security - Policy Process 
Feedback 
State Conditions Ends (Objectives) Means (Actions) Outcomes 
A Internal A Success 
Vul nerabil it i es B Fail ure 
1 Ideas 1 Ensure self- 1 Reform/ 
2 Institutions preservation concessions 
3 Populations survival 2 Force/threat of 
4 Territory 2 Preserve law force 
5 Resources and order 3 Arms acquisitio~ 
3 Maintain the 4 Alliances/ 
integrity of the alignments 
borders 5 Foreign aid/ 
4 Secure natural diplomatic 
resources manoeuvers 
5 Enhance regional 
power and status 
B External Threats 
1 Mil itary 
2 Political 
3 Economic 
Feedback 
Figure 2 suggests how this process of state security policy may 
be portrayed. The process model is divided into four stages. The 
first includes a set of internal and external input factors that 
prompt or compel the governing elites responses to security problems. 
The number of input factors are mainly specified for Third World 
countries, particularly the Middle East. The response of governing 
elites to input factors result in three output stages. The first and 
second (ends and means) are taken by the state elites to form the 
(182) 
major components of state security policies. They include 10 
dimensions of security policy (5 ends and 5 means). These responses 
lead to a fourth stage characterised by the outcome; that the success 
or failure of state security policy has a feedback effect on these 
policies. The outcome can also be seen as a mixture of success and 
failure with the feedback effect limiting or encouraging the actions 
of the ruling elite. The impact of feedback might prompt the ruling 
elite to reassess their understanding and perceptions of their input 
factors or goals. 
The four stages of the security of state process are only 
briefly mentioned, but will be elaborated in the following analysis 
of Saudi Arabia's security challenges that prompt the ruling elite to 
seek U.S. arms. 
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MAP 1. 
Location of Major Saudi Bases, Core Area (Oil facilities) and Centres 
of Government/Cities/Population. 
Sources. 
US Department of the Army, Middle East, The Strategic Hub (Washington 
D.C.: U.S.G.P.D., 1973), pp.342-343; US Congress, Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, The Proposed AWACS/F-15 Enhancement Sale to Saudi 
Arabia 97 Congo I Sess. (Washington D.C.: U.S.G.P.D., 1981), p.1S. 
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II APPLICATION OF SECURITY ANALYSIS TO SAUDI ARABIA 
A State Condition - Saudi Arabia 
B Saudi Security Challenges and Politics 
A State Conditions - Saudi Arabia 
1. Population 
The population of Saudi Arabia is comprised of some 5-6 million 
indigenous people, plus an estimated 2 million foreign workers and 
their dependants. II The population is distributed along three belts 
which correspond to historic and geographic divisions. Approximately 
half of the population lives in the Hejaz and Asir regions of the 
west and the southeast; these areas include the Holy cities of Mecca 
and Medina and the ports of Jeddah and Yanbu. The second population 
belt consists of cases extended from Hail in the north to Karj in the 
south. This is the area of Najid Power of the House of Saud and 
includes Riyadh, the Saudi capital. The third belt begins on the 
east coast on the Gulf near Qatif, Sha';s population centre, and 
extends south and west to the oasis of Haradh. This is the site of 
Saudi oil fields and facilities, the Dhahran airbase and the new port 
of Jubail. 
The three population belts are separated from each other 
geographically, and each is surrounded and divided by vast thinly 
inhabited spaces, resulting in a multitude of sub-regions. These 
cause a division of population into major tribal groupings and many 
more sub-groupings. 
Nearly half the Saudi population is under the age of fifteen,I2 
and half of the remainder are women, most of whom are excluded from 
the labour force because of tradition. The national labour force 
amounts to approximately one million, or about 20% of the population. 
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Because of this severe manpower shortage, to enable Saudi development 
plans to go ahead, foreign labour has been imported on a massive 
scale. The bulk of an estimated 2 million foreign workers come from 
poor Arab states such as the Yemens, and Jordan, from the Indian 
subcontinent and from the Far East, particularly Nationalist China, 
the Philippines and South Korea. A large number of managerial and 
skilled jobs are occupied by westerners, mainly from the United 
States and the United Kingdom. 
2. Geography and location 
The small Saudi population lives in a vast, wasteland country. 
The realm forms a rough rhombus more than 1,000 miles long and 800 
miles wide, comprising about 900,000 square miles, about four-fifths 
of the Arabian peninsula, and is about the size of the United States 
east of the Mississippi River. There are no rivers, and rainfall is 
scarce except in the southwest; less than 1% of the country is 
suitable for agriculture. Most of the realm - except the mountainous 
west - consists of great sand deserts. There is the Rub al-Kali 
(Empty Garden) in the south, the Dahna (desert) in the east and the 
Nafud (desert) in the north. The desert in the east, where oil fields 
and their facilities are located, is flat and low-lying and therefore 
difficult to defend. 
Although the realm has a coastline of 1,300 miles on two seas 
(800 miles on the Red Sea and 500 miles on the Gulf) it has access to 
the open sea only through the two choke points on the Red Sea, and 
one on the Gulf. The 20 mile wide strait of Bab al-Mandab, adjacent 
to South Yemen, controls the passage between the Red Sea and the Gulf 
of Aden, while the Suez Canal links the Red Sea to the Mediterranean. 
The 30 mile wide strait of Harmouz, adjacent to Iran on one side and 
Oman on the other, links the Gulf to the Arabian Sea. 
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Until recently, all Saudi oil exports had to go through the 
Strait of Harmouz. The completion of the 750 mile pipeline from the 
Ghawar oil field to Yanbu on the Red Sea has provided an alternative 
outlet for over two million barrels a day, but has also increased the 
country's dependence on the Suez Canal and Bab al-Mandab. Both Saudi 
oil imports and goods are vulnerable to blockade of the choke points. 
The desert nature of the terrain of the Arabian peninsula makes 
the precise demarcation of boundaries virtually impossible. For 
example, Saudi Arabian boundaries to the south and the east are not 
well defined. This could explain Saudi Arabian involvement in border 
disputes with her immediate neighbours such as Abu Dhabi of the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman. A much more serious security problem 
facing Saudi Arabia comes from some 12 states surrounding the country 
which are either too strong such as Iran or Iraq, or too weak, such 
as Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. The former 
threaten aggression, whilst the latter invite it, particularly since 
many inhabitants of both are also extremely rich, and vital Saudi 
interests could suffer in the process. 
3. Economic resources 
The realm of Saudi Arabia has one of the greatest of economic 
resources - oil. In the years of 1973-79 Saudi Arabia commanded 
about 40% of production in the Middle East, but in the years 1980-83 
13 this rose to 51.9%. As of the end of 1984 Saudi Arabia oil 
resources in relation to world reserves stand at about 24%.14 Most 
of saudi Arabia's oil producing capacity is derived from five fields 
clustered in an area 250 miles long and 50 miles wide on the Gulf 
coast and offshore. The production of these oil fields has risen 
sharply over the years. It was 7.6mbd in 1973, 8.3mbd in 1974, 
6.9mbd in 1975, 8.5mbd in 1976, 9.2mbd in 1977, and 8.3mbd in 1978. 
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But in the years 1979-81 it stabilised at an average of 9.8mbd. In 
1982 this dropped to 6.7mbd, and again down to 5.2mbd in 1983. 15 
Terminal facilities serving all Saudi fields occupy 50 mile stretches 
between Ras Tanura and Al-Khobar. Until recently, all Saudi oil was 
loaded at Ras Tanura until the additional terminal of Ju'ayma became 
operational. The entire area is furnished with power plants, pumping 
stations, refineries and tank farms. 
The entire 50 miles of oil facilities could be subjected to 
damage, sabotage or airstrike by regional hostile forces. It could 
also be vulnerable to military action from one of the great powers. 
The use of force, even by a friendly power against the rich oil 
areas, could also occur when Saudi Arabia, for instance, decides to 
cut production or proclaim an oil embargo. 16 
4. Type of State 
The Saudi state consists of territory and population as a 
physical base and governing institutions which control the physical 
base. The question that arises now is: What type of state is Saudi 
Arabia in relation to security? Generally speaking, Saudi Arabia is 
a state-nation. 17 Since the beginning of this century, the House of 
Saud united through military operations various regions and people, 
who were under different kinds of rules and control. The Hashemite 
control, for instance, was in the western region while the Turkish 
influence was in the East. Central Arabia was left to the competing 
warlords of different tribes. Moreover, in every region of Arabia 
there were tribes whose identity lies in relationship with similar 
tribes or relative tribes but not to the population as a whole. 
Since the military unification in 1925 until the present day, the 
Saudi state has been attempting to develop a common national 
consciousness and identity for all these people in different regions. 
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Until this is accomplished, the Saudi nation-state is likely to be 
vulnerable to challenge from both within and without. 
5. Governing Institutions 
The contemporary Saudi state can be described as the Saud family 
's oligarchy, committed to Islamic governance under a 
non-constitutional monarchy. A Saudi monarch governs his eponymous 
Kingdom without any limitations to his power. In the absence of 
institutions such as national assembly, political parties or 
labour/professional unions, the Monarch's authority is not restricted 
or defined. However, despite this totalised secular power, the 
monarch accepts the Sharia - the Islamic law that is based on Qur'an 
which his religious advisers construe as the only basis of government 
and justice. 
The Monarch's commitment to the unitarian concept that secular 
and religious life is indivisible, as well as his commitment to the 
social and economic well being of his subjects, probably provides 
crucial elements for the legitimacy of his rule, as well as 
minimising the effectiveness of opposition. 
Since formal institutions for making or legitimising decisions 
have never been developed, political power has been highly 
centralised, with the government largely reflecting the Monarch's 
abilities and interests. King Abdul Aziz, the founder of the 
Kingdom, for instance, involved only himself and his expanding family 
in running the government. Opposition groups were not tolerated, and 
when the zealous Ikhwan-Muslim Brethren, which he organised, allied, 
all those committed to religious principles were crushed when the 
Ikhwan broke away from his absolute secular leadership. 
King Abdul Aziz's son, King Saud, proved to be politically and 
administratively inept. As a result his power base was eroded, and 
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his vulnerability attracted political opposition groups. The most 
important and effective opposition came from within the Royal family 
itself, and forced his abdication when his ability to provide 
political leadership appeared to jeopardise their security and 
survival. 
King Faisal, brother of King Saud, sought to widen the political 
base in the government by introducing non-royal members and by using 
the revenue from oil to initiate the first five year development plan 
in the country, thereby balancing absolute authority of leadership 
with the welfare of the people. 
Whilst King Kha1id expanded government services and functions to 
serve the majority of the people, the present King, Fahd, supported 
government programmes on developing and modernising Saudi society 
both socially and economically. 
However, balancing absolute authority with modernisation could 
be problematic, leading to polarisation between the pro-development 
faction versus the pro-traditionalists. Also, the process of 
development might create a generation not only satisfied by economic 
needs, but also by political development. 
Despite these social and economic developments, can the Saudi 
monarchical system still maintain popular acceptance and minimise 
opposition in the absence of crucial governing institutions? Also; 
can the Saudi system ignore the politics of the external world? 
These questions can be answered within the context of the challenges 
that have faced Saudi Arabia since its existence both at home and 
abroad. 
B. Saudi Security Challenges and Policies 
The second five year development plan (1975-1980) outlined seven 
fundamental goals. Several of these goals dealt with economic and 
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social issues, such as increasing economic growth, developing the 
physical infrastructure and improving human resources. Others, 
however, had much wider moral and political implications and related 
directly to the fundamental attitudes of the Saudi ruling elite. 
Thus, the first two goals of the plan were stated as 'maintaining the 
religious and moral values of Islam' and 'assuring the defence and 
internal security of the Kingdom'. The third goal was to 'foster 
social stability under circumstances of rapid social change' .18 The 
achievement of social stability could help to enhance the state 
security. 
Security and social stability are therefore, among the basic 
values of the Saudi ruling elites. Security, in this sense, is 
defined as the defense of the state, by whatever means, against 
internal and external challenge. Two key questions arise here: what 
are the security challenges that have confronted Saudi Arabian 
leadership since its formation in 1926? What policies have the Saudi 
leadership designed to cope with these challenges? The most natural 
division to this extended discussion, is that of the respective 
reigns of the Saudi Kings. It is necessary to go right back to Ibn 
Saud so as to understand policy development in a state whose rulers 
are inherently conservative and resistant to radical policy shifts. 
Thus one King's policies are often intimately linked to the policies 
of his successor, though as I shall see, the continuity of policy has 
suffered disruption from a variety of sources. It is one of my major 
concerns to identify these sources. 
1. Saudi Security Challenges and Policies, Pre-1973 
The territory now known as Saudi Arabia was, prior to 
establishment as a unified Kingdom in 1932,19 divided by tribes and 
warring factions. Ibn Saud, the strong chieftain of Najd province, 
later King Ibn Saud, backed by his Wahhabi Ikwan or brethren, gained 
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full control of his own domain of Najd in the face of Turkish-backed 
rivals by 1906, and over the next 20 years successfully gained 
control over Saudi Arabia through war and the expulsion of the 
various tribes including the Shammar, the Idrisi and the 
British-backed Hashemite. 
By 1926 Ibn Saud could proclaim himself King of Hejaz and Sultan 
of Najd and dependencies, and as such, his rule was first recognised 
by the Soviet Union and by Britain under the treaty of Jeddah in 
1927. 
However, the British presence did not wholly dissolve and he had 
to agree, under the above treaty, to recognise the British supported 
Hashemites as the legitimate rulers of Trans-Jordan and Iraq, and not 
to encroach upon British protected Sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf. In 
this sense, Saudi Arabia, as a nation, was born into a field of 
potential conflict because it had expelled rival tribes from its 
territories. Thus, Ibn Saud's rule had instant external security 
threats. If this did not make for uncertainty, the Wahhabi Ikwan and 
supporters, also rose against Ibn Saud in 1929 because he was seen as 
compromising Muslim brotherhood through agreements with Western 
powers in pursuit of the consolidation of his control over Saudi 
Arabia. And it is an irony that this revolt was quashed by the use 
of the British Royal Air Force. 20 Having re-established control over 
the Ikwan, Ibn Saud was able to deploy them effectively against the 
1934 challenge from the southern region of Asir and the Kingdom of 
Yemen. Using the Ikwan Army to invade Yemen, Ibn Saud soon ended 
Yemen's backing of the Asir revolt, and brought Asir back under his 
21 control. 
Thus in the early years, Saudi Arabia's borders were as shifting 
sands, and the relatively low-level tribal wars22 and their 
resolution (which lacked finality) posed problems both of internal 
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and external security. 
The local politics of Saudi Arabia made it appear that Saudi 
Arabia was outside of the political and economic fortunes of the 
world. However it was, as were most countries, suffering from a lack 
of finance and in a bid to raise revenues in 1933 Ibn Saud sold a 
66-year exploration concession to Standard Oil Company of California 
(SOCl) for a paltry £30,000 in gold. 23 In the years of World War II 
the neutrality of Saudi Arabia was violated by Italian air raids on 
oil insta11ations24 and this produced uncertainty among American 
staff working there, leading to a reduction of oil production and 
revenue. 
conditions. 
The revenue from pilgrims also declined due to war 
These conditions brought hunger and starvation to 
southern Hejaz. 25 Ibn Saud, facing the possibility of disorder among 
tribes, threatened to end the oil concessions with SOCL unless he was 
provided with funds to alleviate his financial crisis. SOCL in turn 
appealed for support from the U.S. government which turned out to be 
in the form of including Saudi Arabia in the lend-lease scheme in 
1943. 26 In addition to the retention of SOCL interests, the Saudi 
government agreed to the Allies' use of Saudi air space to carry war 
material via Iran to the Soviet Union,27 and to the construction of 
Ohahran air base (adjacent to the oil fields) in 1945 which aided 
American efforts to prosecute the war against Japan. 28 The U.S. use 
of Ohahran was again ratified in 1951, granting them access to it for 
five years, with the option of a further five years extension. 29 A 
mutual defence assistance agreement was signed at the same time, 
laying the ground for the U.S. to provide arms and military advisers 
to Saudi Arabia. 30 (These agreements are found in Appendix A). This 
was the first major arms transfer between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia that laid the ground for a U.S. military training mission and 
d 1· . 31 arms e lverles. 
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The conjunction of Standard Oil Company, u.s. government 
interests and the availability of lend-lease to Saudi Arabia was a 
crucial moment for Saudi aid, and was a catalyst to it having 
significance in the setting of international relations. 
The rapid increase of Saudi oil revenue from $10 million in 1946 
to $212 million in 1952,32 combined with acceleration of U.S. 
interests in Saudi Arabia and the absence of tribal threats to Ibn 
Saud's rule in the immediate post-war period, implied both a context 
of stability for Saudi development, but more importantly for my 
study, an opportunity to create and pay for the means of future 
security, both internal and external. The presence of a 'standing 
army' is now central to the definition of a state, and lacking this 
in the pre-war era, Ibn Saud and his successors now had the financial 
power to provide monies for permanent Saudi Armed Services. Anthony 
Cordesman has observed that at the time of the Ikwan rebellion 
1929/1930, Ibn Saud was "still using irregular forces whose modern 
armament was limited to a few armoured cars and machine guns".33 
Though Ibn Saud created a Ministry of Defense in 1940, it was 
not until 1947 that modern military training started and only in 1952 
did Saudi acquire jet fighters, namely the British-made 'Vampire' .34 
But the weakening of defence provisions could be seen not only in 
terms of hardware, but also in terms of the inadequacy of 
organisation of staff, and ad hoc defense planning, largely due to an 
over-emphasis on internal security provision. 35 Although the 
breakdown of figures (due to the paucity of details) is not known, 
one may note that defense and security allocation rose from SR157 
million in 1951/52 to SR400 million in 1952/53 or 52% of total 
revenue SR758 for FY 1952/53. 36 
As with so many emergent nations, Saudi development politically, 
economically and militarily, was in fits and starts. Its absolute 
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monarchy was not conducive to efficient organisation and 
decision-making, and to the nurturing of these three elements. More 
particularly, Saudi defence policy looked more toward internal 
security, and it was to quiet its anxieties on these problems and, to 
a lesser extent, threats on its borders, that Saudi Arabia wanted to 
purchase arms from the United States and also from Britain. 
The death of Ibn Saud in 1953 and the rise of King Saud, Ibn 
Saud's son brought no major re-orientations of defense policy. Much 
as his father had done, Saud sought British and American defense aid 
to contain internal security threats and an alliance with Egypt and 
Syria to restrain Hashemite antagonism towards Saudi Arabia. But the 
appearance of Nasser and the vigorous ideology of pan-Arabism in 
conjunction with the rising tide of anti-colonial, and 
anti-imperialist rhetoric and action, complicated the reading of the 
issues for the new king. 
Not only this, but the Baghdad Pact countries - a Pact promoted 
by Britain and America to halt Soviet interests in its Middle East 
neighbours - of (initially) Iraq and Turkey, and later Iran, Pakistan 
and, because of colonial ties, Britain, by their membership, were 
able to procure Western arms supplies. 37 This meant that the 
Hashemite threat from Iraq in the 1950s was greatly enhanced. To 
deflect this problem, Saud nurtured connections with Egypt, despite 
Egypt's radical Arab orientation under Nasser. The latter opposed 
the Baghdad Pact because it was pro-Western, rather than a pan-Arab, 
Pact. Saudi Arabia's connection with another major Arab state 
produced a formidable Arab alliance not easily resisted, morally or 
politically. In this, Saudi Arabia supported pan-Arabist efforts, 
though it is important to recognise that Saudi Arabia did not accept 
Soviet arms supplies while Egypt did. 38 This pointed to the 
ideological differences between the radicalism of Nasser's Egypt and 
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Saudi Arabia's conservatism. Moreover, Saudi Arabia supported 
Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal, and this taken in 
conjunction with their opposition to the Baghdad Pact placed Saudi 
Arabia in opposition to Britain and America on two grounds. In 1954 
Saudi Arabia had dismissed the American Point Four Mission declaring 
that the economic and technical assistance offered was small compared 
to that of Israel. 39 This revealed, for the first time, Saudi 
misgivings about the links developed between the U.S. and Israel. To 
drive home its connection with Egypt, and to signify its rejection of 
Western and particularly American policy in the Middle East, Saudi 
Arabia in 1955 signed a defence agreement with Egypt which provided 
for the training of Saudi forces by Egypt, in addition to training by 
U.S. military personnel. Despite the tension between Saudi Arabia 
and the West, the U.S. lease of Dhahran air base was not terminated, 
but renewed in 1957 for a further five years. 40 
What King Saud had not anticipated fully but was to discover, 
was the impact of Nasser's pan-Arabism in the Saudi Army Corps. For 
example, a Department of State intelligence report stated that in 
mid-1955 a group of senior army officers with nationalistic and 
revolutionary sentiments had plotted a coup.41 The signal of a 
challenge to Saudi autonomy and Saud's personal power was clear, and 
relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt cooled. Saudi Arabia had 
overstepped the mark. Its involvement with Nasser had brought it 
internal instability, and the distrust of the U.S. due to Saudi 
friendship with a friend of the Soviet Union and the 
straight-down-the-line radicalism of Nasser. Further, it had 
compromised its relations with Britain. Accordingly, the Royal 
Family asserted itself and Saudi policy was realigned in favour of 
Western interests and internal stability. 
The Western need for oil was beginning to have an impact. 
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American concern found its expression in the 1957 proclamation of the 
Eisenhower Doctrine. 
Saud's positive way of showing this realignment towards Western 
interests was to approve42 of the Doctrine which 'gave the President 
the right to intervene in the Middle East whenever a legitimate 
government said it was threatened by Communism and asked for aid,43 
and as stated before, he also granted the U.S. use of the Dhahran air 
base for a further five years in exchange for American military 
assistance. Indeed Saud now conceived of a 'King's Alliance' with 
the Kings of Iraq and of Jordan to counter Nasser's populist 
revolution. But the change of options from supporting Egypt to a 
'King's Alliance' was to leave Saud dangling in the middle, for in 
the final analysis he could not afford either option as supporting 
Egypt, as I have shown, would bring the distrust of the West and 
thereby the loss of Western security assistance, and pushing ahead 
with the monarchical union would bring upon his head the vilification 
of Arab states impressed by Nasser's stand. 
The intervention of the Royal Family in the continuation of 
Saud's pro-Nasser policies was an indication that they would be 
prepared to turn an absolute monarchy into an oligarchy, as well as 
demonstrating a regular problem of absolute rule - that of good 
decision-making. To facilitate improved administration, Ibn Saud 
just before his death had set up a Council of Ministers under Crown 
Prince Faisal. But this led to conflict between Faisal and his 
brother, King Saud. Faisal wanted the Council to have regular 
ministerial annual budgets, development plans and control over the 
regular army and national guard,44 but he was frustrated by Saud's 
interference in the management of the Council and his overspending 
which placed the country in financial trouble, despite its rising 
income. 45 Finally in 1958 these problems of finance and political 
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responses to Nasser and to the West pushed the Royal Family into 
acting against Saud. They removed his exclusive powers, which were 
now vested in Faisal, though Saud retained the title of King. 46 
Faisal's policies attempted to calm the situation with Nasser 
and his supporters, by condemning British and American intervention 
in Jordan and Lebanon in 1958. 47 He promised not to renew the 
Dhahran air base lease upon its expiry in 1962, and suspended the 
development of Saudi forces, thereby reducing the demand for American 
military aid. 
Under Faisal, balance fiscally and politically was the main 
criterion. But by a coalition with various princes, Saudi regained 
power in 1960 though he confined the stances taken by Faisal on pan-
Arabism and Dhahran. 48 
In 1962 the monarchy in Yemen was overthrown and replaced by a 
republic. There followed a civil war, and the republican forces 
appealed for Nasser's help, whereas the Saudis aided the pro-royalist 
forces. This was a distinct threat to Saudi security for two major 
reasons: firstly the Egyptian presence in the Saudi backyard - Yemen 
- could encourage dissidents in Saudi Arabia to follow the Yemeni 
example and to do this, ask for Egyptian military help. Secondly, 
the Saudi armed forces - subjected to Nasser's pan-Arabism ideas 
during the Saudi-Egyptian harmony - were no match for Egyptian forces 
in the event of Nasser deciding to invade Saudi Arabia from the 
south, i.e. from Yemen. The Yemen conflict impressed on Saudi Arabia 
the continued need for American military aid, and these new 
challenges to Saudi security paved the way for the return of Faisal 
to power to secure the realm from the revolutionary Egyptian-Yemeni 
threats. 
Continuing with Ibn Saud's policy of seeking allies among the 
opponents of his enemy and reviving British and American connections, 
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Faisal secured Hashemite support from Jordan (Talf Pact, 1962).49 
However, Saudi forces, joined by stronger Jordanian forces, failed to 
dislodge Egyptian forces from Yemen or to deter Egyptian air and 
naval attacks on the Saudi border. 50 To combat the Yemeni threat, 
Saudi Arabia also accepted British military assistance which included 
a dozen Lightning and Hunter jets, a battery of Thunderbird 
surface-to-surface missiles, and pilots and military personnel. u.S. 
assistance came in 1965/66 in the form of Hawk surface-to-air 
missiles and communication systems. 51 
The critical point of the defense policy was thrown up in 1962 
with the outbreak of the Yemeni Civil War. Saudi Arabia was 
unprepared militarily despite increased military spending which rose 
from SR486 million in 1961/62 to SR676 million in 1962/63 or 28% of 
total revenue, and SR2452 million of FY 1962/63. 52 The division in 
the armed forces due to the effect of Nasserism was forcibly 
demonstrated when some Saudi pilots, ordered to supply Yemeni 
pro-Royalist bases, defected. The upshot was a grounding of the 
entire Saudi air force and a purging of it. 53 
In the period between 1962 and the beginning of Faisal's reign, 
Saudi security perceptions had changed radically, and the importance 
of the West to fulfil Saudi military needs was made greatly manifest. 
Faisal in the reign of Saud had demonstrated his capacity for 
administration and upon his accession he united the powers of King 
and Prime Minister so that he headed the Council of Ministers. This 
rapid consolidation of power would be resistant to internal 
challenges from pro-Republican forces or from a resentful and deposed 
Saud. In addition Faisal embarked on political, economic and social 
reforms that would strengthen the internal situation against 
revolutionary appeals. These reforms were presented in a ten-point 
programme, among the most significant of which were the formation of 
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a 'Basic Law' or constitution, improvements in standard of living, 
and the abolition of slavery.54 
The sixties presented a rough ride for Saudi Arabia. Vemen by 
1965 was receiving both Soviet and Egyptian aid, and Saudi 
anti-Republican moves were not effective against the pro-Republican 
elements and supporters. This North Vemen threat was overtaken in 
1967 by a South Yemeni threat. British withdrawal had given way to a 
Marxist regime and this was a clear problem to Saudi Arabia. Not 
only this, but South Vemen supported another civil war on the Saudi 
border - the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. These extensive worries 
justify Anthony Cordesman's judgement that only upon the incoming of 
Faisa1's government was there "any serious attention to improving 
Saudi defense planning and modernization".55 
Faisa1, despite more insight than his predecessors into military 
needs, still had no adequate defense procurement mechanism and it was 
left to Faisa1's defense minister, Prince Sultan, to organise 
competing Western bids and commission agents to acquire weapons 
technology. 
It said something for the improvement in Saudi defense that the 
South Yemen occupation of the Saudi border town of Wadiah in 1969 was 
removed by Saudi air power. 56 This was, for all intents and 
purposes, Saudi Arabia's first military engagement since 1934 in 
Yemen and the symbolic engagement in Palestine in 1948. 
The rebellion in Oman was ended by British and Iranian forces, 
and Saudi money in the early 1970s, but the Yemens were to remain a 
permanent security problem for Saudi Arabia. 
Through the period from 1965 to 1968, Saudi Arabia substantially 
increased its air force. It acquired the Hawk missiles, a further 
supply of Thunderbird missiles and, for its air force, 49 Lightning 
interceptors and training and support services, at a cost of $62 
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million. 57 This procurement, an Anglo-American package termed the 
'Magic Carpet' programme, was disastrous in its organisation, causing 
major delays in supply and leaving a quite inadequate Saudi air 
defense system. Saudi Arabia desperately needed proper air defense 
to combat its' neighbours' air power. Because of the vast territory, 
her neighbours were largely unable to attack Saudi Arabia on land or 
sea, but they could attack Saudi Arabia by aircraft or bombers. 
Further, Saudi Arabia, due to limitation in human resources and 
skills, could never hope to compete with the ground forces of even 
some of its smaller but more populated neighbours. Thus Saudi 
weakness in the air could severely damage her defences. To improve 
things further, Saudi Arabia purchased 25 BAC-167 Strikemaster 
counter-insurgency trainers from Britain. 58 But British withdrawal 
from the Gulf in 1971 confronted Saudi Arabia with the loss of 
Britain as a strategic shield against Iran and Iraq, and against 
radical penetration of the Trucial states. The sudden absence of a 
protector in the Gulf prompted the old adversaries, Iran and Iraq, to 
stand as candidates for this inauspicious role of protector and 
consequently they involved themselves in an arms race. 
Four years earlier the shocking defeat of Egypt in 1967 in the 
'Six Day War', when the Israeli air force had neutralised the 
Egyptian air force by destroying most of Egypt's aircraft on the 
ground, had brought home vividly to Saudi Arabia, the need to improve 
air power and to obtain more effective attack aircraft. To this end, 
despite the wish of Prince Sultan to purchase McDonnell Douglas F-4E 
Phantom multi-role attack fighters, including reconnaissance 
equipment which was sold to Iran and Israel in 1970, Saudi Arabia 
ended up with a rather weaker aircraft in range and performance, the 
Northrop F-5A aircraft from the U.S. in 1971. 59 At the time this was 
acceptable because most potential threat fighters lacked long range 
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and low-altitude flying capabilities. 60 
Through the sixties, in a rather muddled way, Saudi Arabia 
effected greater defense procurement. The cumulative effect of 
trouble, in the Yemens and Oman, with Iran and Iraq over British 
withdrawal from the Gulf land most important of all, the destruction 
of Egyptian forces by the Israelis, concentrated Saudi minds 
wonderfully on the need for a much more formidable defense system. 
Not only this, but an indirect threat to Saudi Arabia was posed by 
her relationship with the United States, given extensive U.S. support 
of Israel over the Six Day War, and beyond. 
King Faisal pleaded with the U.S. to intervene to stop the 
fighting along the Suez canal 1n the "War of Attrition" that followed 
the 1967 war, as a step towards a resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, since the presence of Israel in Arab lands fuelled the 
spread of Arab radicalism and the raison d'etre for a Soviet presence 
and influence, as well as bringing criticism of Saudi Arabia for not 
taking an unambiguous stance against both U.S. and Israeli actions. 
This would expose Saudi Arabia to dangers, particularly as the Saudi 
demand for American arms was increasing. That is to say, the 
increasing association with the U.S., and the latter's unconditional 
support for Israel, put Saudi Arabia in a difficult position in the 
Arab world. King Faisal's appeals, and U.S. worries about the Soviet 
presence in the Middle East region, produced the 1969 Rogers Plan 
which called for an Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories 1n 
exchange for Arab recognition of Israel. 61 Egypt and Israel accepted 
these proposals in 1970. The result was a delimited a drift towards 
general war and further dependence of Egypt upon Soviet support. It 
also portrayed Saudi Arabia as an honest broker for the Arabs, with 
the U.S. able to calm hostilities in the region. This helped Saudi 
Arabia to negotiate openly with the U.S. for major defence and 
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civilian projects crucial to the first five year plan (1970-1975). 
Negotiated between 1970 and 1972, these security and defence 
agreements were worth about $80 million in 1970, $15 million in 1971, 
and $371 million in 1972. 62 
King Faisal once again was involved in a balancing act, having 
to retain his security and defence connections with the United States 
and at the same time take a clear pro-Arab line in the complexities 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the failure of King Faisal to 
enlist American support to gain Egypt's expulsion of the Soviets in 
1972 and to pressure Israel to withdraw from the Arab-occupied 
territory of pre-1967, was a crucial factor for Egypt and Syria in 
their jOint attacks against Israeli forces stationed there in 1973. 
Washington's significant military support for Israel, which was 
a crucial factor in enabling her to turn a near defeat into a 
military victory, directly led to the oil embargo of 1973/74. To try 
to halt U.S. help to Israel starting in the October 1973 war, Saudi 
Arabia cut oil production by 5% a month. Later it increased this to 
10% a month as a prelude to its total oil embargo against the United 
States. 63 This of course had the knock-on effect, of Western arms 
suppliers competing to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. In 1973 Saudi 
Arabia signed defense and security agreements worth $2.176 billion or 
about 33% of a total revenue of $6.517 billion, of which over $700 
million was with the U.S. 64 Now Saudi Arabia's support could not be 
taken for granted. Through political rationalities and the necessary 
restructuring of political and economic commitments, Saudi Arabia had 
come to realise her power. 
The following figure summarises and illustrates the Saudi 
security/defense process during the pre-1973 period as follows: 
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Figuret~: Saudi Security/Defense Process pre-1973 
Saudi State Ends Means put comes 
Conditions 
A Internal A Preservation of A Tribal grants A Internal/ 
Vulnerabilities dynasty/realm external 
1 Tribal/ B Use of force conflict 
regional B Containment of 
conflict Hashemite and C Economic/social B Rising 
2 Royal Nasserism reforms importance of 
division threats Saudi Arabia 
D Regional. alliancl 
B External C Settlement of ~ Relative 
threats Arab-Israeli E Foreign aid military 
1 Military: conflict strength 
Hashemites of F Anglo-American 
Transjordan/ 0 Association/ arms transfers 
Iraq. Nasser maintenance of 
in Yemen. American/British 
Iraq. Iran connection 
and Israel. 
2 Political: 
Nasser's Pan 
Arabism. 
Radicalism. 
Communism. 
3 Economics: 
Oil fields 
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II Saudi Security Challenges and Policies, 1973-1983 
After the assassination of King Faisal in 1975, his brother, the 
Crown Prince Khalid, became King Fahd (Khalid's brother) became Crown 
Prince and first deputy Prime Minister. The Royal family spoke of 
continuing with King Faisal's established policies. However, King 
Khalid's reign was marked by a major change in the power structure. 
The result of this change was a collective leadership which replaced 
the unitary rule of King Faisal. This collective leadership was 
headed by a final arbiter in the person of King Khalid and supported 
by the presence of a prominent leader with delegated responsibility, 
in the person of Crown Prince Fahd. The basic rationale of this 
shared power structure was to be the avoidance of the King Saud/King 
Faisal power struggle which occurred in the late 1950s and early 
1960s which nearly brought disaster upon the Saudi dynasty and its 
realm. This collective leadership worked well between 1975 and 1979 
due to the fact that foreign and domestic conditions were relatively 
stable. Crown Prince Fahd was the most influential figure in this 
period, but when conditions changed between 1979 and 1982, 
differences of opinion among the leaders emerged and Crown Prince 
Fahd's prominent role was opposed by his brother, Abdallah. Among 
the new conditions that emerged in 1979 which triggered a critical 
debate among the Saudi leaders, was the fall of the Shah's regime in 
Iran, the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli treaty and the war of the 
two Yemens. 
The Royal split in the era of King Khalid, resembling that of 
King Saud's reign, ended when the wisdom of compromise among the 
leaders prevailed. 
Once this power-sharing war was settled, the Saudi leadership 
continued with King Faisal's policies of development. King Faisal 
had allocated $143 billion for the second five-year plan (1975-1980). 
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The collective leadership under King Khalid went even further in the 
third five-year plan (1980-1985) and spent over $237 billion on 
civilian projects as well as £100 billion on military projects. 65 
Figure 3 indicates that the increased oil revenues, due to high oil 
output particularly from 1973 to 1983, enabled Saudi Arabia to embark 
on such enormous development plans. 
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Figure 4: Saudi Oil Production/Revenues 
$bn.y. mbd 
120 14 
100 12 
80 10 
60 8 
40 6 
20 4 
/ 
I , 
10 2 --~ 
0 a .-
1938 45 50 65 70 
Legend. 
$bn.y. = US billions of dollars per day. 
mbd = Millions of barrels a day. 
= revenue scale. 
--- = production scale. 
1938-1983. 
• , \ 
, \ 
I \ 
I 
, 
I 
, 
I 
, 
\ 
I , 
I \ 
• 
, 
I 
I 
I , 
I , 
I 
I 
I , 
I 
/ 
73/74 79 80/81 83/84 
* = Since March 1983, Saudi Arabia accepts no formal quota 
production but adjusts production to fill the gap between 
OPEC production (17.5 mbd) and world demand. 
Sources: 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency, (SAMA), Statistical Abstract (Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia, December 1972), pp.52-53 (Arabic); Middle East and 
North Africa, Saudi Arabia (1981-1982), pp.665-666, 672. The 
Economist, 'The Gulf; a survey' (28th July, 1984), pp.I-50. Aviation 
Week and Space Technology. 'Saudi's Allocating $32 billions for 
Military.' (23rd April, 1984), p.59. 
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Among the main objectives of the development plans were the 
strengthening of Saudi defence capabilities, and the move towards a 
solid economic structure based on industrialisation. Though military 
modernisation enabled the country to have a military infrastructure, 
modern weapons and military advice, the vast territory, lack of Saudi 
manpower and insufficient experience in military confrontation 
contributed to a lack of progress in military power. With regard to 
the Saudi economy, she intended to use oil revenues to finance major 
industrial development programmes such as steel and petrochemicals. 
Modernisation in the field of industry would be essential to the 
enhancement of defence capabilities, whereas the development of a 
solid economic base founded on technology could provide skilled 
technical manpower to the area of defence and security. However, 
only the future can tell us whether Saudi industrial development will 
become an important asset to the enhancement of defence and security 
capabilities. 
The massive and expensive Saudi five-year-plans naturally 
increased the country's dependence on foreign goods and services. 
Saudi Arabia's import of goods and services rose from $15 billion in 
1975 to $135 billion in 1981. 66 Thus, there was a possibility that 
Saudi Arabia would be vulnerable to retaliation from the industrial 
world in the event of a Saudi attempt to use the oil weapon. These 
imports were also subject to disruption from those countries 
controlling the choke points on the Suez Canal, Bab al Mandeb and the 
Strait of Harmouz. 
Given the expanding scope of Saudi Arabia's development plans, 
there is no doubt that the proportion of foreign to indigenous 
workers in the country must rise continually to keep pace with new 
construction. The need for massive foreign labour for development 
brought with it cultural conflict in terms of their social and 
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cultural background quite different to that of the Saudis. Foreign 
labour, as stated earlier, represents about 1/3rd of the total of the 
Saudi population, the latter estimated to be between 5 and 6 million. 
Nevertheless, the involvement of foreign labour mostly in civilian 
projects enabled the release of the indigenous Saudi work force for 
'1 't d' t' 67 ml 1 ary mo ernlsa 10n. The importance of foreign labour 
contributes to an increase in the general level of education - a 
significant area in the realisation of the country's potential. A 
whole generation of young Saudis has been exposed to Western ideas of 
social liberty and democracy, through having Western teachers at home 
or abroad. 
The fear of a decline of a unified Islamic culture has caused 
considerable misgivings among the Saudi leaders, as it has across the 
Arab world, But the political and eventual cultural impact of 
Western technology signifies an irreversible need to accommodate such 
"corrupting" influences. Saudi Arabia must have oil markets, 
extensive defence capability and a continuation of its internal 
public policies if it is to reign supreme defensively, economically, 
and politically as well as theologically in Islam. 
If oil wealth made it possible for the Saudi collective 
leadership to embark on impressive development plans and thereby 
improve their legitimacy, the expensive military modernisation plans, 
particularly in the airforce, training and infrastructure (see Figure 
4 which expresses the relation between oil wealth and military 
expenditure) did not in general improve military capability such that 
Saudi Arabia could invade or attack regional enemies, but it did mean 
that the old and new foreign challenges which threatened the national 
security of Saudi Arabia, could be repulsed or deterred. 
(209) 
Figure 5: The RelationtRlp of Oil Revenues to Defence/Security 
Allocations '1973-1983. 
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constraints and keep the people 'pure', Saudi Arabia has imported 
many workers (and their dependents). These workers often possess 
skills which Saudi Arabia could not, otherwise, command. The irony is 
that these workers whose responsibility is to provide structural 
modernisation (one pole of the cultural threat) also provide a more 
insidious threat - diversity of views expressive of modernistic 
attitudes, communicated at levels of the foreigners' interaction with 
the Saudi people. So ideological modernisation is the other side of 
the cultural threat. With these come the influx of countervailing 
political ideas about the role of Saudi Arabia in the Arab world, and 
these arise from non-Saudi, Arab advisers (more a feature of the 
Sixties). 
A significant and continuing problem for internal security is 
one reflective of tribal division. In Saudi Arabia there exists a 
minority Shi'ite Muslim population against a majority of Sunni 
Muslims. It is the Shi'ites who make up between 40% and 60% of the 
oil field work force. 68 They are regarded as of secondary status and 
have benefited little in the oil revenue boom years from the 1960s 
onwards. Their discontent has been occasionally expressed in 
protests in towns, but a great filip to their efforts was afforded by 
the coming to power in 1979 in Iran of the fundamentalist Shi'ite 
leader, Khomeini, who himself encouraged Saudi Shi'ites to revolt. 
Shi'ite demonstrations followed in 1980/81, but then, the Saudi 
National Guard and security forces quelled the minority uprising. 69 
Although the Shi'ites are a minority, the Saudi royal family is aware 
that the daily flow of oil - 'The Kingdom's' lifeline - depends 
critically upon the Shi'ite labour force to operate the oil wells and 
refineries without interruption. Therefore the Saudi rulers keep a 
close security check on their activities. 
A third source of internal security challenges to Saudi is an 
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arising middle, or middle professional, class. Development, 
supported by oil revenues, has led to an extension of educational and 
welfare facilities for the population, and this in turn requires a 
professional infrastructure to execute the new 'needs' created by 
modernisation, e.g. medicine, and for overall security purposes they 
need a proportion of the 'professions' filled by nationals. The 
problem lies in the fact that members of this 'middle class' are 
trained largely in the West, usually the U.S. and Britain, or are 
taught in Saudi Arabia by Western teachers. The inevitable 
inheritance of Westernised attitudes has led to Westernised 
expectations of the Saudi state by these groups. They now desire, 
not only a greater share in the economy, but have Western political 
aspirations of liberalisation and democratic practice. An attempt to 
meet these demands came in the form of an as yet, undelivered promise 
of a 'Basic Law' or constitution which defines the obligation of the 
citizen in return for their participation in the political process. 70 
2. Local 
Local security is the issue of the relations of states 
immediately on the borders of Saudi Arabia which do not affect the 
concerns of all states in the region. Most critically this means the 
running problem of the Yemens. South Yemen, a Marxist regime, has 
permitted Soviet use of its territory to facilitate Soviet support to 
warring nations in the Horn of Africa such as Ethiopia against 
Somalia in 1978/79 over the Ogaden dispute. 71 South Yemen's 
socialist commitments make them obvious antagonists to conservative 
Saudi Arabia. Further, Saudi Arabia is made more nervous by the 
attempts to force an alliance between the Yemens under the leadership 
of the Aden government. What impact this eventuality will have on 
the estimated one million Yemeni workers in Saudi Arabia does not, 
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for the Saudi authorities, bear consideration. 
In addition to the Yemeni security problems are the security 
problems of the smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman. 
Especially due to the Iran/Iraq war and the Iranian fundamentalist 
Shi'ite regime, these states who have close ties to Saudi Arabia are 
eminently invadable, or subject to invasion in error due to an 
overspill of the Iran/Iraq war. The weakness of the small states and 
their pro-West, pro-Saudi stance may permit the war to encroach on 
Saudi borders, or permit Iranian Shi'ite influence to traverse across 
the smaller states into Saudi Arabia. In addition, Saudi Arabia is 
also concerned about the impact of the Shi'ite revolution in Iran on 
these smaller Gulf states which contain large Shi'ite communities. 72 
It may be noted that the U.S. military presence in these states is 
relatively low-level, only extending to a naval base in Bahrain, and 
an air and naval base in Oman. 73 
3. Regional 
In the past, efforts towards regional settlements have been 
effected by political and economic manoeuvres, but after the fall of 
the Shah of Iran, Saudi Arabia was obliged to create a major military 
deterrence against Iran. In the early 1970s, the U.S. involvement in 
the Vietnam conflict, which hindered its efforts to fill the vacuum 
in the Gulf upon British withdrawal from the region, as well as the 
Shah's growing military power bought with American arms and training, 
led Saudi Arabia to seek an 'understanding' with the Shah of Iran 
over the issue of the Gulf. This understanding was based on the 
Shah's recognition of the smaller Gulf states (with the exception of 
the Islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs) as fully under Saudi 
influence, in return for which the Saudis acknowledged the Shah as 
the new guardian of the Gulf. 74 Thus, the fall of the Shah in Iran 
(214) 
by the end of the 1970s, in security terms caused deep anxieties for 
Saudi Arabia. The volatility of Iran (and Iraq), both bad cases of 
political or religious neuroses, has created massive uncertainty in 
the Gulf, leaving all the states to unilaterally minimise risk to 
themselves. 75 
The massive military input required to minimise regional 
threats, imposed upon Saudi Arabia the need for further dependence on 
the West and the U.S. Also the low population in relation to 
territorial size required advanced military technology, especially in 
regard to air defence systems, to match the huge manpower of Iran and 
Iraq. 
One of the issues dominating Arab politics has been the conflict 
with Israel. Saudi Arabia for the most part, in no way seeks 
confrontation with Israel, knowing full well that in any military 
action Saudi defences are likely to be destroyed. The more powerful 
armed forces of Egypt and Syria were subjected to severe damage by 
the Israeli airforce in 1967, 1973 and 1982 (Syria). Thus, Saudi 
Arabia avoids significant participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict 
other than preserving its position as the moral and religious 
guardian as well as the financial backer of all things Arab and 
Islamic. This necessitates the rhetoric of disapproval of Israel and 
the U.S. role in the Camp David Accords, and occasional action, 
usually through manipulation of oil supplies or prices to the West as 
illustrated by occasional approval of OPEC price-rise decisions. But 
Saudi Arabia has found that such practical moves may gain it renewed 
respect by Arab states who have condemned Saudi Arabia's close 
friendship with the supporter of Israel - the U.S., and lose it 
substantial portions of oil revenues in the long run, as countries 
try other oil markets or resort to their own oil supplies. By not 
confronting Israel, Saudi Arabia does not want to complicate its 
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security connection with the United States. 
4. International - the Soviet Union 
Representation in the Gulf is as important to the Soviet Union 
as it is to the United States, largely for the same reasons - the 
presence of each other. The central issue of the U.S.S.R. presence 
may not only be located in the Saudi oil fields but in the pursuance 
of maintaining pressure on the U.S. In this sense, Saudi Arabia 
becomes a secondary factor in International Relations and strategy. 
It has been argued that, from the Saudi perspective, the priority of 
combatting a direct Soviet threat has "always been relatively low".76 
Thus, the U.S. is seen as a guarantor of Saudi defence against local 
and regional security threats. 
B. The provision of Saudi defence, 1973-1983 
In the mid-seventies, Saudi Arabia faced the disapprobation of 
the West due to the oil embargo of 1973/74. However, in many eyes, 
this was compensated by the fact that the wealth immediately 
generated by the consequent and massive rise in oil prices enabled 
Saudi Arabia to effect much greater defence provision. The 
resumption of good relations with the U.S. in mid-1974 did not mean 
that Saudi Arabia would once more cling to the U.S. for arms 
transfers. It now had the financial capability and political 
autonomy to purchase weapons systems from other Western states, 
especially France and Britain. Between 1973 and 1975 defence 
expenditure increased from $3.447 billion to $6.774 billion or 6.99% 
and 9.8% of total Saudi Gross National Product (GNP) of $49.956 
billion and $69.122 billion in 1973 and 1975. In 1981 and 1983 it 
was $22.164 billion and $24.183 billion or 16.7% and 20.3% of total 
GNP of $132.718 billion and $119.128 billion. 77 
Despite my focus on air defence, I must briefly consider Saudi 
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response to continuing internal security problems. The Saudi 
government would shy away from using air power to control its 
population, though air power would be useful if deployed against 
guerrillas in the open desert. 
The control of internal security is nowhere near as 
administratively inefficient as control over the armed services, 
emanating out of the Ministry of Defence and Aviation (MODA). Until 
the uprising at the Grand Mosque in Makkah in November 1979 there was 
no pressing need to restructure the Saudi Arabian National Guard 
(SANG), the intelligence services, or various sections of the 
Ministry of Interior charged with public security. After this 
episode, the Royal family sought to improve its contacts with tribal, 
religious and regional leaders, and the Saudi government also 
examined the possibility of the U.S., Britain, France, Jordan or 
Pakistan training Saudi personnel in internal security measures. 78 
It eventually signed an agreement to this effect with France on 2 
November 1980. 79 But until Makkah, Saudi Arabia had been satisfied 
with general help on internal security from other nations, and using 
its own means. 
The relative absence of direct violent action, bar the Makkah 
case, provided little incentive to reform the administration of the 
armed services. The development of bureaucracy had begun in the 
sixties via King Faisal's reforms, but a Saudi bureaucratic 
temperament, unlike that of say, the British, was not innate. 
Low-level civil servants would always refer decisions upstairs or 
just lose the problem in paperwork, and senior decision-makers had a 
tendency to make snap judgements on inadequate briefings. Certainly 
there was a demand-push to produce ad hoc solutions to 'shock' 
security problems such as the fall of the Shah or Afghanistan, but 
their difficulty in effecting good decisions also lay in poor 
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implementation of Western administrative procedures such as programme 
planning budgeting (PPB) used to such effect in McNamara's Department 
of Defense. This was worsened by foreign advisers helping MODA 
failing to insist that the locus of decision should not fallon one 
person, but on collective thinking. SO A further lack of 
co-ordination of military decision resulted from Western advisers 
being apPointed to solve individual problems without reference to 
other previous plans, defence activities or the overall defense 
programme. S1 These weaknesses crippled MODA's efforts to improve its 
management and planning activities to respond to changes in external 
threats. 
Ultimately, MODA was attempting to spend its way out of trouble, 
and in terms of cost-benefits, failing. Of course, in some sense, 
the failings of MODA which continued through to 1983, are of little 
issue with respect to the U.S. arms transfers as long as Saudi Arabia 
can go on spending on arms and producing oil at reasonable prices, 
and Saudi Arabia does not have to procure a total mobilisation of its 
forces to meet a formidable security challenge. The effects of its 
inefficiency will only be felt internally as they affect the politics 
of status among the Saudi hierarchy within MODA. 
It is clear that in the face of its huge size and lack of 
manpower, Saudi's military policy has centred on building up an 
airforce which has the capacity to defend vast tracts of Saudi 
territory at speed and with force roughly equivalent to that of her 
most troublesome neighbours such as Iran and Soviet-backed South 
Yemen. 
France and Britain have both supplied weapons to Saudi Arabia, 
but it is the U.S. who has sold Saudi Arabia most of her arms;82 and 
importantly, her most sophisticated weapons systems such as AWACs. 
Of course, ideological difference and the need to maintain strong 
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relations with the U.S. have prevented Saudi purchasing arms from the 
Soviet Union despite Soviet willingness to sell arms to Saudi Arabia. 
There were 3 major U.S./Saudi Arabian arms sales in the period 
of 1973-1893: F-5 (1975), F-15 (1978), and AWACs/F-15 enhancement 
equipment (1981). 
The background to the U.S. intention to supply arms to the 
Middle East countries was the outcome, not only of a general desire 
for security for oil production, but of an articulation of a two 
pillar policy calling for support for two strategic countries, one in 
Iran and the other in Saudi Arabia. But in reality, military 
support, intended to obviate the need for a deployment of U.S. forces 
(the Nixon doctrine) was given to the Shah's Iran, whereas Saudi 
Arabia was treated almost solely as an oil supplier. This had the 
double benefit of releasing U.S. troops for Vietnam and cutting out 
the 'contradiction' implicit in U.S. support for Israel and Saudi 
Arabia; and the resultant pressure on the U.S. exerted by the 
pro-Israeli lobby and criticism of Saudi Arabia by Arab states. As I 
have implied, America could not afford these doctrines after the oil 
embargo of 1973/74. These U.S. policies had offered an opportunity 
for Iran to become the dominant military force in the Gu1f,83 and a 
threat to Saudi Arabia. To avoid this, Saudi Arabia needed to build 
a military infrastructure, but in doing so, it was forced to spend 
the vast majority of its defence budget on construction and training. 
As late as 1978 it was spending 72% of its military budget on 
construction and infrastructure, and the rest on training and 
hardware. 84 Worst of all from Saudi's perspective, was that Congress 
misperceived Saudi's military response capacity by only understanding 
Saudi military potential in terms of dollars spent. On this basis it 
has, since 1974, appeared that Saudi Arabia was equal to Iran. The 
weakness of Saudi military led her to effect economic diplomacy and 
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gain support of other conservative Arab states such as Jordan, Oman, 
Egypt and the Sudan, through the provision of financial aid. 
At the same time, for reasons outlined above, Saudi Arabia 
entered a modernising programme for her armed forces. The most 
important of these steps was the enhancement of its air force, 
substantially reinforcing it with the purchase of Northrop F-S 
aircraft through the years of 1971-1976. 85 As Northrop supplied more 
F-SA and F-SE aircraft, so the U.S. airforce took over more and more 
of the training of Saudi pilots, which formerly had been done by 
British staff at the Saudi Air Institute at Riyadh and the Technical 
Studies Institute at Dhahran. By 1976, the facility to train 100 
Saudi pilots a year was set up at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas. 86 
Northrop's status changed from being a supplier in competition with 
other suppliers, to working closely with the Saudi Air Force and 
senior Saudi defence officials. A hiccough over Prince Sultan's 
attempts to buy the F-4 Phantom, which had a greater capacity than 
the F-5 in terms of radius of action and payload carrying ability,87 
and a split in the Defence Department as to whether they should agree 
to sale, was smoothed over by an agreement to sell more F-SE and 
sufficient improved Hawk surface-to-air missiles to provide a point 
defence of Saudi air bases, key cities, and oil faci1ities. 88 The 
break in U.S.-Saudi Arabian relations due to the oil embargo was, in 
part, resolved by the building up of military ties. The need of both 
sides to establish good relations gave much incentive to the purchase 
of arms with the setting up of the American-Saudi's Joint Committee 
on Economic and Defense Co-operation in 1974. 89 Both sides witnessed 
a massive expansion of U.S. military assistance to Saudi Arabia. 
U.S. foreign military sales and military construction agreements 
increased from about $709 billion in 1973 to $2,031 billion in 1974 
and to $3,614 billion in 1975 ranking Saudi Arabia second to Iran 1n 
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buying U.S. arms. 90 
The U.S. Air Force (USAF) planned a series of studies named 
'Peace Hawk', which examined the air threat to Saudi Arabia and Saudi 
air defense modernisation requirements. 91 By 1975, Saudi Arabia had 
purchased F-5E/F, and by 1978, upon the purchase of F-15, all the 
F-5s were operational. 92 The IISS reported that the success of the 
Peace Hawk programme was demonstrated by the fact that the Saudi Air 
Force had reached proficiency levels superior to those of any Gulf 
air force except that of Iran. 93 Averaging $1.2 billion in the 
period 1976-1980, Saudi aircraft purchase provided Northrop with 
between 22% and 44% of total sales. 94 However, all was not as smooth 
as it may have seemed. As stated earlier, Congressional and, more 
particularly Senate hearings, on corruption in international arms 
sales implicated Saudi Arabia, and some elements of the senior Saudi 
defence personnel were stigmatised. Such scrutiny of a country 
averse to any publicity, especially bad publicity, increased tensions 
in Saudi/American military relations, and raised doubts as to whether 
Saudi Arabia should rely so heavily on U.S. arms transfers. 
The Joint Commission's researches had shown that Saudi Arabia 
would need a replacement of its obsolete Lightnings, which were 
really interceptor/fights with some loiter capability. looking 
towards Saudi air defence needs for the 1980s, a 1975 Saudi study 
team was invited by the U.S. to review and evaluate the F-14, F-15 
and F-18. President Carter in early 1978 announced that the U.S. was 
committed to selling an advanced plane package to Saudi Arabia, 
Israel and E9ypt. 95 In 1977 the Saudi Air Force had determined that 
the all-round capacity of F-15 made it the right one to purchase. 
Further, it was anticipated that this would be acceptable to 
Congress, unlike a purchase of the F-14 or F-16 which were regarded 
as superior to Israeli planes. While the F-15 air-superiority 
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fighters would be adequate in meeting Saudi air defence needs (long 
range attacks and interception missions) against Yemen and in the 
Gulf, it lacked the advanced target-acquisition, munition-delivery 
capability and attack avionics crucial to make Saudi Arabia effective 
in meeting more formidable adversaries such as Israel. 96 But to put 
Israeli minds at rest, however much it infuriated the Saudis (and it 
did), Carter assured Israel that the Saudi F-15 planes would be 
subject to the condition that the planes could not be sold to a third 
party without prior U.S. consent, and that they were only to be 
deployed at Taid, Khamis Mushayt, and Dhahran bases to protect key 
Saudi oil fields, cities and ports. 97 This, of course, was 
enforceable by the U.S. refusing to train pilots or service the plane 
and provide spare parts in the event of the agreement being broken. 
The Congressional debate over the Saudi purchase of F-15 was bitter, 
with Israel's supporters arguing that the sale would make Saudi 
Arabian military intervention in any Arab-Israeli conflict highly 
likely. Also, it was argued, the addition of 110 upgraded F-5Es with 
Sidewinder missiles98 would add considerably to the Saudi military 
threat to Israel. However, this would only be possible when the 
acquisition of F-15 would require support from advanced radar 
systems, either in the form of Boeing AWACs or the Grumman Hawkeye 
system. 
The sale was finally approved in May 1978 by a narrow majority 
in the Senate of 54-44. Various commentators have speculated as to 
whether the deal would have been passed in Congress had not the 
defeat of Somalia by Soviet-backed Ethiopia, recently taken place. 
From Saudi's point of view, the need to have these advanced 
planes was more than demonstrated by the crisis in Iran. It also 
showed the U.S. (as if it needed reminding after the oil embargo 
episode) how much it needed Saudi Arabia so that it could use her 
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territory as an 'over-the-horizon' base to monitor developments in 
Iran. Having passed the hurdle of Congress over the F-15, it was as 
the pro-Israeli lobby expected: Saudi Arabia began a run-in towards 
the hurdle to which an 'AWACs' label was attached. 
The need for advanced radar facilities was made evident by the 
Yemen's border war in March 1979 to which (on behalf of Saudi Arabia) 
the U.S. sent two E-3A AWACS planes, and also by the Iran-Iraq war in 
October 1980 when it was thought likely that Iran would attack Arab 
oil facilities in the Southern Gulf. 99 The U.S. had transferred a 
ground radar system TPS-Y3E to Saudi Arabia to detect aircraft around 
the oil fields, but it was weak in that it could not overcome 
electronic counter measures, and had limited surveillance coverage 
(186 mi1es).100 As Anthony Cordesman notes, "the lesson was clear 
that Saudi Arabia would require much more sophisticated air defences 
than the F-15 alone could provide. lOl 
Thus, in several ways, the need for AWACS was manifestly 
evident. What ran against the Saudis obtaining it was not only the 
pro-Israeli lobby who would have their "noses rubbed in it" if Saudi 
Arabia was given AWACs, but other "Western" nations who had requested 
AWACs or were negotiating on it, but had not secured a deal. 102 
Operating within a framework of resentment and apprehension against a 
deal were the complicating factors of Israel's rapprochement with 
Sadat which had caused anxiety and misgivings in Saudi Arabia; the 
fall of the Shah; and Saudi-U.S. misunderstanding on whether U.s. 
military presence in the Gulf was required, the U.S. assuming it 
was. 103 The U.S. seemed to be working towards a permanent presence 
in the Gulf whereas Saudi Arabia was sitting uneasily between Camp 
David and the escalation of problems between Iran and Iraq, and 
within Iran. This U.S. pressure for a military presence made it 
doubtful whether she really grasped that Saudi Arabia had to steer a 
(223) 
narrow path between the need to appear to their Arab neighbours 
independent of American support, and Saudi's actual dependency on 
u.s. military support. 
This problem in American-Saudi relations was compounded by the 
u.s. need to pull back on arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to the 
forthcoming Presidential elections. I04 Given the opposition to the 
F-I5 sales, accession to Saudi's request for AWACs and the F-I5 
enhancement equipment, which included fuel tanks, KC-I35 tanker (FAST 
KIT) and Sidewinder missiles, would be an electoral liability.I05 
The postponement of the AWACs package until after the election meant 
that Saudi-American military relations were weak at a time when they 
needed to be strong. 
In the face of the pro-Israeli lobby's arguments, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Douglas Bennet, wrote 
to Congressman Lee Hamilton in February 1978 that "an F-15 sale will 
not lead to the sale of E-2C (Hawkeye) or E-3A (AWACs)".106 But as 
the Iranian revolution escalated, the presence of the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan increased, trouble in the Yemens flared and the Iran-Iraq 
War started, Defence Secretary Harold Brown observed that the u.S. 
should consider the Saudis request for AWACs "since the situation 
demands it",107 and by November 1980 President Carter had agreed to 
the sale in the wake of his electoral defeat. However, the Reagan 
transitional team decided that they would review the decision. I08 
It was the aggressive style of the Reagan administration that 
may have been at least partly instrumental in their final decision in 
April 1981 to sell Saudi Arabia 5 E-3A AWACs aircraft, and the F-15 
air defence enhancement package that included 8 KC-135 tankers, 1,177 
"Sidewinder" AIM-9L air-to-air missiles, and 101 conformal fuel tanks 
(CTSs).109 The Reagan administration stated that the air defense 
package sale was a continuation of U.S. commitment to the defence of 
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Saudi Arabia, and that the sale was essential to protect U.S. 
interests in the Middle East region due to the deterioration of 
security in that region. State Department Spokesman William Dyess 
remarked the U.S. Middle-East policy would concentrate on a 
"bolstering of the deteriorating position of the West vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union in the region".110 
The major point of determining Saudi Arabia's request for 
high-technological air defense systems, such as the AWACs and the 
F-15 enhancement, were the attacks Iraq and Iran made on each other's 
oil facilities. This was the first "oil" war between two oil 
producing nations in the region, and the means to enhance the air 
defence system was not only a legitimate response to protect its 
vital resources - the oil fields - but to the U.S. to protect Western 
supplies of imported oil. Further, the series of troubles in the 
Middle East between 1978 and 1980 made the sale of adequate air cover 
for Saudi Arabia (the most reliable ally in the region) crucial. The 
Reagan administration then had little choice but to endorse the 
Carter agreement to sell the AWACs package to Saudi Arabia. 
The very openness of the oil fields (core areas) - their having 
no natural cover - made them susceptible to relatively simple 
airborne raids. Successive studies, especially the "Peace Hawk VII" 
report initiated by the U.S. Air Force in 1981 to study air defense 
feasibility of Saudi Arabia, had analysed the weakness in the radar 
system, and it recommended, amongst other things, that Saudi Arabia 
establish a comprehensive command, control and communication system 
(C3).111 But in order to understand the recommendations of the "Peace 
Hawk VII" for the improvement of Saudi air defence capability, one 
must understand the strategic area of Saudi Arabia. In strategic 
terms, Saudi Arabia must depend on air power defense due to the fact 
that the area of Saudi Arabia is 873,000 square miles, but it has a 
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relatively low population, limited skilled military personnel and few 
military bases. Thus she needs effective air power to protect the 
core area in the east - the oil fields/facilities from Safaniyah, Ras 
Tanura to Ghawar, the capital Riyadh, the two holy cities of Mekkah 
and Medina, and the two petro cities Jubail and Yanbu112 - against 
possible attacks from the Yemens, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Israel. 
The most valuable terrain in this strategic area is the core 
area which covers 10,000 square miles and is flat with no mountains, 
and thus it may be subjected to bombing or aerial raids. 113 The 
military weakness of Saudi Arabia means that aircraft can only 
operate from five military bases: Khamis Mushayt, Taif and Tabuk in 
the south-west, Riyadh in the centre and Dhahran in the east plus the 
one under construction at Hafar al Batin in the east. 114 Though 
Saudi Arabia acquired fighter aircraft such as F-5s and F-15s in the 
middle and later 1970s, she did not have the C3 system to detect 
enemy aircraft or direct her own aircraft in case of military 
engagement. The radar operates on a line-of-sight principle and of 
course the curvature of the earth screens low flying aircraft from 
detection by a sectoral ground-based radar such as the then existing 
radar facilities in Saudi Arabia. Obviously the AWACs package was 
the answer to the problems of ground-based radar. 
In many areas of Saudi Arabia, especially Dhahran, the most 
crucial airbase-radar has a maximum placing height of 1000 feet due 
to the lie of the land, making the area covered by Dhahran, namely 
the central oil fields, vulnerable. Again E-3A AWACs surveillance 
radar with its antennas in a rotodome could detect enemy attacks at 
30,000 feet within a radius of 230 miles. lIS It could track fighters 
at a medium or even low altitudes as little as 200 feet above the 
ground. The choice of AWACs was also made in the view of its 
'electronic counter-measures' which could jam enemy 
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air, computer and electronic equipments, 5 E-3A AWACs and 18 ground 
radar systems would be sufficient to provide warning and air-control 
capability to detect and track high- or low-flying fighters over both 
land and water before they could strike at Saudi oil facilities or 
coastal cities. 1l7 Nevertheless, for all its sophistication, the 
AWACs sold to Saudi Arabia would still be vulnerable to superior U.S. 
and Israeli jamming devices. Israel has the best communication and 
jamming system in the Middle East, and with its E-2C Hawkeye could 
detect the Saudi AWACs and send its F-15s for an interception. 118 
Further since the AWACs would not be delivered until the mid-1980s, 
the Soviet Union would be able to deploy its new advanced early 
warning airborne system - Illyusion ll-? 'Mainstay' in 1983. 119 
The remainder of the package was also important. The KC-136 
tankers would be capable of refuelling Saudi Arabia's fighter 
aircraft and extend the range of conformal fuel tanks for its F-15 
fighters. These features would allow Saudi Arabia to redeploy its 
fighters rapidly from anywhere in the Kingdom, to concentrate their 
mass, and to provide the F-5s, F-ISs, and E-3A AWACs with the 
endurance necessary to fly extended combat air patrol missions. 120 
The "Sidewinder" AIM-9L missiles would give Saudi Arabia an improved 
air-to-air missile with the shoot-down capability that it could use 
in "head-on" intercepts against low-flying attackers without having 
to sacrifice the time necessary to manoeuvre into a long chase or 
"dog-fight" position. This was essential, given the limited time 
warning by AWACs and the need for each F-15 to be able to engage more 
than one threat fighter per encounter. 121 
Taken overall, the AWACS package did not give Saudi Arabia an 
attack capacity vis-a-vis some regional or international level 
nations to which I have referred. It did not match up to Israeli 
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hardware defense capacity, so the Israeli lobby fears could, to some 
degree, be quelled. At best, Saudi Arabia would have a self-defense 
capacity were she attacked. She could give a good account of herself. 
Thus the air enhancement still tied her down to largely a protection 
and deterrence role. This enhancement programme went a long way to 
allaying Saudi fears for her sovereignty and as to whether, in 
cleaving to the U.S., she had stood shoulder to shoulder with the 
wrong horse. In line with the old maxim, "nothing succeeds like 
success", Saudi Arabia scored a triumph in procuring AWACS/F-15 
before NATO states. Not only this, but the fact that it now had 
AWACS added to its credibility as possessing an adequate deterrence 
force. If, as I said above in regard to the oil embargo, Saudi 
Arabia found an identity politically and economically by defecting 
from the U.S. strategy, Saudi Arabia also had found an identity by 
co-operating with the U.S. strategy over the air defence enhancement 
package of 1981. 
The following figure will illustrate Saudi Arabian security 
policy during 1973-1983 as follows: 
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Figure ,: Saudi Arabia's Security/Defence Process, 1973-1983 
Saudi State Conditions Ends Means Outcomes 
A Internal vulnerability A Preser- A Oil wealth A Internal 
1 Foreign worker. vation/ conflict 
2 Western educated survival B Social/ 
middle class of the Economic B Relative 
3 Traditions vs realm military military 
modernity debate development capability 
B Containment 
B External Threats of the C Diplomatic C Soviet 
1 Military: The Yemens. alliance activism 
Yemens. Iran-Iraq Iran. Iraq 
war and Arab- D American D Continuation 
2 Political: Iran Israel arms of the 
Islamic revolution conflict Yemens and 
Arab-Israel conflict. Arab-Israeli 
Soviet influence C Maintenance and the Gulf 
3 Economic: Oil fields/ of U.S. conflicts 
facilities security 
connection E American 
Security 
enhancement 
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Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have suggested that the u.s. strategic 
priorities led it to view Saudi Arabia as a major oil producer whose 
oil was of considerable interest economically - enough to merit some 
arms transfers, but not as a military critical problem area. This 
realisation only came with the 1973/74 oil embargo. Unfortunately 
for the U.S., Saudi Arabia was then obliged by her Islamic brothers 
to take the moral high ground, causing her to shift politically away 
from the U.S. and toward Islam's interests. The new complex duality 
of United States/Saudi Arabian decision structure did not damage 
U.S.-Saudi relations, but proposed a position change in the long term 
understanding of the relationship for both players. The problem was 
that America lacked perception of the consequences of this new 
position, still acting as if Saudi security determinants were a 
function of those of the U.s. Saudi Arabia operated under the 
internal, local and regional constraints facing her and therefore was 
forced to defect from the U.S. position. 122 I have shown that this 
problem of U.S. blindness occurred again in 1979 with the failure of 
U.S.-Saudi relations over the possibility of U.S. presence in the 
region. One must note that despite the continuation of US/Saudi arms 
transfer relations, Saudi has not been tied exclusively to US arms. 
Indeed the US did not object to Saudi Arabia buying arms from France, 
Britain and Germany. This was because US was increasingly unable to 
satisfy Saudi military requirements due to the domestic political 
constraints on making major arms sales. 
Despite the 'bumpy ride' in the relationship in the past ten 
years, the anticipated or, by some, hoped for break between the two 
has never occurred, and the reason for this endurance is precisely 
the respective priority each country places on the Saudi security 
position in the Middle East and, (for Saudi Arabia), priorities at 
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home. 
There are still problems facing Saudi Arabia's response to her 
perceived security determinants, the foremost of which is the gap 
between bureaucratic and administrative functions in the armed 
services, namely those emanating from MODA, and the improved 
operational potential of the services if backed by good bureaucracy. 
This is a gap that may close with time, and training by Western 
instructors. Given this, I still have to acknowledge that it was by 
King Faisal's consolidation of his grip on the running of Saudi 
Arabia - a process started in the time of his struggle with his 
brother, King Saud - that Saudi Arabia has been able to play a 
greater and more structured role in the Middle East and in its 
relationship with Washington. At this level money is not the only 
determinant of a nation's power, either of its political voice or its 
military. Thus it is, that from King Faisal to King Khalid, Saudi 
Arabia though improving its military capability, is still not a 
threat to countries in the Middle East who mostly are her foes. At 
best, she can defend herself; to that end she has been allowed, 
despite the trouble in Congress, to buy F-Ss, F-1Ss and, best of all, 
the AWACs system and an elaborate air defence enhancement package 
worth $8.5 billion. 
The shocks in the period 1978-1980 (which I have shown had their 
origins in the reign of King Saud and King Faisal, for example, the 
Yemens, Oman and the Arab-Israeli conflict) were shown to force the 
decision to sell F-lSs and AWACS to Saudi Arabia, irrespective of a 
presidential change from the hapless Jimmy Carter to the pro-Israeli, 
hawkish Ronald Reagan. But here the perceptions of security 
determinants diverged - Reagan was responding to the Soviet threat in 
the region (Afghanistan) and Saudi Arabia to the perennial problem of 
instability in the Middle East. In this Chapter I have addressed the 
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complexities and rationalities of Saudi security determinants via the 
concepts of 'state' and 'security' (Part A) and the development of 
Saudi-American relations in the Middle East context through the 
reigns of Ibn Saud, Saud, and Faisal. 
This period, lasting from the final two years of King Faisal's 
reign to the end of King Khalid's reign, saw the change in U.S./Saudi 
relations structure with respect to air defence policy and weapons 
procurement, showing that though Saudi Arabia has grown strong -
strong enough to look after herself - to date she is not strong 
enough to go on the offensive or to repulse an all-out attack from 
Iran or Iraq. At best, she is on a par. Saudi Arabia is still 
accountable to, and dependent on, U.S. arms transfers. The flow of 
U.S. arms, paradoxically keeps Saudi Arabia both strong and weak at 
the same time. 
Saudi Arabia is exposed to internal, local, regional and global 
concerns. This is one of the penalties of being a developing nation 
but having the resources to generate fabulous wealth. My examination 
has concentrated on the dimensions of my problem (arms transfers) 
almost solely from the perspective of Saudi Arabia. Yet it has been 
seen that however central a position Saudi Arabia may occupy in this 
discussion, from the conditions of its emergence perhaps until the 
day oil runs out, Saudi Arabia will be overlain by the problems at 
home and of its near neighbours, distant enemies and allies alike. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND SAUDI ARABIA'S BEHAVIOUR: 
AN EXAMINATION OF ARMS AND INFLUENCE 
As I stated at the end of Chapter Three, an attempt will be made 
to investigate whether the decisions of the United States to sell 
F-Ss, F-1Ss and AWACS/Enhancement to Saudi Arabia in 1975, 1978 and 
1981 respectively achieve or fail to achieve American oil/economic, 
military/strategic and political/diplomatic interests in Saudi 
Arabia. This is very important, the rationale of these sales, as 
stated in Chapter Three{l), being to advance such American interests. 
In the first chapter of this thesis I also discussed the 
relationship between arms transfers and political influence. I also 
analysed contending perceptions of this relationship. I concluded 
that arms transfers per se might not always be enough to produce 
influence, but added that whether arms transfers will be an effective 
instrument of influence will depend on the context of the transfers, 
ie the ability of suppliers to use arms transfers as an instrument of 
influencing recipients' behaviour towards desired interests is likely 
to be dependent on the 'issue area' in which suppliers attempt to 
exercise influence (the major hypothesis). (2) 
In applying the previous hypothesis that was formulated in 
Chapter One, the following figure might emerge. All Saudi key 
decisions with a positive rating of co-operation towards US interests 
might indicate US influence is likely to occur, ie compatability 
between Saudi behaviour and US interests. All Saudi key decisions 
with a negative rating of co-operation towards US interests might 
show no US influence on Saudi behaviour (incompatability). 
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Figure 7: Interaction between Saudi behaviour and American interests 
Saudi Arabia's Behaviour 
United States Interests 
Oil/ Moderate oil price/production 
Economic Advance trade/investment 
Mil itary/ Approve military accesses 
Strategic Share regional stability 
Political/ Support diplomatic initiatives 
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legend: 
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p = weakly positive 
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Therefore, in this chapter I intend to analyse the role of arms 
transfers in the Saudi-American relationship. We also want to 
establish whether arms transfers by the United States to Saudi Arabia 
necessarily create a direct influence on Saudi behaviour, especially 
before and after the transfer of major military aircraft. As I 
stated in the introduction of the thesis, I am interested in studying 
the period between 1973 and 1983. However, in order to take a global 
view of this relationship, I will also analyse the nature of the 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States prior to 
1973. 
Note on evidence: 
This chapter's structure has, as its dominant theme, oil. It is 
the centring upon oil policy which determines the rest of the 
chapter's analysis of security strategy and political activity. Thus 
in relation to oil, the latter two areas hold a secondary position. 
It will be noted as the chapter progresses that the strength of 
evidence becomes somewhat attenuated. The reasons for this are 
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themselves indicative of Saudi Arabia political behaviour and its 
changes over the period with which I deal (1973-1983). As Saudi 
Arabia has become deeply involved in highly sensitive arms/oil deals, 
publicly available information on the execution and dimensions of 
foreign policy has become necessarily restricted. To dig into this 
material would not only be foolhardy, but most likely unfruitful.(3) 
Riyadh and Washington Connection: Pre-1973 
Prior to 1943, Riyadh/Washington contacts at the official level 
were largely ad hoc and always aimed at solving specific problems 
arising from any threat to American oil companies operating in Saudi 
Arabia. 
commercial. 
Thus, American interest in Saudi Arabia was purely 
Indeed, even when the United States established 
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia in 1942 it was at the request 
of American oil companies(4) , and was aimed at protecting American 
oil companies from adverse competition from other multinational 
corporations and threats from within Saudi Arabia due to the 
financial crisis of the late 1930s that led to political unrest. (5) 
This rather functional relationship was a direct result of the 
relatively stable geo-strategic situation in the Middle East region. 
Even when the state of Israel was established in 1948, Saudi Arabia 
was relatively weak and too poor to play any major role. Saudi 
Arabia was not perceived as a major actor in the region. 
However, the outbreak of World War II and the rising wave of 
Arab nationalism with regard to the Palestinian issue (the former 
from the early 1940s and the latter from the late 1940s) changed the 
geo-strategic map of the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, because of its 
geographical location, became an important sea-port along the Red Sea 
and the Gulf shipping routes which were crucial to the Western 
Alliance war efforts. Moreover, its accessibility to India and the 
Far East rendered it even more pertinent. The extension of the US 
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lend-lease aid programme to Saudi Arabia in 1943 was a reflection of 
the growing importance of Riyadh. In extending the aid to Saudi 
Arabia, the Americans justified their action on the Far East: 
"Saudi Arabia lies between the vital Red Sea and Persian Gulf 
shipping rQ~tes and across the direct air route to India and the 
Far East."\ ) 
The aid programme allowed the United States military aircraft 
the right to fly over certain uninhabited zones of Saudi Arabia. (7) 
The programme was also an attempt by Washington to prepare the ground 
for extensive air facilities in the future. Curiously, the United 
States in return for Saudi Arabia's gesture provided the latter with 
two million dollars in silver coins.(8} Saudi Arabia also secured 
the services of an American military survey to determine its military 
needs.(9) 
This was to be the beginning of military co-operation between 
Saudi Arabia and the United States. The construction of an American 
military base in Dhahran in 1945 was a move in this direction, even 
though the two countries signed the agreement for the construction of 
the air base for two different reasons. For Saudi Arabia it was 
mainly for financial reasons, whereas for the USA it was part of a 
global move under Truman to expand their influence as well as part of 
the military efforts of the Allied Powers in the Far East. (10) 
However, there was a significant change in the airbase agreement. It 
was intended that the United States turn over the airbase to Saudi 
Arabia at the end of the three-year period following the end of World 
War II. (II) But the subsequent cold war that developed within the 
Super Power politics, and the perceived Soviet threat to America's 
vital interests of the Middle Eastern oil, prompted a request for 
renewal of the airbase by the United States, which Saudi Arabia 
approved in 1949. (12) Although Saudi Arabia rejected the earlier US 
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'Hoskins' proposals to establish Arab-Jewish dialogue towards the 
Palestine issue(13) she showed, by approving the renewal, her shared 
mutual interest in curbing the Soviet overtures in the region and in 
protecting her vital oil fields. The renewal also resulted in 
military training assistance worth 100 million dollars over a 
five-year period for the formation of a modern Saudi armed force.(14) 
Despite these parallel interests, Saudi Arabia in 1953 refused 
to be a part of the proposed Middle East Defense Organisation (MEDO) 
under the auspices of the United States. (IS) The organisation was to 
be an anti-communist defence line in conjunction with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). However, strong opposition from 
the Arab world, and especially vehement criticism by Nasser's 
revolutionary Egypt, forced the United States to drop the idea.(16) 
The Baghdad pact in 1955 was seen as a possible alternative. 
Consisting of Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan, the US-sponsored Pact 
was rejected by Saudi Arabia who preferred instead a security 
alliance with E9ypt.(17) Despite her concerns with the US over the 
postwar Soviet threat in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia rejected the 
Baghdad Pact for the following reasons: 
I Iraq's involvement in the Pact was seen as a resurgence, in a 
most harmful form, of the old Hashemite threat. 
2 Britain's participation in the Pact was also regarded as a means 
of weakening Saudi Arabia's claim over key strategic and 
oil-exploration areas along the border with Qatar, the Trucia1 
States and Oman, all of which were under British protection. 
3 Participation in the American-inspired security pact would 
deprive Saudi Arabia of its legitimacy as an independent state 
and would become a political liability within the Arab world. 
4 In any case, the USA's protection was far preferable to a formal 
military alliance which might lead the signatories into a 
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super-power conflict as well as limiting Saudi Arabian regional 
diplomatic flexibility. 
Interestingly, Saudi Arabia endorsed the USA's declaration(18) 
of intention to use force if necessary to assist any Middle East 
country that was threatened by international communism. (19) 
Originated by President Eisenhower, the declaration of 1957 was aimed 
at checking the ambition of the Soviet-supported Nasser's radical 
Pan-Arabism in the wake of the Suez war. In fact, the policy was 
geared towards protecting the conservative regimes in the region. 
Saudi Arabia's support for the American declaration reflected the 
country's impatience with Nasser's pro-communist attitudes and 
advocacy of a united Arab nation stretching from Cairo to Baghdad 
right along Saudi Arabia's border. 
A decade later, Saudi Arabia agreed to be involved in a 
US-sponsored agreement (Bunker Agreement of 1963) to half support for 
the feuding parties in the Yemen civil war which was fuelled by both 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt. (20) American interest in the Yemen conflict 
was apparently to prevent the conflict from threatening a regional 
order. Of course, Washington and Riyadh shared a mutual interest in 
preventing the expansion of communism in the region. In fact, the 
deployment of a fighter squadron (8 F-I00s) in Saudi Arabia by the US 
in 1963 known as Operation Hardsurface21 was both to force Egypt's 
Nasser to accept a ceasefire and a clear signal of USA concern about 
the civil war in Yemen. In particular, Washington was concerned that 
the left-wing pro-Moscow group did not gain the upper hand in the 
war. 
The continuing concern felt by Washington about the possible 
expansion of Soviet influence in the Gulf, especially after the 
British withdrawal in 1971, encouraged the reconstruction of Nixon's 
1969 doctrine which was aimed to "assist in the buildup of strong 
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regional allies that would obviate the need to station US troops 
abroad". (22) With regard to the Gulf, the doctrine was to stand on 
"two pillars" - Saudi Arabia and Iran. Due to the indecisive 
military solution to the conflict in Vietnam, this policy was 
perceived as an alternative for the US to search for regional states 
with compatible interests, to assume responsibility for security. 
Though Saudi Arabia shared mutual interests with the US over the 
Soviet threat in the region, she refused to identify herself with the 
American security policy in the Gulf.(23) Saudi Arabia's refusal was 
based on the grounds of lacking the skilled manpower necessary for 
such a responsibility. In any case, identifying with US Gulf security 
policy might seriously damage Saudi Arabia's reputation in the Arab 
world, especially in view of the US's continued active support for 
Israel. Indeed, a "two pillar" policy involving Saudi Arabia and Iran 
was most strange in view of the mutually antagonistic history of the 
two countries. 
This discussion clearly indicates that since 1943, the 
Saudi-American relationship was largely oriented towards satisfying 
American security needs in the Middle East region. In fact, 
Washington's interest in the region at that time was part of a global 
concern over the possible extension of Soviet influence in the Middle 
East in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular. Of course, the 
United States was also sensitive to any signal of left-wing success 
in the area. Their collaboration to end the civil war in Yemen is a 
point in this direction. But Riyadh's support was regularly lacking 
in other areas of American security interest. Obviously, Saudi 
Arabia's responses were largely dependent on the possible 
implications which such a support for America would have on their 
role in the Arab world. This might be the case when Saudi support 
could have an Israeli linkage. Interestingly, Saudi Arabia found it 
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ideologically convenient to do practical business with the USA, but 
politic to keep a public distance in order to retain a robust image 
as an independent state championing the cause of the Arab world. But 
Riyadh never concealed their ideological preferences. They vividly 
demonstrated these when necessary. One could therefore perceive a 
twin-strategy reflecting the instinct for national survival and the 
desire to playa key role in the Arab world. The former rather than 
the latter being of crucial importance. Thus, Saudi Arabia was 
prepared to tolerate Nasser's revolution at the rhetorical level and 
if limited to Cairo, but was definitely not prepared to tolerate 
Egypt threatening their very existence and survival as a state. 
Although security concerns dominated the Saudi/American 
relationship, it was nevertheless not the only issue in the 
relationship. As stated earlier, the initial interest of the United 
States in Saudi Arabia was commercial. This continued to grow 
despite the emphasis placed on security. But this was largely aimed 
at increasing Saudi stakes in the American oil companies operating in 
Saudi Arabia since the oil concession of 1933. (24) By 1950, Saudi 
Arabia gained a fifty-fifty profit-sharing with the American oil 
companies (Aramco). (25) In fact, the 1954 SATCO (Saudi Arabian Tanker 
Company) agreement with Aristotle Onassis, the Greek shipping 
magnate, to transport Saudi oil in his tankers(26) was both an 
attempt to diversify commercial partnerships and a pressure on the 
American companies to accept increased Saudi Arabian participation in 
their operations. Although the agreement with Onassis was revoked in 
1958 due to arbitration between Saudi Arabia and Aramco, which had 
been supported by Washington to oppose the agreement(27), the Saudi 
action served to warn foreign companies of Saudi Arabia's intention 
to be involved in decision-making with its oil resources. In fact, 
Riyadh carried this policy further, to the international arena, by 
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playing a key role in the establishment of the organisation of oil 
petroleum countries (OPEC) in 1960. (28) By the late 1960s, the 
international cartel, OPEC, was seen as an international lobby to 
pressurise oil companies to accept increasing participation of oil 
producing countries in the oil companies' concessions which had been 
granted to them in years past.(29) The subsequent acquisition of a 
25% stake in Aramco's equity in 1972(30) did not therefore come as a 
surprise.(31) 
I United States Interests and Saudi Arabia's Behaviour: The Oil 
Connection 1973-1983 
The foregoing discussion indicates a trend in the behaviour of 
Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis their relationship with the United States. 
Riyadh certainly preferred to have American military bases and 
military assistance. They also welcomed the exploitation of Saudi 
oil resources. However, the Saudis displayed a significant degree of 
independence in international politics. Thus, Saudi Arabia wanted 
practical collaboration with Washington in terms of oil policy but 
preferred independence and flexibility in international politics. 
There was therefore a clear dividing line between Saudi internal 
affairs (the shape of which were affected by American involvement) 
and Riyadh international politics. Of course, Saudi Arabia 
co-operated with the United States when fundamental issues were at 
stake. Here again, the Saudis created a dividing line between 
fundamental issues like security of oil, stability of the state and 
its ideology, and secondary issues which had no effect on its 
existence as a nation. In fact, one must bear this in mind when 
analysing the relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States 
between 1973 and 1983. Equally important, and which ought to be taken 
into consideration in the next pages, are issues which may have a 
negative effect on the well-being of the United States as a nation. 
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Therefore, while assessing the level of influence on Saudi Arabia 
achieved by the United States as a result of shipping major military 
aircraft, care must be taken in understanding what issues are crucial 
to each country, and what issues are secondary. 
For the United States, oil was of crucial importance to maximise 
a high level of economic growth. Therefore, the source of the supply 
of oil, and its price, were of great interest to the Americans. 
Obviously, the Americans wanted a reliable source of oil supply at a 
reasonable price, and Saudi Arabia, with its enormous reserves, was 
historically regarded as an ally and a friend. The continuance of a 
low oil price was needed to ensure the low cost of energy and 
therefore the relatively low production costs in the manufacturing 
sector of industry. This was essential if America was to remain 
competitive in world markets. At the ideological level, high 
economic growth had to be maintained to underscore the existence of 
capitalism as a better alternative to communism. Saudi Arabia shared 
these sentiments, and the perception in Riyadh was that the Western 
industrialised nations, in particular the United States, should not 
be deprived of their energy needs. Indeed, in late 1972, King Faisal 
declared that American companies would be given privileged access to 
Saudi oil. (32) 
The unpredictable character of world politics led Saudi Arabia 
to take a hostile action against the United States in the aftermath 
of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In retaliation for the US 
military airlift during the war, the Arab oil producing countries led 
by Saudi Arabia imposed an oil embargo on the United States. (33) To 
reinforce their pressure on other western countries 1n an attempt to 
isolate Israel, Saudi Arabia supported an Iranian-sponsored 
resolution at the December 1973 meeting of OPEC, that oil prices 
should be increased from $5.17 to $10.84 per barrel - an increase of 
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over 100%. (34) 
The immediate and direct effect of these two actions was a 
severe world economic recession. In fact, at a joint meeting of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the United States and 
its Western partners warned that the world might be facing "an 
economic crisis paralleling that of the 1930s". (35) This was no 
doubt an acknowledgement of the importance of oil in international 
economic relations. It also demonstrated the preparedness of Saudi 
Arabia to break with the US, even when an issue fundamental to the 
United States was involved. 
Subsequently, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, 
mediated an agreement for Egyptian-Israeli disengagement of forces 
(Sinai I, January 1974). In the aftermath of this Egyptian-Israeli 
settlement, Saudi Arabia and its Arab oil producing partners lifted 
the oil embargo against the US.(36) 
Curiously enough, Saudi Arabia shortly after that took a 
deliberate action, or deliberately initiated action, within OPEC 
aimed at forcing the price of oil down. Indeed, in July 1974, Riyadh 
announced its intention to auction 1.5 mbd (million barrels/day) in 
the open market and to accept whatever price the market set. (37) 
This in part was a response to the American complaint that the oil 
price had been fixed at an artificially high price. It was felt 
that, if the ordinary law of supply and demand was allowed to 
operate, the oil price would fall. Saudi Arabia's intention was 
therefore to release more oil to the market unilaterally, to force 
the price down from the price set at the Tehran oil conference. 
Strong opposition from Arab members as well as Iran in OPEC persuaded 
the Saudis to abandon their plan. As anticipated(38), President Ford 
warned that OPEC's high oil price would lead the world economy into 
depression, and would lead to the breakdown of world order and 
(251) 
safety. Henry Kissinger, in fact, threatened that unless the oil 
price was lowered, the United States would have to alter its policies 
of helping the oil producing countries in their development 
plans.(39) 
The Vienna Conference of December 1974, however, accepted a 
Saudi-sponsored compromise between the demand of oil importing 
countries for price relief and the desire of OPEC members to maintain 
the existing price. The compromise package was a 4% reduction in the 
price of oil, ie 
barrel. (40) This 
oil 
was 
price dropped from $10.84 to $10.46 per 
no doubt a response to United States 
representations concerning the price of oil. The United States 
agreement (in January 1975) to sell sixty F-5 ElF to Saudi Arabia at 
a cost of $769 million, including spare parts and support, (41) acted 
as a mutually beneficial 'exchange' for the oil, though of course one 
must note that given the long historical relationship and particular 
intricacies of the package, there was no direct causal link. 
An attempt by some OPEC members to raise the price by about 15% 
at the Vienna Conference in September 1975 was strongly opposed by 
Riyadh which threatened a substantial increase in production to 
undermine any price increase. (42) Faced with the possibility of the 
Saudis' threat to raise production, OPEC accepted a 10% increase 
until mid-1976, a compromise price since the Saudis has preferred a 
5% increase. (43) 
The reduction in oil price in 1974 and the moderate increase in 
1975 had helped to improve the economy of the industrialised nations 
and led to a consequent increase in demand for OPEC oil. It was 
feared that, given the existing low oil supply, this might encourage 
an increase in the price of oil. The Americans were worried by this 
possibility. Therefore, Jimmy Carter, during his presidential 
campaign, warned OPEC members that the United States would withdraw 
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arms supplies to those who might seek higher oil prices. (44) This 
threat rang loud in Riyadh which was anxious to maintain US military 
assistance. Thus, against the mood within OPEC at the Doha 
Conference in December 1976 to substantially increase the oil price, 
Saudi Arabia suggested a moderate increase of 5%. The majority of 
members of OPEC wanted a 15% increase. (45) Displeased, Riyadh, 
supported by the United Arab Emirates, went ahead with only a 5% 
increase. (46) But to further resist the 15% increase wanted by the 
rest of OPEC members, Saudi Arabia increased its oil production from 
7.1 mbd in 1975 to 8.5 mbd in 1976. (47) Riyadh threatened to 
increase its production to the maximum capacity of 12 mbd. This was 
clearly a conscious policy of price restraint, which was condemned by 
Iran and Iraq(48) but praised by the United States. According to 
President Gerald Ford, Saudi Arabia should be applauded for 
"exercising international responsibility and concern for the adverse 
impact of an oil price increase on the world's economy". (49) The 
American Treasury Secretary was even more generous in his praise. 
According to him, Saudi Arabia was a "true friend of the West in 
general and the United States in particular".(50) Others in the US 
described the Saudi moderating influence on oil price hike as 
'statesmanlike' and 'courageous' .(51) Capitalising on the praise from 
the United States, the Saudi minister of oil, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, 
demanded a quid-pro-quo for Saudi assistance on oil prices when he 
declared that "we expect the West to appreciate what we did, 
especially the United States".(52) These statements operated at two 
levels, one on Congress such that Congress, who traditionally had 
misgivings about the aggressive pro-sales policy to Saudi Arabia, 
would be more sympathetic. 
But Saudi Arabia was also concerned with divisions within OPEC, 
and was interested in increasing its influence within the oil cartel. 
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Riyadh, therefore, sponsored reconciliation at the Stockholm 
Conference in July 1977 by raising its oil price by 5% - bringing its 
oil price into line with the other OPEC members. The compromise was, 
however, based on a price freeze by OPEC throughout 1978. (53) The 
July 1977 compromise in OPEC thus brought about an agreed oil price 
at about $12 per barrel. 
The Executive appreciated the Saudi oil policy of moderation, 
and the Senate approved Carter's proposal to sell sixty F-15 C/O to 
Saudi Arabia as part of a military aircraft package to the Middle 
East in May 1978. (54) 
Against a background of revolution in Iran, various actions and 
deals occurred. The revolution reduced Iran's capacity to produce 
oil. The December 1978 Abu Dhabi Conference provided an opportunity 
to rectify this shortfall which might have led to a price increase. 
The Conference accepted Saudi Arabia's proposal to allow Riyadh to 
increase oil output from 8.3 mbd to 9.5 mbd.(55) However, Saudi 
Arabia went along with OPEC's decision to gradually raise oil prices 
by 14.5% during 1979 in four stages. This meant that since the oil 
price stood at $13.33 per barrel in January 1977, by October 1979 it 
would have reached $14.54.(56) 
At the same time as the United States was playing a major role 
in sponsoring the Egyptian-Israeli Camp David Accords, OPEC held an 
emergency meeting at Geneva in March 1979 to revive its Abu Dhabi 
Conference decision on price. The emergency conference was called 
ostensibly to discuss the oil market situation where most OPEC 
members were offering $8 higher than the $13.33 agreed upon at Abu 
Dhabi. (57) But it was more than a coincidence that the Conference 
reneged on its December 1978 agreements against the background of 
strong Arab opposition to the Camp David Accords. The March 1979 
Geneva Conference agreed to an immediate implementation of the Abu 
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Dhabi decision(58}, ie oil prices moved up from $13.33 to $14.54 per 
barrel from January to March 1979. Also at the Conference, Saudi 
Arabia agreed to the demand of the new Iranian regime to cut 
production in order to enable Iran to resume its production disrupted 
during the revo1ution.(59} Saudi Arabia oil production was then cut 
in April 1979 from 10.4 mbd to 8.5 mbd. (60) Unexpectedly, this 
decision raised the spot oil market price from about $20 in March to 
about $35 in June 1979 although the official OPEC price was fixed at 
$14.54 per barrel. (61) 
Clearly, the OPEC official price was unrealistic and the June 
1979 Geneva Conference was an attempt to rectify this situation. 
Official OPEC price was raised to $18 per barrel where OPEC's members 
were allowed to surcharge up to $5 per barrel. (62) Thus while Saudi 
Arabia agreed to raise its crude oil price to $18 per barrel, other 
OPEC members were charging over $23 per barrel.(63} 
The Americans were obviously unhappy about the oil situation, 
especially in view of the negative effects on growth of the high oil 
price. President Carter therefore requested the Saudis to increase 
their oil production. In response, Riyadh increased its oil 
production in July 1979 by one million mbd (from 8.5 mbd to 9.8 
mbd)(64} and the President welcomed the Saudi increase as a "positive 
decision".(65) This decision led to a decline in the price of the 
oil spot market. The spot market price came down from $35 in June to 
about $33 per barrel in August 1979. (66) 
The December 1979 Caracas meeting of OPEC and the June 1980 
Algiers Conference failed to persuade Saudi Arabia to reduce its oil 
output which was then 9.6 mbd(67) , although other members of the 
international oil cartel reduced production in order to maintain a 
high oil price. (68) The June 1980 meeting, in fact, left OPEC 
divided and weak, with delegates agreeing that each member-state 
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should fix its oil price. (69) Saudi Arabia, for its part, decided to 
sell at $28, as against $32 per barrel being offered by other members 
of OPEC.(70) Clearly, Saudi Arabia tried in the first instance to 
force OPEC to lower the oil price. When this failed, Riyadh 
maintained a high production in order to increase supply and lower 
prices. The Saudis succeeded in convincing its OPEC colleagues of 
the need not to allow frequent price increases. The September 1980 
Vienna decision of the oil cartel to freeze oil prices(71) appeared 
to be the result of Saudi Arabian pressures, although economic 
recession and conservation programmes in the industrialised nations, 
as well as the increased oil supplies from non-OPEC oi1(72), may have 
had an additional impact. In a move to close ranks with its OPEC 
colleagues, Riyadh agreed to increase its oil price by $2 per barrel 
(making it $30 per barrel).(73) This was still far less than was 
being demanded by other OPEC members which then stood at $36 per 
barrel. (74) 
Given Saudi Arabia's close relationship with the West, it was 
not unmindful of the West's economic position and the effects a rise 
in oil prices would have. Once again the historical position of 
Saudi Arabia in relation, particularly to the US, operated, and the 
notion that higher oil prices might reduce arms sales was not Saudi's 
major consideration. It was more the case that a general rift could 
occur between Saudi Arabia, the US, and the West. 
Iraqi-Iranian War Reduces Oil Supply: 
Riyadh Prevented Oil Price Increases 
The aftermath of the Iraqi-Iranian war which broke out in 
September 1980 led to a loss of over 2 mbd from the two warring 
nations.(75) The Saudis quickly increased their oil production from 
9.5 mbd to 9.9 mbd(76) 1n order to make up for the loss in supply, 
and thereby prevented a market panic that might have increased oil 
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prices. In fact, the fall of the Shah of Iran, and Saudi Arabia's 
decision to reduce production in response to a request from Khomeni's 
Iran, had had exactly that impact. The decision of Saudi Arabia was 
therefore an attempt to prevent any possible demand for a high OPEC 
price rise. As it happened, the December 1980 Bali Conference agreed 
to limit oil price increases to $2 per barrel. OPEC prices then 
ranged between $32 per barrel (Saudi Arabia) and about $40 per barrel 
(Libya). (77) However, a continued high production level by Riyadh 
forced the spot market price down from $40 per barrel in December 
1980 to $32 in June 1981. (78) Against the background of Saudi 
Arabia's high production and, as mentioned earlier, the economic 
recession in the West which had caused a lower demand for oil, 
long-term contracts by oil companies with OPEC members were 
cancelled. For example, Nigeria and Kuwait were unable to contract 
the selling of their oil at their desired prices. (79) Faced with 
these new developments, OPEC at the May 1981 Geneva Conference 
requested Saudi Arabia to cut its oil production so as to avoid the 
worsening of oil prices. The Saudis, however, failed to accede to 
this request. Riyadh, in fact, refused both to cut its oil production 
and raise prices so as to close the price gap with the rest of 
OPEC. (80) In any case, OPEC members (except the warring Iraq and 
Iran) agreed to freeze oil prices and cut production by 10% in the 
face of the intransigence of the Saudis to fall in line with general 
OPEC policy. (81) 
It should be recalled that there was a shared Riyadh-Washington 
interest to keep oil prices low. This was part of the American plan 
to keep energy prices low in order to achieve lower costs of 
production and high highly competitive industrial products. For 
being faithful to this information agreement, the Reagan 
Administration rewarded the Saudis by proposing, in October 1981, to 
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sell AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment to Saudi Arabia. This 
proposal was eventually approved by the US Senate in late October 
1981. (82) 
Saudi Arabia's continued opposition to high prices was 
maintained at the OPEC Vienna Conference in March 1982. The 
Conference failed to impose a quota production for each member, due 
to opposition from Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia. (83) The first two 
countries' opposition was based on the paradoxically similar reason 
of the need to finance their war efforts and war-torn economies. The 
March 1983 London Conference of the oil cartel agreed on price and 
production levels. Oil price was reduced to the then spot price of 
$29 per barrel, while a quota ceiling of 17.5 mbd was imposed for the 
rest of 1983. (84) Riyadh, however, accepted no formal quota. She 
obtained the right to be flexible on its production so as to fill any 
gap between what the rest of OPEC produced and world demand. For 
example, if the market demanded the 17.5 mbd OPEC ceiling, and all 
the twelve members produced 12.5 mbd, Saudi Arabia would produce 5 
mbd. This was no doubt a substantial drop in Saudi Arabia's oil 
production. 
An overview of the foregoing analysis indicates a deliberate and 
consistent policy by Saudi Arabia to induce a reduction in oil price. 
This was always contrary to the policy positions of other members of 
OPEC. Of course, a consistent confrontation was always stemmed by 
practical collaboration. This was the case when OPEC was still 
strong. The resistance to a price rise was a conscious decision by 
Saudi Arabia to pursue its policy of oil price reduction and still 
remain influential within the oil cartel. However, Riyadh became a 
little more intransigent when OPEC was weakened by an excess oil 
supply in the market. As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia's behaviour 
over the ten years under study, revealed a remarkable coincidence 
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with the interests of the United States of America. On the face of 
it, Saudi Arabia was doing the Americans' bidding. Nevertheless, 
dependent on the issue area upon which arms supplies attempted to 
effect an influence, one can explain Saudi oil behaviour. Riyadh, 
out of conviction, would believe that a low oil price might ensure 
the continued dependence of the industrialised nations on oil. This 
could be an attempt towards making oil producers important within the 
international economic system. But the Saudis' low price policy 
started in the 1970s, and was clearly at variance with Riyadh's 
earlier preference for a higher oil price. In fact, one of the 
primary objectives of OPEC at its inception was to ensure this. If 
one held that influence was articulated only 1n terms of particular 
sales, then it would be difficult to establish whether Saudi Arabia 
complied with the US because of Saudi conviction or US influence. 
But my thesis has argued that there is an historical relationship at 
work which over-determined particular sales deciSions, but not 
forgetting historical patterning. It is the relationship of the 
historical to the particular, which patterns the trend of arms sales 
and the willingness of Saudi Arabia to agree to US demands. I have 
shown that the pattern of historical influence tended to reconcile 
quickly differences between Saudi Arabia and the US, or at least 
maintain a security/military relationship at the same time as there 
were differences in other issue-areas. 
Having said the above, it must be borne in mind that the main 
aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between arms sales 
and influence. The immediate question therefore is whether there is 
any direct relationship between arms transfers to Saudi Arabia and 
its position within OPEC. It is difficult to indicate a direct 
relationship, especially as Saudi Arabia's support for lower oil 
price predates the major military aircraft deals between the two 
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countries. Indeed, the apparent deduction from the fact above is 
that arms supplies were used as a means of compensating an ally who 
had been supporting a particular position, rather than an attempt to 
make another country behave in a particular fashion. It should be 
emphasised that Saudi Arabia and the United States share similar 
ideological positions and had had a mutually beneficial relationship 
for several decades. Within this context it is difficult to conclude 
that Saudi Arabia behaved in a particular way because of a single 
variable - namely arms transfers. Of course, arms transfers 
strengthen this long relationship and help to encourage Saudi Arabia 
to continue its pro-capitalist position. No doubt Saudi Arabia, 
either through coincidence of interests and values and therefore out 
of conviction, or through a conscious attempt to please the 
Americans, did support the position of America on oil. That the 
United States did influence Saudi Arabia, should be seen within the 
broader context of a long mutually beneficial relationship between 
the two countries. Influence did occur, but not directly due to the 
supply of arms. Thus, arms transfers could be perceived as a means 
of reinforcing a relationship, rather than the main variable 
dictating how one country should behave towards another. Arms 
transfers along the Riyadh-Washington axis indicate long-term 
political commitment, and another stage in this close relationship. 
It is therefore a function of maintaining and strengthening an 
existing relationship, rather than being the point of origin for the 
close ties. 
II United States Interests and Saudi Arabia's Behaviour: 
Trade/Investment Perspective 1973-1983 
The relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States at 
the economic level was mainly based on two major agreements. The 
first agreement was concluded in early 1974 and one of the highlights 
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was that Saudi Arabia would invest largely in the United States 
through the purchase of US government bonds, notes and treasury 
bills. In return, the United States would guarantee confidentiality 
on Saudi Arabia's investments.(85) A special investment arrangement 
was reached in late 1974 between the US Treasury Department and the 
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) whereby the latter purchased US 
government securities through the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 
Documents outlining details of the special (then secret) arrangement 
between US financial authorities and SAMA will be found in Appendix 
B. 
The second agreement, which was a formal treaty signed in June 
1974, provided for "co-operation in the fields of the economy and 
defense". (86) The agreement provided for a 'US-Saudi Joint 
Commission', adding that the United States would give aid on a large 
scale and help Saudi Arabia in its development plans. Details of 
this massive American assistance to Saudi Arabia's development plans 
in economic and security will be found in Appendix C. 
With nearly $142 billion to spend on its Second Five-Year 
Development Plan (1975-80)(87) that aimed at building the country's 
physical infrastructure, its petro-chemical industries and developing 
its social services, Saudi Arabia could become a very attractive 
market for American goods and services. (See Table 3 - Chapter 
Three: US Trade with Saudi Arabia.) 
Saudi Arabia's signing of the above important agreements on 
trade and investment, particularly at a time of US recession that 
followed the high energy costs caused by the oil embargo of 1973/4, 
represented hard evidence of Saudi Arabia's co-operation with US 
wishes to ease the problem of trade imbalances and enhance US 
financial stability. The factor of 'issue area' can adequately 
explain Saudi Arabia's acceding to US wishes for increased trade and 
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investment, given the desire to encourage the US to provide military 
assistance necessary for Saudi military weakness. Investment in the 
US would also generate income necessary for Saudi's own financial 
stability. It is in Saudi Arabia's interest that its development 
plans be carried out by US skilled labour and high technology. Saudi 
Arabia has few avenues for investment on its soil, and therefore it 
is a practical financial judgement to invest its surplus funds in the 
West which might give the best chances for the protection and 
security of its assets and investments.{88} 
Saudi Arabia, as I stated earlier, acquired three major types of 
military aircraft from the US in 1975, 1978 and 1981. Therefore, 
Saudi/American co-operation agreements on trade and investment in 
early and mid-1974 preceded all the previous arms deals. 
Consequently, Saudi Arabian co-operation with US interests on trade 
and investment occurred before the arms deals. If US influence was 
suggested by this co-operation, then Saudi Arabia's economic 
behaviour was influenced by US wishes. This means there was a 
compatibility between certain US interests and Saudi economic 
behaviour. 
Although the evidence supports the compatibility relationship 
between American interests and Saudi economic behaviour in terms of 
co-operation from the former towards the latter, the question that 
might rise now is whether the economic co-operation of Saudi Arabia 
is a function of US arms transfers. Clearly the answer is no, 
especially since the two main agreements guiding the trade 
relationships between the two countries existed before any major arms 
deals. The US government, to aid Saudi, deployed its lend-lease 
programme in the 1940s, and further helped by giving technical 
assistance in setting up a financial and bureaucratic infrastructure 
in the 1950s. Therefore, following my reasoning above, trade and 
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investment connections between the US and Saudi Arabia are not a 
function of arms transfers. Although arms transfers may have 
contributed to the strengthening of the relationship between the two 
countries, they could not be regarded as the sole determining factor 
in the decision of Riyadh to promote trade and investment in 
Washington. Trade and investment only blossoms in an atmosphere of 
confidence and trust which can only be built over a period of years. 
As stated earlier, Saudi Arabia and the United States preferred 
capitalism. This mutual ideological value and commitment could not 
be better demonstrated than in the terms of economic connection 
between the two countries. Here again, Washington and Riyadh closely 
collaborated to protect Saudi Arabia's investment in the United 
States. This move displayed the Saudi Arabian adherence to a 
capitalist economic system. On the other hand, by investing a larger 
percentage of her petro-dollars in the United States, Saudi Arabia 
strengthened the hands of the United States in discouraging any 
future hostile government in Riyadh. What is of interest to me in 
this thesis is the level of economic co-operation between Riyadh and 
Washington, and the immediate question of the long period of the 
relationship. Arms transfers in the short term can hardly achieve 
this. 
III United States Interests and Saudi Arabia Behaviour: The 
Strategic linkage 1973-1983 
Despite the active collaboration between Saudi Arabia and the 
United States on oil and economic issues, Saudi Arabia defected from 
US Middle East strategy for regional security, on the grounds that 
supporting such security plans would carry heavy political costs. 
This aspect of Saudi Arabian behaviour followed the pattern already 
set by Riyadh in the 1960s, when she refused to renew the lease of 
its Dhahran airbase to the Americans. For Saudi Arabia, it appeared 
(263) 
that collaboration at the level of oil and the economy were 
considered of fundamental interest to both countries, whereas 
supporting Washington's Middle East strategy was considered to have a 
heavy political cost at home and abroad. For political reasons, 
Saudi Arabia then opposed such security plans, particularly those 
which involved Israel. (89) 
At a time of increased regional insecurity upon the fall of the 
Shah of Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Saudi 
Arabia refused to co-operate with two major US security arrangements 
which included the Persian Gulf Strategy of 1980 (seeking regional 
military accesses) and the Strategic Consensus of 1981 (mobilizing 
regional defense pacts).(90) While the Saudis remained supportive, 
though not in public, of bolstering of a US "over the horizon" 
presence as an exercise of the US global strategic role, they 
declined to any American attempts to increase a force presence in the 
region or any suggestion of joint military co-operation, or the 
basing of US forces on Saudi soil.(91) This provided evidence of 
Saudi Arabian lack of co-operation vis-a-vis vital US strategic 
interests. Why did Saudi Arabia refuse to co-operate militarily with 
the US plans despite the fact that the US provided Saudi Arabia with 
three major military aircraft in 1975, 1978 and 1981? 
Before one might answer this question one might examine the 
refusal of Saudi Arabia to co-operate within the context of these 
previous major arms deals. Saudi Arabia received F-5s in 1975 and 
F-15s in 1978, and then rejected the American-sponsored Persian Gulf 
Strategy in 1980, then received AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment in 
1981, then resisted the US Strategic Consensus in 1982. Therefore, 
Saudi Arabian refusal of military co-operation with the United States 
occurred after the major military aircraft transfers. 
If influence is suggested, as stated in Chapter One, by 
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recipients' co-operation towards suppliers' interests, then Saudi 
Arabian behaviour could be best described as incompatible with US 
strategic interests. 
Although the evidence implies the incompatibility between US 
strategic interests and Saudi Arabia's behaviour, in terms of lack of 
co-operation of the latter towards the interests of the former, the 
factor of 'issue area' might provide me with an adequate explanation 
for such lack of co-operation, ie the primary motives behind Saudi 
Arabian lack of co-operation towards United States strategic 
interests. These primary motives are as follows: 
1 While US security policy usually operates openly and formally 
and in an atmosphere of media exposure, Saudi Arabia security 
policy, like most of the Third World countries, is kept secret 
and informal. Thus, Saudi Arabia would seek to avoid an open 
action that would make her display ties with the United States. 
2 Though Saudi Arabia would welcome a US firm stand against Soviet 
expansion, she would like to see US military access to bases 
over-the-horizon but not on her soil. This would avoid Arab 
criticisms that call for an absence of foreign military presence 
in Arab territories. 
3 Since the United States signed an agreement on strategic 
co-operation with Israel, this would make Saudi Arabia guilty of 
an alliance with Israel by being seen to support US military 
policy. This would probably not only weaken her stand at home, 
but would limit her diplomatic manoeuvering essential to her 
security in the region. 
4 While the Carter Administration in the US, and Israel, 
considered the Camp David formula as the only basis for a 
settlement in the Middle East, general Arab attitudes, including 
Saudi Arabia's, were in oPPosition to this formula. Therefore, 
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Saudi Arabia's refusal to co-operate with US strategic wishes 
could be understood within this context. 
5 Since the Reagan Administration considered the Israeli 
settlement in the Arab occupied lands as an obstacle to peace 
but not illegal, if Saudi military policy aligned itself with US 
policy it would jeopardise her influential position in Arab as 
well as Islamic worlds. 
6 Then the question of how much Saudi Arabia trust the United 
States to be consistent in its support, especially military, to 
Saudi Arabia. The answer is not too much, it seems - one can at 
least in part explain why Saudi Arabia refused the Dhahran 
airbase extension (and other cases) by pointing out that if 
Saudi Arabia pretty much broke with its Middle East neighbours, 
and threw its lot with the US, it would then tend to need a 
permanent US military presence to ensure its (Saudi Arabia's) 
security. Presumably, because it thought that the US would not 
remain totally loyal to Saudi Arabian security needs and would 
be tempted to pullout at any suitable juncture, the Saudis 
could not afford to be seen wholly in accord with US military 
desires and intentions. 
A crucial question which must be answered is whether Saudi 
Arabia's refusal to support both the US Persian Gulf Strategy of 1980 
and the Strategic Consensus of 1981 can be termed a failure of 
American arms transfer policy to achieve influence. As has been 
repeatedly stated, arms suppliers (in this case the USA) never stated 
a specific intention to use a given arms supply to influence the 
recipient to pursue a particular line on a given policy. 
Nevertheless, it is difficult for there not to be a spillover effect 
on other issues than the issue mainly affected by arms transfers. 
Thus Saudi Arabia's refusal to support American strategic positions 
(266) 
in the Middle East should be perceived as the inevitable result of 
the relationship between the two countries, each with its own defined 
but irreducible compled of interests. To start to find a connection 
between Saudi Arabia's refusal to support the American strategic 
position and Washington arms supplies to Saudi Arabia should be 
understood within the context of the overall Riyadh/ Washington 
relationship, including the arms factor. 
IV United States Interests and Saudi Arabia Behaviour: The 
Political Axis 1973-1983 
The United States perceived the Middle East as a major foreign 
policy area. Both for domestic purposes, because of the ethnic 
affinity between the American Jews and the state of Israel, and for 
its economic interests in terms of oil, the United States believed it 
must always be seen to act even handedly so as to pursue the 
objective of achieving regional peace and stability in the Middle 
East. Consequently, Washington has always sponsored peace proposals. 
The United States always regarded these proposals as important, 
especially because they were practical efforts designed to resist 
Soviet influence in the Middle East region. The primary US peace 
initiatives in the Middle East from 1973 to 1983 are as follows: 
1 Sinai II Agreement 1975 
The first major political proposal was the Sinai II Agreement of 
1975 which followed the 1973 Israeli-Arab war. Its purpose was 
to enforce a further retreat of Israel's forces along the Suez 
Canal as a precursor towards peace negotiations between the two 
countries. The agreement provided for the following: 
a) The withdrawal of Israeli forces from two strategic passes 
in Sinai, Gidi and Mitla. 
b) An operation of radar warning systems for the Gidi and 
Mit1a passes by the US technicians. 
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c) An expansion of UN neutral zone stationed between Israeli 
and Egyptian forces according to the terms of Sinai I 
Agreement. 
d) An approval of Egypt to permit the passage of non-military 
cargoes bound for Israel through the Suez Canal.(92) 
The Sinai II Agreement, which was directly initiated by the US 
Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, with consultation with the 
Saudis(93), was endorsed by Riyadh. The treaty was, in fact, 
described by Saudi Arabia as an important step in the right 
direction towards a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. (94) Saudi Arabia did not stop at mere endorsement; 
Riyadh also helped to persuade Syria, who had objected to 
Egypt's unilateral move, to accept the treaty. To encourage the 
Syrians to support this policy, Riyadh provided financial aid 
and recognised Syria's prominent role to lead an Arab deterrent 
force in Lebanon. (95) However, it may be noted, Syria in 
reality only made a nodding acquaintanceship with the Treaty to 
which she was, from the beginning, a reluctant signatory. 
2 Camp David Accords 1978 
President Jimmy Carter's sponsored Camp David Accords were not 
popular with the Saudis who rejected them(96) despite President 
Carter's efforts to get the Saudis to support the Accords. (97) 
According to the Accords, Egypt would regain sovereignty over 
Sinai up to the pre-1967 border, while Israel would withdraw 
its armed forces from Sinai. They also provided for freedom of 
navigation for Israel through the Suez Canal and the Strait of 
Tiran. (98) Other highlights of the treaty include: 
a) Limitation of Egyptian armed forces to one division 
(mechanised or infantry) within fifty kilometers east of 
the Gulf of Suez and the Suez Canal. 
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b) Withdrawal of Egyptian forces on the remaining part of 
Sinai. 
c) Limitation of Israeli military forces to four infantry 
battalions within three kilometers east of the 
international border. 
d) Deployment of United Nations forces to be stationed within 
an area lying west of the international border and the Gulf 
of Agaba, varying in width from 20-40 km. 
e) Peace treaty between Egypt and Israel to include full 
diplomatic recognition, economic and cultural 
relationships, termination of economic boycotts and 
barriers to the free movement of goods and people. (99) 
The Camp David Accords also provided autonomy for the 
inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. A tripartite 
agreement between Israel, Egypt and Jordan was to establish for 
the inhabitants an elected self-governing autonomy 
(administrative council) in the area, and Israeli armed forces 
were to be withdrawn from inhabited locations and be redeployed 
to specified security areas. According to the Accords, once the 
self-governing authority has been established a transitional 
period of five years was to begin. By the end of this five-year 
period, the final status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip would 
be determined. Finally, Palestinian refugees would be returned 
to the West Bank and Gaza Strip with the unanimous approval of 
Israel, Egypt, Jordan and the self-governing authority.(IOO) 
Clearly the implementation of the Accords would involve official 
diplomatic recognition to Israel by Egypt in return for the 
latter's right to repossess Sinai. However, it failed to provide 
for a Palestinian homeland in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The 
treaty also failed to demand Israeli withdrawal from the Syrian 
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'Golan Heights' or the Saudi 'Tiran and Sinafir Islands' 
occupied by Israel since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. These 
treaties' shortcomings might then arouse Arab opposition. Due 
to general Arab opposition and the pressures on Egypt, who faced 
almost total isolation in the Arab world, Riyadh had no option 
but to oppose the treaty. 
3 Reagan's Palestine Program 1982 
This plan, which was a direct follow-up to the Camp David 
Accords, was equally rejected by Saudi Arabia.(101) The core of 
this proposal, considered generally unacceptable by the Arabs, 
was the provision that Palestinian autonomy was to be 
administratively co-ordinated by Jordan, and the plan's position 
on the status of Jerusalem was ambivalent. (102) This was an 
obvious contradiction of the official position of the majority 
of the Arab states, which endorsed at the Fez meeting in 1982 a 
proposal calling for the establishment of a Palestinian state in 
the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip with Jerusalem as its 
capital.(103) The 1982 Fez proposal was largely based on the 
1981 Fahd eight-point Peace Plan. Though the Fez proposal was 
not as forthcoming as the original Fahd Plan(104) it had the 
merit of Arab majority consensus, contained an indirect 
recognition of Israel (in Point Seven), and was not totally 
incompatible with the Camp David Accords of 1978, at least as a 
negotiating position. Thus, although the Saudis, who failed to 
get Arab endorsement in 1981, saw their efforts were successful 
in 1982, for their part the Americans were encouraged by Saudi 
Arabia's implicit recognition of Israel as a country with whom 
to negotiate. (105) 
4 Lebanese-Israeli Agreement 1983 
In a move inconsistent with its earlier positions on Middle East 
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politics, Saudi Arabia provided tacit support to President 
Reagan's sponsored Lebanese-Israeli Agreement of 1983 which 
provided for Lebanese recognition of the state of Israel. 
Lebanon was to sop the use of its soil as a base for military 
actions against Israel. Finally, Israel withdrew its forces 
from lebanon. (106) In a tacit approval of the agreement, Saudi 
Arabia persuaded Syria to soften its position on the American-
sponsored withdrawal agreement.(107) 
Here again, Saudi Arabia was consistent in following the pattern 
of behaviour already laid down pre-1973. Riyadh displayed some 
flexibility in its relationship with the United States. 
Nevertheless, this relative flexibility towards US diplomatic 
initiatives was always dependent on the possible impact such 
flexibility would have on its inter-Arab politics. 
Saudi Arabia's behaviour towards US sponsored diplomatic 
initiatives revealed endorsement as well as lack of endorsement. On 
the one hand, Saudi's endorsement of Sinai II and Lebanese-Israel 
Agreements in 1975 and 1983 provided evidence of Saudi Arabia's 
co-operation towards American diplomatic interests. On the other 
hand, Saudi Arabia's rejection of Camp David and Reagan's Palestine 
Program in 1978 and 1982 provided evidence of a lack of co-operation 
on the Saudi behalf towards US diplomatic proposals. 
If influence is defined by recipients' co-operation towards 
suppliers' interests, then Saudi Arabian behaviour could be best 
described as compatible in the one case and incompatible in the 
other. However, Saudi Arabia's compatibility or incompatibility with 
major US diplomatic initiatives from 1973 to 1983 in the Middle East 
could be explained through the factor of 'issue area', i.e. the 
primary motives behind Saudi Arabian endorsement of some American 
initiatives and its rejection of others. Among the primary motives 
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are the following: 
1 Saudi Arabia's support for Sinai II and Lebanese-Israeli 
Agreements would keep the Soviet influence out of the Middle 
East peace process (compatible with US wishes). Also stalemate 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict might lead to a military 
confrontation in which Saudi Arabia would find itself. Finally, 
Saudi Arabia's ability to get Syria (a key political actor in 
the region) to approve the previous agreements would minimise 
Saudi Arabian political costs in the Arab world. 
2 Saudi Arabia's lack of support for Camp David and Reagan's 
Program Agreements in 1978 and 1982 were perceived as follows: 
a) Camp David Accords alienated most of the Arab world from 
the US and thereby could have increased Saudi vulnerability 
if she had wished to tie itself with US diplomatic 
proposals. 
b) Fear of retaliation from radical Arab groups, or Arab 
hard-liners like Syria. 
c) Feeling of kinship towards Arabism and obligation to 
Palestinian cause. 
d) Both the Camp David Accords and Reagan's Palestine Plan 
failed to establish a comprehensive peace that restored 
Arab-occupied lands and established an independent 
Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. 
As the main objective of this thesis is the relationship between 
arms transfers and political influence, the crucial question that 
arises is whether Saudi Arabia's endorsement of the US sponsored 
initiatives (Sinai II 1975 and Lebanese-Israeli Agreement 1983) is a 
function of arms transfers, or whether Saudi's refusal to endorse 
both the other major American proposals (Camp David 1978 and Reagan's 
Palestine Plan 1982) is meant to illustrate a failure of arms 
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transfers. (This of course is based upon the standard hypothesis, 
that arms transfers initiate and shape political behaviour.) The 
answer to both questions is no, particularly when Saudi Arabia's 
endorsement of the former proposals occurred after the approval of 
the transfers of F-5s (1975) and AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipment 
(1981). By the same token Saudi Arabia's rejection of the Camp 
David/ Reagan Palestine Plan agreements also occurred after the 
approval of the last two arms supplies. Saudi Arabia's refusal to 
endorse American sponsored diplomatic initiatives should be seen as 
an inevitable result of a complex relationship between the two 
countries, each with its own defined interests. 
Conclusion 
Taken as a whole this chapter has tried to establish that there 
was a consistent pattern in the Saudi behaviour over the years. It 
might be recalled that I divided the interacting issue areas between 
the two countries into fundamental and secondary areas. 
In the case of fundamental issues such as oil and 
trade/investment, Saudi Arabia followed a consistent policy of 
supporting American interests. On the other hand, where secondary 
strategic/political issues were involved, Saudi Arabia showed 
inflexibility towards the former and some degree of flexibility 
towards the latter. Therefore, Riyadh's co-operation strategy was 
only affected when it suited her, i.e. when her interests coincided 
with the US and at no political cost. The question of whether arms 
transfers succeeded in producing influence on Saudi's co-operation 
vis-a-vis US interests, or failed to produce influence and thereby 
lack of co-operation, was demonstrated within a 50-year span of 
US/Saudi relations. What are the implications of these findings? Do 
or do they not support the assumption that the link of arms transfers 
to political influence depend on the issue area involved? The answer 
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to these questions and others will form the basis of our next, 
concluding chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
The preceding investigation in Chapter Five has analysed US 
attempts to use arms transfers to influence Saudi Arabia foreign 
policy behaviour (1973-1983). Our investigation has confirmed the 
importance of that means of influence during this period. It has 
been suggested that influence should be seen within the context of a 
long mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. 
This holds true both for Saudi Arabian foreign policy outcomes and 
for the US decision-making in attempting to influence Saudi behaviour 
with arms transfers. This concluding chapter will review major 
implications of arms/influence in the United States/Saudi Arabia 
relationship, and then attempt to draw some generalisations for use 
in the future. 
The predominant arena of existing analysis embodied in the 
academic studies of William Quandt, Thomas Wheelock, Uri Ra'anan, 
Roger Pajak and others is concerned with the arms/influence 
relationship in a variety of different countries, but they have not 
adequately discussed the US/Saudi Arabia relations. 
As I stated in the thesis, the previous scholarly studies of 
arms transfers do not suggest that they are always without value as 
part of political discourse, but that the effectiveness of the arms 
transfers to produce desirable results is unlikely to be wholly 
positive. If there are any results, they are likely to be restricted 
as William Quandt and Thomas Wheelock have observed with regard to 
the US arms supplies to Israel, and Uri Ra'anan and Roger Pajak have 
observed as regards Soviet arms transfers to Arab states. 
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Despite the lack of persuasive evidence, the United States 
government continued to use arms transfers as a primary foreign 
policy measure for maintaining and expanding its interests, in this 
case with Saudi Arabia. 
Academic studies have examined the arms/influence relationship 
from different aspects. I have investigated the use of arms 
transfers by the United States to gain political influence on Saudi 
foreign policy behaviour in conjunction with other variables/factors: 
arms and influence is understood within a much broader context. 
Among the variables that I have suggested are as important as arms 
transfers in determining US ability to achieve its interests in Saudi 
Arabia, are Saudi Arabia's alternative sources of arms supplies, 
Saudi Arabia's involvement in Middle East conflicts, and Saudi 
Arabia's 'policy priority' or 'value orientation' - how much and for 
what reasons Saudi Arabia values the interests that the US attempt to 
achieve via the transfer of arms. From the supplier's side, I have 
examined the legal, Executive and Congressional instruments and 
manoeuvres which enabled or impeded arms sales to be made. 
The examination of arms/influence in the US/Saudi Arabia 
relations 1973-1983 has revealed significant results. Among these 
are: US attempts at influence via arms transfers are more successful 
in areas of oil and trade than in the areas of diplomacy and have 
achieved little in regard to its military and defense plans. 
The examination of Saudi oil policy within OPEC indicated a 
deliberate and consistent policy by Saudi Arabia to induce a 
reduction of oil prices and adequate 011 supplies to the 1st. A 
primary example was the sponsoring of a resolution to reduce oil 
price from $10.84 to $10.46 per barrel at the 1974 Vienna 
Conference. (1) This was a response to US concern about the high 
prices of oil. In January 1975, the US administration agreed to sell 
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sixty F-Ss to Saudi Arabia. In the 1978 Abu Dhabi Conference Saudi 
Arabia announced an increase in production from 8.3 mbd to 9.5 
mbd.(2) Immediately prior to this had been Iranian domestic unrest 
and US concern about the uncertainty of oil supplies from the Gulf. 
Earlier in Hay 1978, US Congress approved the sale of sixty F-ISs to 
Saudi Arabia after which Saudi oil production increased. The high 
production of oil during the Iran-Iraq war, which broke out in 
September 1980, stood at 9.9 mbd up from 9.5 mbd. (3) This continued 
high oil production forced down the spot market oil price from $40 
per barrel in December 1980 to $32 in June 1981.(4) Five months later 
the US Congress approved the Reagan administration's proposal to sell 
AWACS/F-15s Enhancement Equipmnt to Saudi Arabia. 
If influence, as defined in Chapter One, is the obtaining of a 
recipient's co-operation by the suppliers' actions which the 
recipient would not otherwise have done, then the three primary 
examples revealed a remarkable Saudi co-operation in oil 
price/production with the US wishes. The apparent deduction from 
these examples is that there is a direct relationship between US arms 
supplies and Saudi Arabia oil policy especially when Saudi oil 
co-operation occurs before and after the sale of major US weapons 
systems. However, it is difficult to establish a firm causal basis 
to such a relationship. Indeed, the three major arms deals - F-5s, 
F-ISs and AWACS/F-15 Enhancement - could be taken as evidence of 
coerced or simple exchange relationships, for instance as a reward to 
Saudi Arabia for its conformity to US demands in regard to oil 
policy. By implementing a policy of stable prices and high 
production, Saudi Arabia tried to ensure the dependence of the west 
on their oil. Instead of the West looking to conservation measures, 
the West would still depend on Saudi 011 at reasonable prices and in 
adequate quantities. 
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Full Saudi oil production (12 mbd.) would oblige other OPEC 
countries to follow the Saudi wishes, otherwise Saudi could use her 
controlling share of oil resources to enforce compliance and thereby 
control the decisions of the OPEC cartel anyway. 
When oil prices are low, it is tempting to leave the oil 
underground, yet Saudi Arabia can produce massively whatever the 
fortunes of the market. Though as I noted in Chapter Four, actual 
oil production rose and fell markedly in the period of 1973-1983. 5 
Why does it do this? largely because Saudi wants to retain its' 
share of the market, the West's trust and also her high revenue. 
Even though marginal profits may fall close to zero in a weak market, 
the opportunity costs of not producing are, by implication, more than 
would be incurred by producing, over time. Reduction of the oil 
output would strain Western economies and little serve Saudi 
interests. Were Saudi to reduce oil output, it would place in 
question military and security ties with the US. There is of course 
a bi-lateral price dependence between US and Saudi Arabia in terms of 
oil and arms, due to the fact that if the price of oil rises, then 
the increased costs will be passed on to the US manufacturer of arms, 
(as well as much of the rest of the US industrial sector). 
But there is a limit in regard to the harmony of interests. 
Saudi Arabia can allow an oil price rise if there is a growth in the 
US economy and a slowdown in inflation, because America's capacity to 
buy oil at a higher price 1s then greater. In 1982, Saudi Arabia 
sold its oil at $34 per barre1 6 and claimed that they were still 
serving US interests, despite the significant rise in the oil price. 
Before I recap on the pre-1973 period, we must hold clear in our 
minds, the point, that after 1973 Saudi Arabia/US co-operation was 
high and distinctly harmonious in the area of oil. 
With the exception of the oil concession of 1933, Saudi 
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co-operation with the US commercial interests was significant, as 
shown in Chapter Five. There was a series of Saudi/American clashes 
beginning in 1950, when Saudi Arabia gained a 50/50 profit-sharing 
agreement with Aramco, and then the 1954 Satco affair where Saudi 
Arabia attempted to be independent of American oil companies in oil 
transportation and marketing. Finally the Saudi-led forming of OPEC 
in 1960. OPEC of course wished to establish oil-producing countries 
right's to oil exploitation, production, and marketing. In 1972 
Saudi Arabia succeeded in gaining a 2S% stake in Aramco equity. Not 
least, there was a major clash of interests upon the oil embargo in 
1973. 
In regard to trade and investment, the results of our 
investigation have indicated that since the energy crisis of 1973, 
the United States has benefitted from Saudi investment due to the 
1974 Investment Guaranties Agreement which facilitated the investment 
of Saudi revenue surpluses in the US in the form of purchase of US 
government bonds, notes and treasury bills, estimated at between 
$40-60 billion. The 1974 Co-operation Agreement in the areas of 
economics and defense also helped to buy American goods, and procured 
the transfer of services needed to achieve Saudi five-year 
development plans. 
The above two primary agreements occurred at a time of a 
recession in the US which itself was partly due to high energy costs. 
The agreements indicated Saudi co-operation towards US economic 
interests. This co-operation preceded the transfer of US military 
aircraft, F-Ss, F-lS's and AWACS/F-IS Enhancement equipment in 1975, 
1978 and 1981. The predominance of a co-operative strategy by Saudi 
Arabia toward the US in the face of the potential strength of its 
bargaining position over the US, and the likelihood of a political 
profit accruing by a defiance of US wishes in terms of Saudi Arabia's 
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popularity with her radical anti-US near neighbours, 
persistence of influence by the US over Saudi Arabia. 
implies the 
This Saudi 
behaviour also shows the Saudi desire to encourage the US to increase 
military aid. 
Saudi investment in the US, generated additional income necessary 
for continuing its' development plan. Due to scarcity of avenues of 
domestic investment and the 'political' restraint on trading with 
other states, Saudi Arabia's investment in the United States is 
unsurprising. 
The economic co-operation of the two countries was a function not 
only of arms transfers, but it was predicated by the initiation of 
the US lend-lease programme of 1943, and the financial technical 
assistance of the 1950's. Arms transfer, however, did play an 
important role in cementing the economic relationship. Trade and 
investment flourished in an atmosphere of confidence and trust which 
was built over a period of years. I re-iterate that Saudi Arabia and 
the US believed in the capitalist systems. Saudi Arabia, in 
investing in the US with a larger percentage of her surplus 
petro-dollars, enhances the mutual fiscal strength of the respective 
countries. The investment's return could then be used for economic 
modernisation in Saudi Arabia and thus, by implication, for the 
internal political stability of Saudi Arabia through the provision of 
public welfare services. 
In regard to its security and defense policy, the US achieved 
very little in supplying arms to Saudi Arabia. This aspect of 
behaviour followed a pattern already established in the early 1960's 
when Saudi Arabia refused to allow the further use of its' Dhahran 
Airbase. Therefore the Saudia Arabian refusal to Join the 1980 
Persian Gulf Security Plan as well as the 1981 US strategic 
consensus, despite US arms transfers, implied the awareness of the 
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high political costs that Saudi Arabia would have to pay if she 
approved the plans. The 1958 deposing of the Iraqi monarchy 
predicated upon its collusion with the Western Military Alliance -
the Baghdad Pact, served as a reminder and a warning to the Saudi 
Monarchy of the possible consequences of too close a relationship 
with Western powers. In addition despite Saudi approval of the US 
stand against the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, her preference 
for not having US bases on her soil because of the criticism which 
having them would bring from her neighbours, still remained, and any 
military alliance with the US implied a direct alliance with Israel 
who was a signatory to the US strategic consensus. This then would 
damage Saudi's position and influence with respect to her Arab 
states. The uncertainty of Saudi Arabia as regard to US military 
intentions has been justified in several cases. For instance the US 
failed to back its' friends and allies in the Third World countries 
when they were facing domestic opposition, despite its' military 
interests in those countries, e.g. Somoza of Nicaragua, and the Shah 
of Iran. Saudi Arabia from her pOint of view had to appear to 
maintain a sovereign independence, and this she did at crucial 
junctures such as in 1973-1974. She successfully ran the gauntlet 
between her concern at losing full US military help and her fear of 
strong adverse reaction by her Arab neighbours, many of whom held 
oppositional ideologies or political beliefs. 
Saudi's lack of co-operation with the US military plans cannot be 
necessarily termed as the failure of US arms transfers to achieve 
influence on Saudi behaviour, because the US never openly stated that 
specific arms transfers were intended to achieve certain objectives. 
Thus, Saudi Arabian refusal to support all aspects of the US military 
policy in the Middle East is an inevitable result of the relationship 
of the two countries, each having a defined, but complex set of 
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interests. Thus, US arms transfers not achieving complete Saudi 
military co-operation must be understood within the context of the 
overall relationship between the two countries, and not in crude 
terms of policy failure. 
The evidence provided in Chapter Five also suggests relative 
success of US diplomatic policy on Saudi behaviour through arms 
transfers, i.e. Saudi Arabia endorsed the US sponsored 1975 Sinai II 
and the 1983 lebanese-Israeli agreements, but refused to back the 
1978 Camp David Agreement or the 1982 Reagan Plan on Palestine. 
Influence - as co-operation or compliance - was achieved in some 
cases but not in others. 
Saudi endorsement of the first two US sponsored agreements was 
based on the Saudi attempt to involve the Americans in the peace 
process, and thereby excise Soviet influence on regional settlements. 
Solving the Arab-Israeli conflict peacefully would also have 
prevented Saudi Arabia from gradually being dragged into that 
conflict. Saudi Arabia's success in bringing about the endorsement 
by Syria of Sinai II, would have reduced Arab antagonism towards 
Saudi Arabia. For them, any compliance of Soviet-backed Syria with 
an America-led initiative would have tended to undermine or weaken 
Syrian ties with the Soviet Union. 
Saudi lack of support of the last two initiatives was based on 
the Saudi insistence that the Arab-Israeli conflict could only be 
settled within the context of recognition of Palestinian rights for 
self-determination as well as the return of the third Islamic shrine 
_ Jerusalem. Thus, Saudi non-endorsement of the Camp David and 
Reagan programme emphasised Saudi Arabia's essential affinity to the 
Arab and Islamic worlds. 
Again it is difficult to establish a linkage between US arms 
transfers and Saudi Arabia's approval/disapproval of US sponsored 
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diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. But to gain a purchase on 
an understanding of Saudi behaviour, one must see it within the 
context of the complex relationship between the two countries which 
has existed over the past five decades. However, the overarching 
themes as I established earlier on, are the US' recognition of her 
need for oil, and Saudi Arabia's need for military aid as Middle 
Eastern politics have become more fraught. 
The Arab oil embargo of 1973-74 following the October War, and 
the consequent high oil revenues it brought, changed the nature of 
the Saudi/American relationship. Suddenly Saudi Arabia not only 
became a relevant power in terms of oil and financial wealth, but the 
US gradually became more reliant on Saudi oil supplies and trade. 
Saudi provided a political Significance instrumental to US diplomacy, 
and strategic bases which facilitated the effectiveness of an 
increased US military presence in the region to protect the oil 
supplies. Thus the relationship shifted to being more equal than it 
had prior to 1973, i.e. the US needed Saudi Arabia nearly as much as 
Saudi Arabia needed the US. 
However, Saudi financial power was not matched by her military 
capability. Thus Saudi Arabia, in order to cope with this dilemma, 
used her new wealth in a series of strategies intended to reduce 
external threats and internal vulnerabilities; namely through US 
security assistance and development aid. 
Saudi Arabia purchased advanced weapons systems and attempted to 
build a military infrastructure in order to enhance her defence 
capabilities. Indeed by 1980, Saudi was rated sixth in the world's 
annual military expenditures, after the US, USSR, UK, West Germany 
and France. 7 
Saudi military expansion has had continuing assistance from her 
primary arms supplier, the US. From 1950-1972, Saudi signed military 
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equipment and construction agreements worth about $1 billion.8 
However, from 1973 to 1983, Saudi Arabia signed agreements for 
American arms supplies and military infrastructure construction worth 
$40 billion. 9 Out of this, S12 billion went on the purchase of 
advanced weapons and their services such as F-S's, F-lS's and 
AWACS/F-15 enhancement in 1975, 1978 and 1981 respectively. 
In supplying assistance to Saudi Arabia, the US attempted to 
secure its' national interests, not least in respect of oil supplies 
at reasonable prices and adequate quantities, trading advantages, 
access to military facilities and support for regional diplomatic 
initiatives. 
If the level of such arms transfers is a measure of influence on 
Saudi it would seem intuitively that the US's influence on Saudi 
Arabia was wide and considerable, yet as I have argued, in certain 
areas it was restrained and limited. The US was able to influence 
Saudi Arabia mainly in oil and commerce, but had a far lesser 
influence on the diplomatic sphere, and none in the military, (e.g. 
the strategic consensus). In the pre-1973 period, US economic and 
military assistance influenced Saudi behaviour such that they agreed 
to US military bases on Saudi Arabia; however the diplomatic 
initiatives, and the small portion of oil activities held less 
10 significance. 
The limited US influence (1973-1983) was due to Saudi attaining a 
bargaining position roughly equal to that of the US which diminished 
the leverage of arms supplier on arms recipients' policies. 
Influence weakens because recipients gain a clear idea of their 
over-riding interests which they will not sacrifice in favour of arms 
supplies. In recent years super-powers in the Third World have been 
requested to remove themselves in the wake of disputes between 
suppliers and recipients. This happened in regard both to US 
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presence in Turkey and the Soviet presence in Egypt. Yet again these 
moves were a result of regional and contextual reasons, i.e. 
nationalism, sovereignty and notions ons of self-determination, 
regional stability and local diplomacy. 
The US's relative success in some policy areas but not in others 
can be seen in terms of the staggered realisation by the suppliers 
that recipients have different policy perceptions to them. I call 
this accommodation and recognition to the new status of the 
recipients, rather than confrontation. 
Domestic American politics, the Congress and pressure groups such 
as the pro-Israeli lobby also played a role in diminishing US 
capacity to influence Saudi Arabia, since their pressure led the US 
administration to send low-level arms rather than sophisticated 
hardware in some cases, e.g. F-5's. The implication of this, of 
course, is that more powerful armaments lend more influencing power 
to suppliers over recipients. 
This examined extensively in Chapters Two and Three. The 
suppliers capacity to supply arms as I have shown, is accountable to 
the forms and forces of domestic politics. It is largely in the 
period after 1973 that the Congress asserted its' role in arms sale 
policy to the diminution of the Executives's control and hold over 
policy initiation and implementation. The consultation process 
generated countervailing interests and showed-up the uncertainties 
and incoherences in those policies. Up till 1973 there had been 
three main centres of policy control: Department of Defense, 
Department of State and the President. Though there was competition 
between the 000, and the DoS due in the main to the formal hierarchy 
of the DoS over the 000, though the 000 was obviously most concerned 
with arms sales, most arms sales issues were resolved within this 
triumvirate. However, after 1973, especially due to the Watergate 
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Affair which had weakened the symbolic power of the office of 
President, the Congress by a series of amendments to legal 
instruments governin9 arms sales insisted upon rights of oversight. 
The purpose of oversight was to examine whether arms sales 
policies were operating in line with stated US foreign policy 
interests and responsibilities to recipient countries with regard to 
the world military and political balance. Thus the measure of arms 
sales policy, especially to the Middle East, was in terms, not just 
of the rights of the Presidency, but also of the US position in 
relation to global concerns and foreign policy. This index was an 
attempt to reel in a succession of arms sales policies which had 
permitted most sales to whatever country, to go through. With the 
exception of the [stated policy] of the Carter Presidency, the Nixon, 
Ford and Reagan presidencies had encouraged the proliferation of arms 
sales. But in the light of a basic desire of Congress to check this 
open-door policy on arms sales, and the underlying 'moral' view that 
the spread of arms was more likely to lead to war situations, and the 
further destabilisation of already unstable regions, in particular 
the Middle East, the Congress/Executive split on this issue meant 
that a coherent policy was unlikely. 
The basic belief of successive Presidencies, that arms sales 
brings influence to bear upon reCipients, has been shown to be 
mistaken. It is not at all apparent that arms sales has a direct 
causal relationship with the procurement of influence. To effect 
influence requires an historical relationship between supplier and 
recipients. When a recipients' interests and regional relationship 
are challenged by a supplier's actions, then the recipient (Saudi 
Arabia) refuses to give the supplier (US) her needs (oil). Certainly 
the historical relationship between Saudi and the US remains intact 
in the sense that diplomatic relations have been maintained and 
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cracks quickly papered over, but the arms sales by themselves were 
not enough to bring about oil supplies. In other words, arms failed 
to act as direct causal agent for the procurement of the supplier's 
interests. Thus it is, that the arms for influence assumption, is at 
best weak, and is severely limited in its' effectiveness as a single 
tool of foreign policy. 
The findings of this thesis reassert the belief of all realist 
approaches that states seek power (influence) over other states to 
achieve their national interests. States use different instruments 
such as economic aid, force or arms transfers to influence other 
states. But, IS we illustrated in Chapter One, if states use arms 
transfers as instru.ents of foreign policy influence, effective 
influence must be seen as localised to the reCipient's valuation of 
supplier's interests. By the evidence shown, Saudi co-operation in 
some areas and lack of compliance in others, is part of the terrain 
of Saudi/American relations. Thus, depending on the issue area in 
question, influence is manifested. However it is difficult to 
conclude that Saudi co-operation towards some interests of the US is 
due to a single variable - arms transfers. Nevertheless, by the 
definition of influence, the US influenced Saudi behaviour in the 
area of oil. But this should be seen within the context of a long 
mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries. 
Influence occurs, but it is not directly related to arms transfers. 
Arms transfers reinforce the relationship instead of dictating it. 
Shahram Chubin his pOinted to the dual aspects of influence -
direct and indirect, local and historica1 11 as opposed to those, such 
as the US administration officials, who tend to think on terms of 
short-term political logic. One needs to point to the historical 
structure of beliefs, common political culture, trust, anticipations 
and expectations which co-ordinate US and Saudi Arabia's policy 
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towards each other. The long-term investment of friendship over the 
past fifty years has created a climate which, despite the Middle East 
regional struggles. has given the US grounds to expect that if 
pressure is applied. Saudi Arabia will broadly fall into line with US 
policy. America then. in fact, has a long-term influence over Saudi 
Arabia which cannot be erased just because Saudi Arabia has regional 
pressure placed upon her. She both knows or can anticipate American 
response to any situation in the Middle East, and lay the ground for 
placing herself between US interests and her neighbour's demands, at 
the same t1-. trying to be closer to the US anticipated position than 
to the position of her radical neighbours. It could be objected that 
her political and economic ideologies - conservative and capitalist 
in character - cause her to act in line with US interests anyway, but 
this, as a historical point, is not enough. The overlay of 
temporally local political issues has imposed a logic of strategical 
response in an unstable region, and the recognition of that stability 
and the security needs of her great oil wealth has pushed her toward 
seeking and securing 'superpower' protection. The ideological 
attitudes of Saudi Arabia may explain why she sought American help 
originally, but are not enough to explain the ongoing relationship. 
That is a response to lOre varied factors, historical and political. 
The thesis has analysed the form and function of (a) the 
influence/arms relationship, (b) the belief in a direct 
arms/influence relationship between Saudi Arabia and the US. Thus 
not only have I challenged the existing assumptions and intuitions on 
the relationship. but I have filled a surprising gap in the 
literature, that being the absence of an analysis of the US/Saudi 
Arabian arms transfer relationship. 
A 'realist' approach should work on the basis that states are 
dynamic interpreters rather than positivistically-inclined 
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fact-gatherers. The uncertainty of human judgment is the limit on 
truth, and for a 'realist' the recognition of this must always be 
there. 'Realists' have reflexively to take into account their, and 
other's subjective perceptions, beliefs and also well-confirmed 
statements in formulating foreign policy. They produce judgments, 
not facts which on the whole they take as subject to unexpected 
developments. Part of America's mistake in relation to Saudi Arabia, 
which forced a change in the US attitude was the overturning of the 
US decision-aakers entrenched view that arms produces influence 
without taking account of historical and contextual modifications. 
I have shown that this is the responsibility of decision-makers, 
not of scholars. Though the US initially assumed a crude realism of 
the execution and .aximisation of power, they learned that the 
decision process .ust be .are subtle. With increased pressures upon 
the President by Congress, pressure groups and reCipient response, 
crude real is. will no longer do, though of course, Reagan has 
attempted to return to this attitude. My notion of realism-in-use is 
an attempt to extend the meaning of realism to make it relevant to 
decision-makers, for they are the bearers of it. Realism is the 
doctrine of the US government, but this does not mean they are bent 
on a Dr. Strangelove approach to international relations. 
Realism-in-use is implicitly flexible. All that 1t really asserts 
is, that power is the main element of political, military and 
economic relations, and that is what is assumed by most 
decision-makers. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTDt SIX 
(1) see Chapter five. note 40. 
(2) ibid. note SS 
(3) ibid. note 76 
(4) ibid. note 78 
(5) BP, Statistical Review of World Energy. (london: British 
Petroleu.. 1985). p.5. 
(6) ibid. p.ll. 
(7) SIPRI, World Ar.l .. nts and Disar.a .. nts Yearbook 1983 (london: 
Taylor and Francis 1983). pp.162-163, 171-172. 
(8) 
(9) ibid. pp.I-2. 7-8, 13-16. 
(10) see Fig.7, Chapter Five. 
(11) -It is .istaken to see the .. nlpulatton of levers or instruments 
in the service of a specified goal. The overall relationship is 
i.portant and this consists of clearly identifiable short-term 
.utual interests together with less tangible long-term mutual 
interests. The relationship reselbles therefore a sophisticated 
dialogue rather than a sl.ple trading relationship- Cited in 
S.Chubin, securitf in the PerSian Gulf: The Role of Outside 
Powers. (London: Iss, 1982). pp.72-73 
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